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Guest Editorial: Critical Genocide and Atrocity Prevention Studies
The frustrations of a genocide scholar are many. Chief among them is what Keith Tester refers to as
the “rage” of the “incapacitated”1 – the paradox of having too much knowledge of human suffering
but finding our selves unable to do little more than shout, “something must be done!” Institutions
have become the primary moral agents for responding to terrible events like genocide, Tester notes,
adding “It is not just the world which has been wholly institutionalized; our imaginations and
horizons for moral action have been institutionalized as well.”2 We seek to influence governments
and other international actors to do something, and sometimes we even have suggestions as to
what they should do. We also educate and raise awareness so that there might be public pressure
that will spark the political will to act. But our action is always reliant on more powerful others to
take on the challenge. And this displacement of agency allows us what Tester calls a “conceit of
innocence,” as though our rage is enough to remove our guilt of living in a world that allows and
enables genocide.3
These frustrations are perhaps what led R.J. Rummel, an early contributor to the field of
genocide studies and author of Death by Government, to pen a series of novels that imagine timetravelling, alternative-universe-hopping lovers who are set on a course to prevent the worst human
atrocities.4 In the first book in the series, they seek to use their knowledge of genocide to create
a peaceful world. But the actions they are willing to take to achieve this goal often leave them
susceptible to Rummel’s broader message that power kills.5 The novel betrays both a longing
for meaningful intervention and a pessimism about the human condition. It should come as no
surprise that Rummel sought to work through his experience as a genocide scholar by imagining
counterfactual histories of key atrocity events.
Even when we are not working through fictional media, scholars are nonetheless engaged in
emplotting narratives of genocide and its prevention. We draw upon interpretive grids to make
meaning – frames – and within these frames we include the information necessary to present a
sensible picture of genocide and its possible prevention.6 In the editing work of frames-making,
information is, of course, left out. Characters are presented as inhabiting clear roles. The miseen-scène communicates the setting and the main line(s) of action. But beyond the frame, in what
Alexander Hinton refers to as the “gutter,” one finds other perspectives and experiences that have
been pushed out of sight.7
For this special issue, we invited scholars working in the centers and peripheries of genocide
studies to explore the gutters of prevention and to query what exists beyond our taken-for-granted
frames. We prodded them to engage in acts of scholarly transgression, reclaim their “imaginations
and horizons,”8 interrogate the given categories and methods of the field, and let tensions multiply.
They have done so to different extents and different ways but always as part of open dialogue,
first as part of a workshop, then in the process of peer review, and now in their iteration in this
special issue and your reading of it. It is for this reason that, from the start, we were committed to
publishing these essays in an open-access journal as opposed to one that lies behind a paywall or
in an edited book.
Keith Tester, Moral Culture (London: Sage, 1997), 7.
Ibid., 7.
3
Ibid., 8.
4
R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994); R.J. Rummel, War & Democide Never Again
(Plantation, FL: Llumina Press, 2004).
5
Rummel, War & Democide.
6
Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1974). See also Alexander Laban Hinton, The Justice Facade: Trials of Transition in Cambodia (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018) and Alexander Laban Hinton, Man or Monster? The Trial of a Khmer Rouge Torturer (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2016).
7
Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (2012), 4-15; Alexander
Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” in Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging Perspectives, ed. Joyce
Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja (New York: Routledge, 2013), 42-58.
8
Tester, Moral Culture, 7.
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Indeed, the paywall is perhaps an interesting way to consider the discipline of prevention,
which is not just predicated on a set of conventional frames but also organizational forms, funding
streams, status markers, domains of “influence,” vernaculars, political and institutional power,
and so forth – a “prevention paywall” if you will. Our intent as co-convenors of the workshop,
co-editors of this special issue, and co-authors of this introduction is to step into the gutters of
prevention and thereby help destabilize the frames undergirding this prevention paywall. It is an
endeavor that requires openness and dialogue, not foreclose.
To this end, this brief introduction offers four ways in which the contributors have stepped into
the gutters of prevention. We invite you to join us in our endeavor to rethink prevention, one that,
as with Rummel’s time-travelers, requires a willingness to reconsider the taken-for-granted and
envision new possibilities. If “capacity” refers to the ability to contain, it also suggests “intellectual
power” and ability creating “a possibility.”9 One modest response to the rage of the incapacitated
is to create such new possibilities by rethinking prevention.
Critique is Prevention
Critique is a first key pathway for this critical genocide studies and prevention. In the spirit of
Derrida, who defended his work against critics who suggested deconstruction is an amoral practice
unable to take a stand on key social issues, these contributors suggest that “critique is prevention.”
In the aftermath of the Paul de Man affair, when the literary scholar and practitioner of
deconstruction was discovered to have been a past Nazi sympathizer, embezzler and bigamist,
Derrida found not only his friendship with de Man, but his entire intellectual project called into
question.10 The fact that deconstruction undercuts the Western tradition of reasoned decisionmaking was viewed to authorize the unprincipled actions of de Man. More seriously, it potentially
placed Derrida among the camp of philosophers, such as Heidegger and Schmidt, perceived to be
in sway to authoritarianism.11 By refusing to privilege modern practices of judgment and reason,
deconstruction was accused of creating space for an authoritarian will to power to impose its own
order.
In a presentation to the Cardozo Law School, which would become his essay “Force of Law,”
Derrida offers a sophisticated apologia for deconstruction. The broader complexity of this essay is
beyond the scope of this introduction; what is most pertinent to our discussion is how he presents
the need for critical practices of deconstruction when contemplating justice as an “experience of
the impossible.” Because justice is never final or fixed, since it represents an ideal horizon that is
always “to come,” our efforts to achieve justice are simply calculations, or decisions, that attempt
to approximate justice.
This is where the “force” of law comes into play, as particular calculations of an incalculable
justice require the force of decision to assert them as universal law. Deconstruction, by offering a
technique for interrogating the arbitrary and “mystical” force of such decisions, provides a means
for keeping open aporias, or paradoxes, of justice so they are not facilely resolved.
For example, Derrida reflects on the aporia that we feel an urgency to act in the face of injustice
while, at the same time, we require an infinite amount of information to act justly. Any response
we make to a perceived injustice must be understood as a fallible, partial response. Deconstruction
ensures that any such decision to act will be subject to critical interrogation.12
What is genocide prevention if not a form of decision-making in the name of justice? In order to
imagine a possible intervention, researchers and policy-makers make multiple decisions, including
assessing which signs and signals denote an oncoming crisis and which counter-measures will be
9

“Capacity,” Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2007.

10

Matters were not helped by Derrida’s book Memoires: Pour Paul de Man (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1988), published shortly
after de Man’s death, which many read as an exculpatory treatise that took too lightly de Man’s antisemitism. Given
Derrida’s prior efforts to speak out against anti-Semitism, his delay in grappling critically with the de Man affair
caused a certain amount of disappointment, and led to further questioning of the ethics of deconstruction.

11

John McCormick, “Derrida on Law; Or, Poststructuralism gets Serious,” Political Theory 29, no. 3 (2001), 395-423.

12

Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,
eds., Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3–67.
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most effective in preventing atrocity crimes. There is a need to act, and questioning the decisions
that are made in a rush to prevent can seem impractical or even a distraction. But each act of
prevention is a fallible calculation, necessitating rather than ruling out critique.
As cultural theorist Gayatri Spivak has argued with respect to the genocide of the Rohingya,
there is also a need for impractical thinking in the face of genocide, since it is only through
imaginative, impractical thinking that we can approach an understanding of our common humanity
with a targeted Other like the Rohingya, while at the same time, granting them their own history.13
The contributors to this special issue call upon multiple critical theorists to argue for the
practicality of a seemingly impractical critique. Andrew Woolford, Adam Muller, and Struan
Sinclair reference Wendy Brown’s argument that critique is a means to prevent foreclosing the
present and stultifying imagination, in addition to employing Deleuze and Guattari’s language
of the molar and the molecular to critically assess predominant genocide prevention metaphors.
Ernesto Verdeja conjures up the spirit of the Frankfurt School and its emancipatory project in
contradistinction to allegedly value-free research. Alexander Hinton weaves Barthes, Foucault,
and Derrida into his recounting of critical prevention stories that operate to unpack some of
the baggage we bring with us to the study of genocide prevention. And Jobb Arnold gathers an
eclectic theoretical crowd of Sara Ahmed, Glen Coulthard, and Claudia Card, among others, in his
emphasis on fostering social vitality over simple prevention.
In each of these nods to well-known critical theorists, what we see is not rote application
of fashionable theory. Nor is it simply name-dropping for purposes of demonstrating cultural
capital. These theorists are not erected as part of a jargon-laden paywall meant to only allow the
initiated into this issue. Instead, concepts and ideas are redeployed to bring the spirit of critique
into genocide prevention studies. They are used to burst open familiar ways and patterns – that is,
to be for a moment, as Spivak urges, impractical so that new possibilities of practical thinking open
up within our field.
This is not to say that the research undertaken by those currently working on genocide
prevention is not in its own way critical. Certainly, when decisions are made about how to predict,
assess and respond to potential crises, critical tools are employed to assist in making a judgment.
This can be done, for example, by assuming there exists a normal or stable state of social life, and
measuring against this norm the destabilizing forces that portend a crisis.
Verdeja in this issue refers to this as the “teleology” of genocide prevention, which is often
a western liberal-democratic norm. This norm becomes the criterion against which the crisis,
and therefore need for prevention, is measured. The existence of such a norm allows for critical
evaluation to the extent that societal stability is assessed against this norm, enabling for criticisms
of those societies that fail to match the ideal.
This is not, however, the way we envision the idea that “critique is prevention.” While
critical work, such as that performed in most genocide prevention studies, engages in judgment
by evaluating a social situation against an expressed or unexpressed criterion, critique endeavors
to interrogate all criteria. Our sacred truths, our heretofore unexamined positionality, and (gasp)
maybe even Raphael Lemkin are exposed to questioning. Critique is prevention because, to return
to Derrida, it challenges the force of genocide studies and genocide prevention.
The force of genocide prevention refers to more than the violence of military intervention,
such as that carried out as a last resort under the Responsibility to Protect, as discussed by Daniel
Feierstein in this special issue. Military violence, as Feierstein shows, begets further violence,14 and
is too often distributed based on arbitrary (rather than just), self-interested criteria – such as when
Libya is selected for intervention while Honduras is not. But even when genocide prevention does
not reach the point of military intervention, it is still susceptible to performative contradiction
when not accompanied by critique.
In other words, it answers perceived violence with a violence of its own. This is arguably
a lesser violence, one that includes imposing meaning on complex situations, translating local
13

Gayatri Spivak, “Public Lecture: The Rohingya Issue in a Global Context,” Hollis E. Cornell Auditorium, Goldwin Smith
Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, October 30, 2017, accessed October 1, 2019, https://www.cornell.edu/video/
gayatri-spivak-rohingya-issue-global-context.

14

See also Alan Kuperman, “Did the R2P Foster Violence in Libya?” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2 (2019), 38-57.
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experiences into universal narratives, creating normative criteria for assessment based upon a
Western cosmology, and disguising self-interest and geopolitical maneuvering as justice. But it
is a violence, nonetheless, and one that threatens to undermine the ethos of genocide prevention,
which, in general, seeks to make room for collective vitality and flourishing.
When genocide prevention comes under question, perhaps as a form of neocolonialism or
geopolitics by other means, the ethos of genocide prevention is potentially compromised because
collective persistence is subsumed under other interests. Critique prevents genocide prevention
from ignoring its blind spots, becoming habituated to Western norms and reason, and failing to
imagine possibilities beyond the current geopolitical arrangement. Critique can even lead us to
question the basic axiological and categorical commitments that underpin the project of genocide
prevention, leading us to ask, among other questions: What is a group? Where do its boundaries
begin and end? What actions threaten its discussion? And which types of groups do we choose to
protect and which do we ignore?
Pathways to a Critical Genocide Prevention Studies
This sort of critique opens space for new visions of prevention, ones the contributors explore in
various ways even as this special issue offers only a sampling of the variety of interventions possible
through a critical genocide prevention studies lens. In addition to and often in the spirit of critique,
the essays that follow step into the gutters of prevention in various ways including by exploring:
a) Genealogies of Prevention and Interdisciplinary Modularity; b) Scalar Interventions and Chronotopes
of Genocide Prevention; c) The Practice and Performance of Critique; and d) Critical Epistemologies of
Prevention.
There are other possibilities for critique as prevention, some still to emerge, as one would
expect from a transgressive scholarly practice. Indeed, all of the papers presented here can and
should be pushed to take their critical project further. We invite readers of this journal to engage
and critique our work – in the open spirit of Roland Barthes’ “writerly” as opposed to the monologic
authority of “the readerly” – as Hinton discusses in his contribution.
Genealogies of Prevention and Interdisciplinary Modularity
A starting point for the critique of genocide prevention is quite often an examination of how we
got to the place we are at now. There is no one trajectory for understanding the development of
genocide prevention as a distinct subfield of investigation within the genocide studies discipline.
In this special issue, there are different, yet complementary genealogies of emergence. The
genealogical method involves unearthing the development of things we take for granted, such as
the logic of prevention, without assuming their naturalness or inevitability.15
In their paper, Woolford, Muller, and Sinclair examine the origin story of this journal and
the rationale Israel Charny and Roger Smith provided for including the word “Prevention” in its
title. They connect this idea of prevention, found also in Lemkin’s thought, to late modern “risk
society,” when tools of prediction and actuarial science fostered the sense that global risks could be
calculated, making intervention possible.
Verdeja emplots the rise of prevention slightly differently, situating it within a liberal
orientation and accompanied by an emergent human rights regime designed to establish
international rule of law. Feierstein, likewise, points to the growth of universal jurisdiction as a
means of breaking through the impunity that comes with an entrenched sovereignty. But he also
sees universal jurisdiction transformed into a global policing strategy as an “international criminal
justice approach” takes hold.
As Hinton reminds us in his article, there are many stories we tell ourselves about genocide
and prevention. This variance means there is also potential to use counter histories to emplot
critical genocide prevention studies in a different manner. These counter-histories need not solely
be studies of the emergence of genocide prevention. They can also focus on specific genealogical
moments. In this vein, Kerry Whigham in his article examines the notion that some conflicts are
“intractable” and how this language circumscribes the possibility of conflict transformation. Julia
15

Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans.
Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139-164.
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Zulver, as well, questions the representation of women in the genocide prevention literature solely
as peacemakers, and the consequences of this limiting role assignment. New stories can be told
about genocide prevention in a manner that opens space for critical insight.
Genealogical interventions arise not only through discussions within the discipline, but
also by broadening the field. Although genocide studies prides itself as a multidisciplinary field,
research in this field has traditionally been informed by a relatively narrow range of disciplines,
including political science, law, history, sociology, and psychology. There remain opportunities
for engagement with other fields. This is what we mean by Interdisciplinary Modularity as a form
of critical intervention. Through interdisciplinary bridging, expansion, or analogy, the habits and
assumptions of genocide studies can shift and grow.
In this special issue, several authors adopt and adapt lessons from research in areas such
as civil war studies, anthropology, ecology, and Indigenous studies to expand or re-orient the
direction of genocide prevention studies. Along these lines, Arnold connects Card’s well-known
work on social death with Antonovsky’s salutogenetic model of health and Ahmed’s work on
emotions and affect. And through this assemblage of ideas, he brings to light the ways local actors
promote social vitality and cohesion for their groups.
For Whigham, the dramaturgical approach of performance studies offers inspiration for
thinking about how individuals enact scenarios that lead beyond intractable conflict. Zulver is
influenced by research on women’s social movements to examine the diverse agency of women
in situations of “high risk feminism.” Finally, Hinton pushes further past field boundaries,
stirring mythology, comic books, translation, and archaeology into the interdisciplinary cauldron.
Genealogy exposes contingencies in the development of genocide prevention as an area of study.
Modularity takes this contingency as an invitation to further re-shape the field. Deprived of an
unassailable foundation, genocide prevention studies can take on the multivocality Verdeja and
Hinton promote in their articles drawing on varied levels of analysis, representational and literary
strategies, conceptual schemes, and methodologies so as not to become ossified in its practice.
Scalar Interventions and Chronotopes of Genocide Prevention
As with Interdisciplinary modularity, scalar interventions are meant to reposition the study of
genocide studies by suggesting genocide prevention cannot simply be measured at one scale. In
this sense, the prevention research and scholarship needs to be multi-scalar -- or at least keep an
eye on other scales. Andrew Woolford’s “mesh” model provides an illustration of how this can be
done.16
Several contributors similarly point to the importance of micro-level scales for assessing the
efficacy of genocide prevention, as can be seen in the articles by Whigham, Arnold, and Woolford,
Muller, and Sinclair. Hollie Nyseth Brehm and Verdeja also give attention to local and regional
variations in genocidal processes, but their interventions are more fully multi-scalar in that they
call for genocide prevention studies to move beyond a fixation on state-level research. Zulver
shares this concern, noting how women are often only considered as micro-level actors, rather
than having roles to play at meso-, macro-, or even global levels.
In James Waller’s article, the scalar positioning is presented somewhat differently, conceived as
placed either upstream, midstream, or downstream from the conflict. This metaphor suggests not
only spatial proximity to conflict but also temporal proximity, since upstream represents the time
and space before the event, midstream is within the moment of crisis, and downstream addresses
its results. This configuration of time and space brings to mind Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the
chronotope, the admixture of an always-entangled space and time, and its relevance to critical
prevention.17
Too often, our attention is turned to either time or space. Though she does not use the term
“chronotope,” Brehm’s examination of sub-regional patterns of genocide in Rwanda are an
effective illustration of the chronotope and its amalgamation of space/time. Whereas state-level
Andrew Woolford, This Benevolent Experiment: Indigenous Boarding Schools, Genocide, and Redress in Canada and the United
States (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015).
17
Mikhail M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of
Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (London: Routledge, 2015).
16
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analyses spatialize and temporize the Rwanda genocide as a nation-wide phenomenon beginning
in April 1994, chronotopic analysis illustrates the ebbs and flows of the genocide, as it sparks first
in specific regions before heating up in others. Feierstein’s critical analysis of differential responses
to mass violence also brings to mind the chronotope, as geopolitical and historical factors collide
in determining where/when prevention is deemed to be needed (e.g., Libya) and where/when it is
not (e.g., Yemen, Honduras, Turkey).
With time and space comes attention to movement, as consideration of the flows of genocide
-- including its pace (fast or slow) -- brings awareness of pulsating, oscillating, and cyclical patterns
of violence that trouble linear models of prevention (see Verdeja, Woolford, Muller, and Sinclair,
and Waller). When the goal is to interrupt the process of genocide, the scale, chronotope, and flow
of genocide are matters of great importance.
The Practice and Performance of Critique
Critique must not be directed solely outward. The target is not a set of scholars or practitioners
who are branded “mainstream” or “conservative” or by some other label. When the practices of
genocide prevention are subject to critique, these practices include not only those that are perceived
to be most prevalent, but also our own. Such reflexivity is at the heart of critique. For this reason,
critical scholars tend to offer tools or guidelines for improving critical practice, or through their
writing, seek to perform alternative ways to engage with our subject matter.
Tools of critical practice can include deconstruction, decentering, frame-shifting, multiple
perspective-taking, and exposure of blind spots, among other techniques. Many of these tools, and
others, are on display in this special issue. Zulver decenters a seemingly gender-neutral prevention
studies to create space to examine women’s agency, while at the same time troubling notions of
women and women’s mobilization.
Woolford, Muller, and Sinclair discuss the tendency toward linear and molar representations
in the genocide prevention and gesture toward a more rhizomatic and molecular understanding
of prevention. And, in addition to suggesting that critical genocide prevention studies should be
anti-teleological and multivalent, Verdeja also provides guidance as to how self-reflective and
dialectical approaches are needed within this area of study.
Waller’s contribution to this volume also serves an important critical role. He challenges
the critics to better communicate the complexity and urgency of genocide prevention to political
actors. In this manner, his article also offers a performative example of the practice of critique.
He illustrates how one must turn critique back upon oneself and consider the end goals of our
endeavors.
In a different way, Feierstein and Hinton also exhibit performances of critique. In Feierstein’s
provocation, the art of provocation is fully on display. Academics are often trained to hedge,
balance, or even equivocate, the provocateur plays an important role in shaking us from our
stupor. In Feierstein’s case, his provocation comes in the form of a discomforting exposé of the
contradictions and limitations of preventative practice.
Hinton’s piece in itself is a performance of critique in the sense that the very act of writing is
intended to overturn conventions of genocide prevention studies and academic scholarship more
generally. It offers multivocality, juxtaposition, recursion, and contested meanings to break us free
from the habits of our research and to alert us to how the cures we proffer may also carry poison
within them. To encourage such reflexivity, he offers a “first lesson in critical prevention,” one
encapsulated in a warning given in the opening line of his essay.
Critical epistemologies of prevention
The critical interventions all raise questions about how we know what we claim to know about
genocide and its prevention. They also present opportunities to know genocide and prevention
differently. With respect to the former, Feierstein challenges the data often used to support socalled humanitarian intervention. By alerting readers to rates of violence and displacement in
nations not typically considered in need of intervention, he exposes the contingency of decisions to
intervene under the responsibility to protect.
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Whigham directs our gaze more toward local ways of knowing, and suggests that “flipping
the script” can allow local actors to know their conflicts differently and overcome intractability.
Likewise, Woolford, Muller, and Sinclair look to new technologies, such as virtual reality, to allow
people to know their social world differently and thereby contribute to the prevention of further
cultural destruction of Indigenous peoples in Canada.
Critical epistemologies of genocide prevention are a means to disrupt or transgress the frame,
to find our way to the gutter. As Hinton’s essay shows, we can carefully excavate the tools that
enable and authorize our research and allow us to tell a story about genocide and its prevention. If
critique is prevention it is also prevention against becoming too invested in our own professional
expertise and the narratives of genocide and prevention we are empowered to create. By excavating
our tools and permits, as Hinton shows, we become aware of our investments, the frames we
construct, and some of what lies beyond them.
Critical prevention studies, and critical genocide studies, remain areas that are still in their
infancy. However, understanding that critique is prevention compels us toward a different
understanding of prevention: one that is ongoing, adaptable, relational, reflexive, fallible, and
multi-perspectival. In this manner, critique transforms prevention into something more reflexive
and consistently active.
Whereas prevention can suggest a surgical cut, a wound opened and closed to avert some
greater threat, critique as prevention suggests something more persistent and dynamic. Like
Arnold’s used of the salutogenetic model, it suggests an always “to come” health that can only be
supported through attention to multiple factors.
Rather than a “responsibility to protect” it suggests what Harroway describes as “responseability,” which is not a liberal obligation to act in a singular manner but rather a relational praxis
of attention and response to the troubles we face. We enact response-ability not just through facts,
but also recognition of the stories we tell—and by joining different stories together, we open up
our frames of genocide prevention to the new possibilities demanded by the challenge of Tester’s
rage of the incapacitated.
Andrew Woolford
Alexander Hinton
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Human Rights? What a Good Idea! From Universal
Jurisdiction to Crime Prevention
Daniel Feierstein

Universidad de Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires, Argentina
One of humanity’s greatest achievements in the last century has been the creation of international
courts of law to judge those responsible for state crimes such as genocide. These courts were
originally a response to the wholesale destruction of European societies by the Nazis during World
War II. The human rights conventions which proliferated in the post-war period attempted to
create an effective universal jurisdiction to limit the punitive power of the state, especially where
large numbers of the civilian population were involved.
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction grew out of the realization that certain state crimes
destroyed the social fabric to such an extent that they were unlikely to be prosecuted in the territory
where they had been committed. The only way of bringing the perpetrators to justice would be to
start legal proceedings in international or regional courts or in the national courts of other countries.
This, of course, was no easy task, but universal jurisdiction offered new hope to the victims of
genocide and massacres by establishing that such crimes were no longer subject to amnesties or
statutes of limitations.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945–1948) were highly problematic and raised
numerous valid questions. Only the defeated powers were put on trial and they were tried by
military tribunals made up of judges from the nations that had won the Second World War. It was
said that this was “Victor’s Justice” and that due process and several of the procedural rights of
the accused were not respected.1 However, it spelt the end of impunity for at least some Nazi and
Japanese leaders. It also encouraged oppressed peoples to demand justice for state crimes they had
suffered and to persist in their demands for years to come.
Nevertheless, universal jurisdiction has been subject to different interpretations, depending
on the role of international and regional institutions in the fight against impunity. Examples of
conflicting interpretations are found in the rulings of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
on the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and Mixed Tribunals in the cases of East Timor, Cambodia
and Sierra Leone. They are also found in the rulings of national courts (paradoxically less visible)
in important cases like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Argentina, Chile, Bangladesh, Colombia, Mexico and
Uruguay, among other countries.
More disturbingly, the different attempts to prosecute and punish state crimes in International
Tribunals have gradually evolved into a self-referential system that tends to invalidate or ignore
national courts in favor of a new international criminal justice approach. Instead of complementing
the work of national courts, these new international institutions have gradually transformed
themselves into the main instruments for prosecuting human rights violations. This has happened
despite their frequent ignorance of the history, language and culture of the countries concerned.
The result is an inefficient and self-perpetuating bureaucracy that has significantly altered
the original intention behind universal jurisdiction. This inefficiency can be seen clearly in the
International Criminal Court, which has only managed to convict two people in 16 years. The ICC
is also criticized for focusing on African countries and not intervening in other important cases (e.g.
Afghanistan, Colombia, Honduras, Iraq, Mexico, among many others).
However, the inefficiency of the ICC is less dangerous than the discourse of prevention that
has developed parallel to it. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of universal jurisdiction
has shifted from prosecuting State crimes, which would otherwise go unpunished, to military
intervention to “prevent” crimes before they are committed. The worst example was the United
Nations attack on Libya in 2011 in response to reports of “possible” crimes against humanity —
attacks for which the UN invoked the new international principle of “responsibility to protect”
(R2P), approved in 2005. In fact, the attacks plunged Libya into anarchy, producing many more
deaths than they were intended to prevent. Unfortunately, the clamor for “intervention” comes
1

See, for example, Luis Jiménez de Asúa, Tratado de Derecho penal, Tomo II (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1950). Also,
Danilo Zolo, La justicia de los vencedores. De Nuremberg a Bagdad (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2007).
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not only from diplomats, politicians and the mass media but — more alarmingly — from many
genocide and human rights scholars and activists.
This paper critically evaluates the use of international laws designed to punish genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity as legitimations for military intervention to prevent disasters
that have not yet occurred. In other words, it deals with the thorny issue of atrocity prevention.
It argues that the legitimation of “pre-emptive” killing, far from defending human rights, has
become yet another way to violate them. Indeed, the “responsibility to protect” is being used to
ensure control of oil and gas resources and geopolitical enclaves where previous discourses (e.g.
the Cold War and the War on Terror) have lost their efficacy. It contrasts levels of violence in
hotspots around the world with calls to protect civilian populations, and shows that intervention
does not reduce violence and often achieves the opposite effect.
Core Elements of the New Principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The principle of “responsibility to protect” emerged from an international conference on issues
of national sovereignty and the possibility of intervention. The International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) met in September 2000 and produced its final report
in 2001 with the title “The Responsibility to Protect”. The report analyzed three obligations: the
responsibility to react, to prevent and to rebuild. But the fundamental issue, made clear through
the name of the Commission itself, was the possibility of international “intervention” in cases of
systematic human rights violations. The justification for suspending state sovereignty in such cases
was the failure of the international community to prevent genocide in the former Yugoslavia (19921995) and Rwanda (1994).2
From then onward, the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) became the focus of dozens
of organizations and think tanks, such as the Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, the Global
Center for R2P, the Asia-Pacific Center for R2P or the Canadian Center for the Responsibility to
Protect. It is worth to point out that many of these organizations are subsidized by the American
Department of State, the Australian and Canadian governments, or the foundations of private
companies with interests in intervention or subsequent “reconstruction” in overseas countries.
Soon after the report appeared, the principle was adopted unanimously by the United Nations
General Assembly in September 2005. Three years later, in 2008, the General Secretary appointed
a UN Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect. Thanks to agreements, diplomatic pressure or
an inability to foresee the consequences, the principle of R2P was still supported — or at least not
opposed — by the majority of UN member states in 2015. It is true that there has been occasional
dissent, such as the Brazilian government’s criticism of intervention in Libya and its proposal to
establish a “Responsibility while Protecting” (in view of the damage produced by the intervention
forces themselves). However, only a handful of States have regularly protested, including — most
significantly — Belarus, Cuba, India, Russia, Sudan, Syria and Venezuela.
The 2005 UN document transformed the original principles (prevent, react and rebuild)
into three pillars. Pillar I affirms that States carry the primary responsibility to protect their
populations (whether nationals or not) from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and ethnic cleansing; Pillar II says that the international community (including the UN, regional
organizations, governments, and civil society) is committed to helping States acquire the capacity
to fulfill their primary responsibility of protecting their population from mass atrocities; Pillar III
follows with the commitment that, when a State is manifestly failing to protect its population from
mass atrocities, or is perpetrating the atrocities itself, then the international community must take
timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
ethnic cleansing.
With one or two exceptions, such as the intervention in Kenya between 2008 and 2013, the
reality, however, is that the first and second pillars have not been implemented. 3 Instead, the
For the origin of the principle of “responsibility to protect” see James Waller, Confronting Evil. Engaging our Responsibility
to Prevent Genocide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
3
See the report of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “Crisis in Kenya,” accessed September
22, 2019, www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya for the peacekeeping intervention in
2

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.3.1669

Human Rights? What a Good Idea!

11

regulatory authority’s main aim has been to suspend national sovereignty and the prohibition
against the use of force in cases where “atrocity crimes” are being (or are likely to be) committed.
This being so, it is necessary to establish who determines the seriousness of such crimes — or the
potential seriousness of possible future crimes — in different parts of the world. Above all, it is
necessary to check whether justifications for R2P are, in fact, borne out in practice.
Critical Analysis of Military Intervention (the Last Resort of R2P)
The two main criteria for military intervention under the responsibility to protect (Pillar 3) are:
1) Military Intervention is necessary in societies with a high risk of violent death among
civilians; and
2) Military intervention is necessary to reduce levels of violence against civilians.
These are the only justifications for violating State Sovereignty.
To decide whether these criteria have been met, the first step is to identify those conflicts with
the largest numbers of victims and the highest civilian casualty ratios. Obviously, numbers can
never explain the whole picture. Numbers have to be interpreted. Moreover, even when estimates
are based on reliable sources, these figures are still estimates. We normally speak of a range of
estimates rather than a fixed and precise number. However, with these provisos in mind, the
different estimates give us at least a starting point from which to interpret the data.
The preliminary data presented in this paper shows an astonishing mismatch between the
countries in which the R2P principle has been applied through military intervention and the most
violent countries in terms of civilian casualties. Figure 1 shows the ten most important conflicts in
terms of number of casualties during the last 10 years and Figure 2 shows the first ten conflicts in
terms of civilian casualty ratios. What is clear from both is that some countries are clearly excluded
from the R2P discourse. This may be due to lack of interest among the self-appointed protectors or
to their alliances with the perpetrators. That is very clear in Sri Lanka (5th in number of casualties
and 2nd in civilian casualty ratios), Pakistan (4th in number of casualties) or Israel (10th in civilian
casualty ratios) — although Israel is at least present in the media. Finally, we should not forget
Yemen, which has received very little attention despite the number of victims (7th in number of
casualties and 8th in civilian casualty ratios).
The second step in deciding whether interventions have been justified is to see whether they
have reduced levels of violence against civilians. In fact, what we find in those cases present in UN
or mass media discourses is that most deaths occurred after the military intervention. This was so
in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, for example. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show civilian casualties
before and after the international military interventions. In the case of Libya, intervention occurred
directly under the R2P principle; in the cases of Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, similar arguments
were used (preventing civilian casualties) even though intervention was not supported by the UN
but was conducted unilaterally by the US and/or NATO.
Kenya. The intervention to overthrow former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbabgo is much more controversial.
This occurred shortly after Gbabgo decided to create a Central Bank that would allow the Ivory Coast to have its
own currency and free itself from the monetary dependence of other former French colonies in the region, whose
currency remains under French control. This initiative is similar to that which Khadaffi attempted shortly before
the same principle of intervention was applied against him. Although currently on trial the International Criminal
Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity, Gbabgo’s removal from power by an opposition force with strong
French support is still questioned by many organizations. Debatably, it constitutes another example of the use of the
“responsibility to protect” principle as an excuse to violate national sovereignty for economic gain. This is not to deny
the human rights violations committed by both Khadaffi and Gbabgo. But these are no different from others that
occurred, for example, in Gabon or Equatorial Guinea, which have not evoked the same indignation, denunciations or
“interventions.” I am grateful to Kerry Whigham for the information on the implementation of R2P principles in the
cases of Kenya and Ivory Coast and for pointing out the need to include them. I am also grateful to Cruz Melchor Eya
Nchama for the information on Cote D´Ivoire. Critical references to Lybia and Cote D´Ivoire can also be found in Jean
Ping, Éclipse sur l’Afrique, Fallait-il tuer Kadhafi? (Paris: Michalon, 2014) and Yash Tandon, Le Commerce, c’est la guerre,
(Geneva: Cetim, 2015).
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Figure 1: Victims of Armed Conflict 2007-2016, organized by total number4
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

TOTAL

-

-

-

-

965

38500

69086

57529

46643

44303

257026

2) Afghanistan

6906

5552

6341

6864

7405

7719

8056

12285

17273

17980

96381

3) Iraq

2217

2200

1043

1144

1072

638

1882

12149

10138

9016

41499

4) Pakistan

747

3537

6864

6052

2863

3018

1802

3136

2077

761

30857

5) Sri Lanka

2494

8262

10165

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

20921

6) Somalia

1579

1529

1481

2151

1937

2600

896

1104

1173

1925

16375

7) Yemen

-

21

94

175

1140

2330

582

1660

6700

2426

15128

8) Nigeria

-

-

405

-

324

811

1629

3811

4493

2430

13903

9) Sudan

217

620

373

1054

1404

1411

593

849

1264

1314

9099

10) Congo

632

767

1978

300

283

773

1531

985

197

261

7707

1) Syria

Figure 2: Victims of Armed Conflict 2007-2016, organized by victim/total population rate5
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Average Rate

-

-

-

-

0,046

1,885

3,488

2,996

2,490

2,404

2,662

2) Sri Lanka

0,126

0,414

0,506

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0,349

3) Afghanistan

0,259

0,203

0,226

0,238

0,249

0,251

0,254

0,375

0,512

0,519

0,343

-

-

-

-

0,312

-

-

0,052

0,044

0,274

0,227

5) Somalia

0,143

0,134

0,126

0,178

0,156

0,204

0,068

0,082

0,084

0,134

0,146

6) Iraq

0,078

0,076

0,035

0,037

0,034

0,019

0,056

0,347

0,281

0,242

0,134

7) South Sudan

-

-

-

-

0,021

0,025

0,083

0,145

0,041

0,058

0,075

8) Yemen

-

0,001

0,004

0,007

0,047

0,094

0,023

0,063

0,249

0,088

0,072

9) Ukraine

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0,097

0,029

0,006

0,066

10) Israel

0,040

0,094

0,094

0,004

0,007

0,008

-

0,210

-

-

0,065

1) Syria

4) Libya

4

Author production. World Bank, “Database International Development,” accessed September 22, 2019, http://databank.
bancomundial.org/data/source/world-development-indicators/preview/on. Last Updated: 07/25/2018. Indicator
Name: Battle-related deaths (number of people). Definition: Battle-related deaths are deaths in battle-related conflicts
between warring parties in the conflict dyad (two conflict units that are parties to a conflict). Typically, battle-related
deaths occur in warfare involving the armed forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield
fighting, guerrilla activities, and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities, and villages, etc. The targets
are usually the military itself and its installations or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often
substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians being killed in crossfire, in indiscriminate bombings, etc. All
deaths--military as well as civilian--incurred in such situations, are counted as battle-related deaths. Alternate source:
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/.

5

Sources are similar to Figure 1. When information is not available for a given year, the rate is estimated only for the years
in which there was reliable information.
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The figures are very clear. But if we widen the focus from casualties in military conflicts to
the total number of civilian casualties or violence in a society, including all kinds of violent death,
the results are even more striking. Figures 3 and 4 show the top ten countries with the highest
Intentional Homicide Rate. Most countries among the top ten are totally excluded from discussions
about mass violence (Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, the USA, Colombia, Honduras, El Salvador,
and Jamaica). Moreover, the list includes three of the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, the body which selects countries for military intervention. South Africa has played a
significant role in the development of transitional justice but is one of the most violent countries in
the world. It seems that the “reconciliation” without justice proposed by the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission is not the recipe South African representatives and many NGOs,
journalists and scholars are trying to sell to the international community. Brazil’s number one
position in total number of deaths could be a fundamental variable for understanding the rise of a
new fascism in Brazil and Bolsonaro´s victory in the October 2018 presidential election.

Figure 3: Intentional Homicide 2007-2016, organized by total numbers6
UNODC Name

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

TOTAL

1) Brazil

44.625

45.885

44.518

43.272

48.084

53.054

54.163

57.091

58.459

61.283

510.434

2) India

45.362

45.999

45.824

46.460

47.640

47.478

45.878

47.356

44.385

42.678

459.060

3) Mexico

8.867

14.006

19.803

25.757

27.213

25.967

23.063

20.010

20.762

24.559

210.007

4) South Africa

18.400

18.084

16.767

15.893

15.554

16.213

17.023

17.805

18.673

19.016

173.428

5) United States
of America

17.128

16.485

15.399

14.722

14.661

14.856

14.319

14.164

15.883

17.250

154.867

6) Colombia

17.198

16.140

15.817

15.459

16.127

16.440

15.419

13.343

12.782

12.402

151.127

7) Russian
Federation

25.377

23.738

21.371

-

-

-

15.763

16.260

16.519

15.561

134.589

8) Venezuela
(Bolivarian
Republic of)

13.156

14.589

13.985

13.080

14.098

16.072

-

19.030

-

17.778

121.788

9) Pakistan

10.556

12.059

12.491

13.190

13.860

13.846

13.937

13.276

9.486

8.516

121.217

10) China

16.119

14.811

14.667

13.410

12.015

11.286

10.640

10.083

9.200

8.634

120.865

6

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Intentional homicide victims, counts and rates per 100,000 population,”
accessed September 22, 2019, https://dataunodc.un.org/crime/intentional-homicide-victims. Definition: “Intentional
Homicide” means unlawful death inflicted upon a person with the intent to cause death or serious injury. Russian
Federation data provided for 2000-2009 are from the World Health Organization and the data from 2013-2016 are
from the Prosecutor-General of the Russian Federation, and include victims of attempted homicide.
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Figure 4: Intentional Homicide 2007-2016, organized by rate7
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Average Rate

1) Honduras

46,5

56,6

65,7

76,1

85,1

84,3

74,3

66,9

57,5

56,5

66,94

2) El Salvador

57,5

52,0

71,4

64,7

70,6

41,7

40,2

62,4

105,4

82,8

64,88

3) Venezuela

47,5

51,8

48,9

45,1

47,8

53,8

-

61,9

-

56,3

51,65

4) Jamaica

57,1

58,0

60,0

51,4

40,0

38,7

42,1

35,1

42,1

47,0

47,15

5) Lesotho

45,1

37,6

35,8

37,4

34,5

30,7

31,1

-

41,2

-

36,69

6) Guatemala

42,2

44,9

45,4

40,7

38,0

33,8

33,7

31,4

29,4

27,3

36,67

7) South Africa

36,9

35,9

32,9

30,8

29,8

30,6

31,7

32,6

33,8

34,0

32,89

8) Colombia

38,8

35,9

34,8

33,7

34,8

35,1

32,6

27,9

26,5

25,5

32,55

9) Trinidad and Tobago

29,9

41,6

38,4

35,6

26,4

28,3

30,3

29,9

30,9

-

32,35

10) Brazil

23,4

23,8

22,8

22,0

24,2

26,5

26,8

28,0

28,4

29,5

25,52

A third way to calculate civilian casualties in conflicts is by examining the number of refugees.
Again, we find the same situation as before: large numbers of refugees do not necessarily trigger
military interventions, as is shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. And where the two coincide, the
number of refugees increases after the intervention and not before.

Figure 5: Refugees 2007-2016, organized by average numbers8

1) Afghanistan

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Average

3.057.661

2.833.128

2.887.123

3.054.709

2.664.436

2.586.152

2.556.502

2.596.270

2.666.305

2.501.445

2.740.373

2) Syria

13.690

15.211

17.914

18.452

19.931

729.022

2.468.332

3.887.491

4.873.243

5.524.377

1.756.766

3) Iraq

2.309.245

1.903.519

1.785.212

1.683.579

1.428.308

746.206

401.466

369.954

264.094

316.030

1.120.761

457.356

561.155

678.309

770.154

1.077.048

1.136.719

1.121.770

1.106.434

1.123.156

1.012.323

904.442

-

-

-

-

-

87.009

114.470

616.211

778.718

1.436.719

606.625

523.032

419.248

368.195

387.288

500.014

568.943

648.942

665.967

627.087

650.640

535.936

4) Somalia
5) South
Sudan
6) Sudan
7) Myanmar

191.313

184.413

406.669

415.670

414.626

415.371

479.606

479.006

451.805

490.289

392.877

8) Colombia

551.744

373.532

389.753

395.577

395.949

394.117

396.717

360.298

340.127

311.062

390.888

9) Sri Lanka

134.952

137.752

145.721

141.074

136.617

132.731

123.084

122.010

121.443

117.479

131.286

10) Turkey

221.939

214.378

146.387

146.794

139.779

135.372

66.575

63.892

59.558

57.925

125.260

7

United States Virgin Islands, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Belize, and Bahamas were excluded from the top ten because they
have a population fewer than 400.000 inhabitants. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Intentional Homicide
victims, counts, and rates per 100,000 population,” accessed September 22, 2019, https://dataunodc.un.org/crime/
intentional-homicide-victims.

8

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics Database,” accessed September 22,
2019, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series.
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Figure 6: Refugees 2007-2016, organized by rate (refugees / total population of the country)9
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Average
Rate

0,70

0,75

0,86

0,88

0,96

35,70

124,61

202,44

260,11

299,74

92,67

2) Afghanistan

114,88

103,80

103,10

106,05

89,69

84,25

80,57

79,26

79,03

72,18

91,28

3) Somalia

41,43

49,36

57,94

63,90

86,83

89,06

85,42

81,88

80,76

70,70

70,73

-

-

-

-

-

8,04

10,24

53,44

65,54

117,47

42,45

81,34

65,39

59,72

54,73

45,02

22,77

11,85

10,57

7,31

8,49

36,72

1) Syria

4) South
Sudan
5) Iraq
6) Sudan

16,20

12,72

10,94

11,26

14,22

15,81

17,61

17,65

16,23

16,44

14,91

7) Colombia

12,43

8,32

8,58

8,61

8,53

8,41

8,38

7,54

7,05

6,39

8,43

8) Myanmar

3,89

3,73

8,17

8,29

8,20

8,15

9,32

9,23

8,62

9,27

7,69

9) Sri Lanka

6,81

6,91

7,26

6,98

6,72

6,50

6,00

5,92

5,86

5,65

6,46

10) Mali

0,33

0,12

0,20

0,24

0,28

9,37

9,27

8,21

8,83

8,69

4,55

Myanmar, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Turkey are never mentioned in discussions on R2P and
military interventions, even if they are among the top ten in one or more of the figures mentioned
above.
The Consequences of Military Interventions
The second main criterion for military intervention under the R2P — that it reduces violence
against civilians — has clearly not been met. In fact, the figures show exactly the opposite. Violence
has grown to catastrophic levels precisely after such interventions where they were not found
to be critical before the interventions on any of the indicators. Some civilian casualties occurred
during the interventions themselves but most happened as countries descended into social and
political chaos after the interventions. This was the case in Iraq in 2003 although it is true that the
intervention was carried out by NATO forces without the authorization of the UN. In fact, the
number of civilian casualties in both Iraq and Libya was not very high before the interventions;
the threat of victimization was much greater than the reality of destruction. In both countries the
number of casualties, intentional homicides, refugees and internally displaced persons increased
dramatically after the military interventions.
The first military intervention carried out under the R2P principle was in Libya in March 2011.
This is one of the most interesting cases, precisely because it was the first case that “followed the
book”. Civilian casualties before the intervention have been estimated at between 233 (Human
Rights Watch) — the lowest and probably the most reliable figure — and 2,000 (World Health
Organization). The Coalition against War Criminals places the number at 519. Nevertheless, even
if we accept the highest estimate, Libya did not rank among the top ten for civilian casualties in
2011 (see figures above).
So, a fundamental question would be why the UN decided to intervene in Libya and not in
Sri Lanka or Sudan, for example, which had higher numbers of casualties, intentional homicides,
refugees and internally displaced persons at the time of the intervention. This question becomes
all the more urgent if we consider that the NATO airstrike campaign in Libya in 2011 caused more
than 1,100 civilian casualties and the total number of civilian casualties for the whole year was
estimated by the Libyan National Transitional Council at around 30,000. Amnesty International
estimates around 350,000 internally displaced people from the beginning of the intervention in
9

Ibid. Total population was taken from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
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March 2011 to the end of 2016. The number of victims of armed conflict in 2016 — the last year
with certified information — was 1,727, a level similar to the five previous years following the
intervention.
In short, it is clear that the military intervention did not guarantee civilian protection under the
R2P principle. On the contrary, it clearly did more harm than good, and caused anything between
five and thirty times as many civilian casualties as existed before the decision to intervene. Exactly
the same thing happened after the NATO military intervention in Iraq in 2003, which was supposed
to prevent the use of chemical weapons that never were found.
Other Elements Explaining Military Interventions
If the main criteria for military intervention are not being met, why do countries continue to insist
on them? The most common critical response to this question is that violence against civilians is
used as an excuse to occupy regions with oil and gas reserves. This idea seems plausible in view
of increasing international confrontations and competition for resources and Figures 7 & 8 show a
clear correlation between major oil and gas reserves and military intervention. Even if correlation
is not explanation, at least it gives us a less contradictory possibility than the failed call to “prevent
civilian casualties”.
Figure 7: International Top Ten Oil Reserves, 201610
RANK

COUNTRY

(BBL)

1

VENEZUELA

300,900,000,000

2

SAUDI ARABIA

266,500,000,000

3

CANADA

169,700,000,000

4

IRAN

158,400,000,000

5

IRAQ

142,500,000,000

6

KUWAIT

101,500,000,000

7

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

97,800,000,000

8

RUSSIA

80,000,000,000

9

LIBYA

48,360,000,000

10

NIGERIA

37,060,000,000

10

Definition: Crude oil - proved reserves is the stock of proved reserves of crude oil in barrels (bbl). Proved reserves are
those quantities of petroleum which, by analysis of geological and engineering data, can be estimated with a high
degree of confidence to be commercially recoverable from a given date forward, from known reservoirs and under
current economic conditions. CIA, The World Factbook, accessed September 22, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2244rank.html. The data was updated on 01/01/2017.
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Figure 8: International Top Ten Gas Reserves, 201611
RANK

COUNTRY

(CU M)

1

RUSSIA

47,800,000,000,000

2

IRAN

33,500,000,000,000

3

QATAR

24,300,000,000,000

4

UNITED STATES

8,714,000,000,000

5

SAUDI ARABIA

8,602,000,000,000

6

TURKMENISTAN

7,504,000,000,000

7

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

6,091,000,000,000

8

VENEZUELA

5,701,000,000,000

9

NIGERIA

5,284,000,000,000

10

CHINA

5,194,000,000,000

The most striking examples are Venezuela and Iran, where interventions are constantly
proposed by different US government statements, mass media and even scholarly works.12 Both
cases lie far below the top ten in any of the figures cited. The only exception is the homicide rate in
Venezuela, which has escalated dramatically over the last few years, but is still lower than Honduras
or El Salvador, where no intervention has been requested. Unlike Venezuela, Honduras has a
dictatorial government, which came to power after a coup d’état in which hundreds of opposition
members and journalists were killed by the security forces. Honduras finally made the news at
the end of 2018. A caravan of refugees and migrants from Honduras and Guatemala numbering
around five thousand walked across Mexico in an attempt to reach the US border, where President
Trump promised to deploy US security forces to stop them.
On the other hand, Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world and eighth largest gas
reserves. Intervention could guarantee control of these resources as happened previously in Iraq
and Libya. Similarly, Iran currently holds the fourth largest oil reserves in the world and second
largest gas reserves. This is not to deny Iran’s controversial nuclear project but simply to place it
within a broader context.
If we look at the top ten countries with energy resources, we can see that their territories are
controlled directly by the main superpowers (US, Russia, China). The US controls Saudi Arabia
and the Emirates through puppet regimes, while Russia does the same in Turkmenistan and other
former Soviet republics. But the superpowers also control resources through military interventions
in the name of R2P (Libya) or with other humanitarian excuses (Iraq). At the same time, R2P
concerns are clearly ignored in countries with no resources, even if — like Sri Lanka, Honduras or
Myanmar — they are in the top ten of civilian casualties or refugees.
The Challenge of Critical Thinking
The current situation regarding genocide prevention is very worrying. On the one hand, the media
attempts to stir up our emotions with images of civilian casualties, whether dozens of people
11

Definition: Natural gas - proved reserves compares the stock of proved reserves of natural gas in cubic meters (cu
m). CIA, The World Factbook, accessed September 22, 2019, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2253rank.html. The data was updated on 01/01/2017, with the exception of the USA, with data updated on
1/1/2016.

12

“Trump alarms Venezuela with Talk of a Military Option,” New York Times, August 12, 2017, accessed November 22,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/world/americas/trump-venezuela-military.html. Among many other
calls from politicians or journalists in 2017 and 2018, see Simon Tysdall, “Trump is risking more than a war of
words with Iran,” The Guardian, September 26, 2018, accessed November 22, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/sep/26/trump-idiocy-war-iran-president-midterms. There have been numerous other calls for
intervention in the last decade from politicians and journalists, in addition to many from scholars.
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have been killed or just a few. No one asks why these images are shown instead of others, why
these civilian casualties deserve our attention while other victims (usually more numerous, as
we have shown above) are totally ignored. After an intense period of focusing on a particular
group of victims, the call starts: we have the duty to intervene. And a chorus of politicians and
journalists start voicing their calls: “How long are we going to stand by? We have to stop the violence!!
Time for intervention is now!!” Almost no one asks why that particular territory is the focus of the
mass media, diplomats or scholars: why Libya and not Honduras, why Iraq, Iran or Venezuela
instead of Yemen, Sri Lanka, Myanmar or Mexico. It is left to the victims of Honduras, Yemen or
Mexico to voice the call for intervention. But their attempts to gain the attention are nearly always
unsuccessful.
Once a country’s oil and gas resources are firmly under the control of “peacekeeping” forces,
that country quietly disappears from the mass media and political and academic agendas even
though, more often than not, the number of casualties continues to grow rapidly. And here is
the truly amazing part: no-one stops to evaluate if anything has changed. No one cares about the
victims after the intervention, neither the media nor academia. No one talks anymore about postintervention Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya. A new case grabs everyone’s attention. Now it is the turn
of Venezuela and Iran. It is never the turn of Myanmar, Honduras, Yemen or Mexico. Sudan is also
there waiting in the wings and maybe one day... one-day intervention will come.
If that last sentence sounded facetious, it is because the general public (and academia as a part
of it) has seemingly been reduced to the role of children asking for their parents to “do something”
(where parents would be the P5 members at the UNSC). There is no critical analysis, no checking
of information, no attempt to think outside the box. We are lost in a terrible cycle of distortion and
manipulation and our main complaint seems to be the one expected from us by the hegemonic
media: why are the parents (UNSC) not intervening more in those countries where the mass media
wants them to act?
Samantha Power´s A Problem from Hell is the best example of this kind of discourse: genocide as
the result of our non-intervention. 13 Strategically ignoring whole regions of the world (the whole
of Latin America, the whole of Southeast Asia and Indonesia, among others), Power suggests that
the main reason for genocide is a lack of US military intervention. Unlike Power’s counter-factual
assumptions: “if we had intervened...” this paper has tried to illuminate those counterfactuals
with real facts: neither UN nor US military interventions happened in the places with the highest
civilian casualties. Neither UN nor US military interventions have reduced civilian casualties but
rather have increased them.
Finally, it is worth remembering the number of deaths caused by direct or indirect US
interventions in Latin America, many of them resulting in genocide and other mass atrocities. Direct
interventions include the failed invasion of Cuba (1959), the invasion of the Dominican Republic
(1963), attacks on Nicaragua in alliance with the “contras” (from 1979 to the early 1990s), and the
invasion of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). Indirect interventions include the instigation and
support of coups in Guatemala (1954), Paraguay (1954), Haiti (1957), Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1964,
1971 and 1980), Argentina (1966 and 1976), Uruguay (1973), Chile (1973) and the backing of civilian
killings under democratic governments in Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico. The final
death toll is difficult to estimate due to insufficient research, but direct interventions produced at
13

Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell. America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Even if Power
was originally a journalist, her book was extremely popular and it was quoted in almost all of the production on
genocide prevention as it summarizes the main arguments from the majority of scholars who work on the field asking
for different ways of using intervention as a tool of genocide prevention. See, for example, two of the most known
scholars on the field: Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocities Once and for All (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institute, 2008) and Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015). More directly on the focus and among hundreds of others on the subject, see also: Micah
Zenko, “Saving Lives with Speed: Using Rapidly Deployable Forces for Genocide Prevention,” Defense & Security
Analysis 20, no. 1 (2004), 3-19, accessed September 22, 2019, doi: 10.1080/1475179042000195474; David Scheffer,
“Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (December 2006), 229-250 or Dieter Janssen,
“Humanitarian intervention and the Prevention of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 2 (2008), 289-306,
accessed September 22, 2019, doi: 10.1080/14623520802075213.
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least 20,000 civilian victims — although the figures for Nicaragua, one of the less studied cases, are
clearly underestimated. In contrast, indirect interventions produced over 300,000 victims (without
counting Colombia and Mexico, which could double the total number).
Instead of Conclusions, Some Provocations
Over the last decades, Genocide Studies has entered what postmodernists would call a “comfort
zone.” With fellowships and support from governments or NGOs, we have developed a very
comfortable environment in which the knowledge we produce about genocide prevention is neither
critical nor useful. We have become trapped by assumptions we have never checked against reality
and many of us have chosen to work inside the circle of those assumptions: genocide and mass
violence are horrible acts committed by horrible people; we cannot stand by and do nothing; we
have the responsibility to protect civilian populations and that responsibility takes the form, as a
last resort, of military intervention.
Often it seems that our main — indeed our only — concern regarding genocide prevention is
to analyze why our parents (the UNSC) are not willing to put an end to the “bad guys” who are
annoying the “good people.” There is a lack of analysis about how cases are chosen, the consequences
of intervention; what happens in countries after intervention; or what other variables (like oil and
gas resources, among many others) could explain the willingness of some countries to disregard
the national sovereignty of others. In the last ten years, no article published in either the Journal of
Genocide Research or the Journal of Genocide Studies and Prevention has asked these questions.
At both the 2017 IAGS and 2018 INOGS Conferences, more than 15% of the papers presented dealt
with “Genocide Prevention” or “Responsibility to Protect.” No paper was presented questioning
these notions.
It is time to wake up. We are not children and the UNSC are not our parents. The world is not
composed of bad people killing civilians and good people at the UNSC who should be persuaded
to intervene. On the contrary, the world is complex and different political actors have different
interests. Just as genocide and mass violence have been a very effective technology of power in the
past, human rights discourse is now being used to justify neo-colonial interventions and control
strategic resources.
As scholars our responsibility is to help, if possible, by calling things by their proper
names. The purpose of academic work is to produce and analyze data but — most important
— to permanently question our assumptions and “common sense” understandings of the world.
Without such critical thinking, Genocide Studies and Prevention will be reduced to a timid voice
in the hegemonic chorus.
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If preventative visits and fact-finding missions to areas of potential conflict were to routinely include
gender expertise and consultation with women’s organizations, systematic and useable information
could be collected and analyzed. Only then could “gender perspectives” be turned into concrete early
warning indicators…1
“What can we do in the context of a peace deal that is neither lasting nor stable?” asks a leader
of a women’s organization based in northern Colombia in an interview in August 2018, “Where
is the justice?”2 This narrative is not uncommon among members of women’s organizations (and
indeed non-gendered social movements) in so-called post-conflict Colombia.3 Despite the formal
cessation of hostilities with the FARC,4 violence continues between criminal groups, other armed
rebel groups, dissident FARC members, international drug cartels, and even the armed forces.5
This violence has direct and targeted impacts on those who mobilize for peace and safety in their
communities; in 2017, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights registered 441 attacks and 121
murders of social leaders, including human rights defenders and social and community leaders.6
The interviewee above belongs to a women’s organization that has received both collective and
individual threats in recent months; one leader is being followed, others have received threatening
pamphlets sent via messaging applications, still others have received phone calls telling them to
stop their community activism.
The interviewee’s question above went unanswered during the interview, but her meaning
was clear: we will continue to fight, to struggle. Practically, this means that despite the threats, she
and her compañeras will continue to: (1) fortify a shared identity as displaced women of the conflict,
(2) strengthen community ties (bonding and bridging social capital), (3) creatively present the
validity of their justice claims to various institutions (legal framing techniques), and (4) highlight
their grievances through public protests (acts of certification). These are the actions that she and
her organization have implemented in varying contexts of conflict and violence since they began in
1998.7 Indeed, these four strategies are the component parts of High Risk Feminism, a framework

1

Felicity Hill, “Women’s Contribution to Conflict Prevention and Early Warning and Disarmament,” Women, Men, Peace,
and Security 4 (2003), 17- 24, accessed November 9, 2019, https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/women-menpeace-and-security-en-565.pdf.

2

Here, the interviewee is referring to the formal title of the Peace Accords (Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto
y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera, Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a
Stable and Lasting Peace).

3

For a counter-narrative on how mass atrocities end, see Alex de Waal, Jens Meierhenrich, and Bridget Conley-Zilkic,
“How Mass Atrocities End: An Evidence-Based Counter-Narrative,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 36, no. 1 (2012),
15–31. For feminist work on conflicts and endings, see: Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Dina Francesca Haynes, and Naomi
Cahn, On the Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-Conflict Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Cynthia
Cockburn, “Sexual Violence in Bosnia: How War Lives on in Everyday Life,” OpenDemocracy, November 28, 2013,
accessed November 21, 2019, www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/sexual-violence-in-bosnia-how-war-lives-on-ineveryday-life/; Marie E. Berry and Trisha R. Rana, “What Prevents Peace? Women and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and
Nepal,” Peace and Change 44, no. 3 (2019), 321-349.

4

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a Marxist-Leninist
rebel group that was at war with the Colombian government for 52 years, until a peace deal was reached in 2016.

5
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6

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Informe Anual Del Alto Comisionado de Las Naciones
Unidas Para Los Derechos Humanos Sobre La Situación de Los Derechos Humanos En Colombia, March 21, 2018 (UN Doc. A/
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designed to showcase the “various forms of agency that women adopt, create, modify, and employ
to counteract fragility in their daily lives.”8
I developed the concept of High Risk Feminism (hereafter, HRF) in previous research based
in Colombia and El Salvador to allow scholars to understand women’s mobilization in contexts
of what Sandvik frames as the “gender of violent pluralism.”9 As will be discussed below, she
highlights the need to: “make sense of women political activists as survivors and actors, where
experiences of violence and loss shape strategies and tactics in the present.”10 Indeed, when it
comes to studies about conflict and violence, much of the literature about women still resorts to a
narrative that paints women as victims. Within studies of transitional justice, Baines points to and
then challenges the line of thinking in which “the ‘ideal victim’… is a person without agency, and
the perpetrator, an individual whose unbounded agency must be disciplined and brought under
control.”11 If there is deviation from the victim narrative, women are framed in their maternal
capacity as being able to take care of others and/or build and restore social fabric in communities
in the aftermath of violence. While this may be an accurate assessment in many cases, it does not
allow these women agency in terms of the strategies they employ to protect themselves and rebuild
their lives, both in contexts of continuing violence, and also in the uncertain times of post-conflict
eras.
Furthermore, when it comes to genocide and atrocity crime prevention research, this gendered
essentialism continues. While scholars increasingly focus on the gendered elements of genocide,12
these are not often holistically discussed in the prevention literature. There is a tendency to fall into
a gendered binary, whereby prevention is a masculine activity, while peacebuilding is represented
as more maternal and feminine.13 This problematic division highlights a worrying pattern both
in the literature and in practice. Indeed, even the UN Women, Peace and Security agenda has
been accused of “[perpetuating] a protectionist narrative” by failing to better enable or support
“women’s participation in peace and security processes.”14 Dianne Otto goes one step further,
arguing that the Security Council continues to rely on the “gendered paradigm that men fight wars
in order to protect women (and children), and that women are naturally predisposed to peace.”15
This article will challenge the trend of gendered essentialism and read genocide and atrocity
crimes “from the bottom up”, as suggested by Elisa von Joeden-Forgey (whose work is an exception
8

Julia Zulver, “High-Risk Feminism in El Salvador: Women’s Mobilisation in Violent Times,” Gender and Development 24,
no. 2 (2016), 172.

9

Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “Gendering Violent Pluralism: Women’s Political Organising in Latin America,” Third World
Thematics: A TWQ Journal (2018), 12.

10

Ibid.

11
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International Political Sociology 9, no. 4 (2015), 2.

12
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to the above trend). She suggests: by including nuanced gender-sensitive research, we will better
understand atrocity and thus inform early warning and prevention strategies.16
Even when gender is taken into account in genocide prevention research, there is something
uncomfortable about how analysis instrumentalizes the reason women and their experiences
should be taken into account.17 For example, Matveeva reflects on a report released by International
Alert: “the rationale behind introducing gender into early warning rests upon the argument that
the use of a gender-lens enriches early warning analysis and allows for more appropriate response
options.”18 While at face value this is not necessarily problematic, she continues, it is based on three
hypotheses that place women in “micro-level events” as opposed to “macro-level conflict” and
that seek to hone in on the potential of “women… as actors for peace.”19 Like Matveeva, I question
if “the reality is…as straightforward.”20 My contention is slightly different from hers, however: I
question the implication that women’s supposedly peaceful nature makes them well suited to onthe-ground prevention efforts.
To bring this conversation about agency and gender analysis back to critical genocide studies,
we can turn to Alex Hinton, who tells us that “critical genocide studies takes place in the gutter,”
the space between frames, or the gap to be filled,21 and that we need to unpack and decenter the
assumptions of the field. This can be read alongside the work of Oliver Kaplan, which unpacks
assumptions regarding agency and civilian resistance in Colombia: “civilians are not necessarily
passive or powerless. They are actors with agency whose ability to respond to dangers of conflict
derives from social cooperation.”22 He continues, “social cohesion affords civilians greater chances
to overcome fear, break ‘laws of silence’… and implement collective strategies for protection.”23
This article overlays a gendered lens on these assertions. It highlights that women do not
always exclusively mobilize for others, nor do they fit neatly within circumscribed categories
of victims, nor peacebuilders. Rather, they have the ability to develop and refine a contextually
relevant style of feminist agency that allows them to navigate and make sense of the violences
to which they are exposed, even during times of high risk. Given my own regional focus, the
present article will largely focus on literature and case studies from Latin America. Despite this, the
article will expand beyond case studies to draw out some of the emergent lessons about women’s
(particularly) feminist agency in conflict contexts more broadly.24 This article is not prescriptive but
rather, descriptive; describing the ways in which women choose to protect themselves allows us
important insight into local forms of protection, agency from below.
The article will proceed as follows: (1) it will examine the outdated ways in which women and
conflict are studied and highlight why these are not universally applicable; (2) it will highlight
lessons of HRF for genocide prevention; (3) and it will underscore the importance of recognizing
and studying women’s agency in conflict situations, with particular attention to the intersectional
complexity of agency. It will then speak to how the lessons learned from HRF have the potential to
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inform intervention and policy, particularly in terms of women’s resilience and agency.
Outdated Ways of Studying Women’s Activism and Conflict:
The literature is clear that women and girls suffer conflict and atrocity differentially. This is not
news.25 Cockburn, for example, posits that war and conflict impact women differently than men,
and that visions of security must also bear this in mind if lasting peace is to be secured.26 Boesten
and Wilding note a “consensus in feminist literature about the continuum of gender based violence:
the idea that violence against women may take different forms and be of a different scale during
periods of conflicts.”27 In the Colombian conflict, for example, there is literature that shows that
massacres at Bahía Portete and El Salado and the paramilitary control of communities in Bajo
Putumayo involved the murder and torture of women in order to destroy the communities’ social
fabric.28 Furthermore, there is growing research that also asks which women experience conflict
differently from other women; this intersectional focus will be further discussed below.
In recent years, importantly, the literature has moved away from a black and white victimperpetrator binary.29 Despite this, there is still a tendency to instrumentalize the roles that women
can and do play in conflict and post-conflict settings, even in the context of the Women, Peace
and Security Agenda (discussed below).30 Scholars and practitioners might assess women in their
capacities (i.e. their ability to protect their children), or their ability to be peacebuilders (i.e. their
ability to re-weave social fabric). Sometimes, if women transgress these gender boundaries, we
focus on them as revolutionaries or guerrillas.31
Before detailing some of the established ways that we think about and represent women who
resist their violent surroundings to engage in some sort of collective action, it is first important
to unpack the category of “women’s organization” itself. For the purposes of this article, and my
research in general, I speak about women’s groups, women’s organizations, or HRF organizations
to refer to local, non-political, non-professional groupings of women. I use the word local (or
grassroots) to differentiate these groups from national or regional, more professionalized projects
(like Sisma Mujer or the Ruta Pacífica in Colombia).32 The constituent members came together
in solidarity as a direct result of their conditions as survivors of the violence of the conflict; they
also share an ongoing condition of vulnerability to further (and sometimes retributive) acts of
violence. Below, I will discuss inter-group tensions and differences in order to highlight that
despite creating collective identity to allow for grassroots resistance, the women who engage in
HRF do not represent a homogenous bloc. Despite this: “a critical genocide studies might help us
understand how a wide variety of identities, including non-Western ones, crystallize… in a variety
of genocidal situations.”33
Mobilizing as Mothers:
In Latin America, the natural place to begin studying women who resist conflict is with the Madres
de Plaza de Mayo, the heroic image of mothers in politics.34 During the military dictatorship in
Argentina (1976-1983), a cross-class group of mothers engaged in peaceful protest to find their
children who had been disappeared by the state. They marched around the statue at the Plaza de
Mayo in Buenos Aires, calling on the military junta to give them information about their children.
They did so despite the great personal risk this implied: the dictatorship was notoriously violent
against anyone who dared dissent. Moreover, they had personal knowledge of the violence they
risked because of what had happened to their children.
Navarro explains that the women were able to engage in collective action against the repressive
state because they created a new political opportunity by mobilizing from their social location as
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mothers.35 That is, acting as mothers allowed the women to “achieve new identities and roles.”36
Elshtain, for example, theorizes about the transformations that these mothers underwent as a
function of their mobilization.37 She says that in fact, it was their mobilization – the act of coming
together in the first place –that gave them the ability to manage their emotions and generate change
through action. By talking about human rights, they were:
Afforded… a framework within which to canalize their grief – to make it do political
work. And those Mothers who seemed to me to be coping best were those who had been
able to transcend somewhat the vortex of personal devastation and make common cause,
through human rights efforts, with their fellow Argentines and human rights activists
internationally.38

More than just a “sorority bound by loss”39 the Mothers became a force to be reckoned with,
by using their disobedience to transform their roles as mothers (supposedly powerless and weak)
into a strategic strength that could confront a brutal dictatorship.
It is clear that the Mothers perceived themselves as less likely to face repression than fathers,
for example, would. Despite this, it is important to highlight that they did not think they were
safe; they were keenly aware of what the regime was capable of doing because of their losses (their
children). They knew that they had a certain cultural legitimacy to mobilize as mothers looking for
their children but also recognized that the regime would not necessarily avoid repressing them, as
was evidenced by the disappearance of three of the founders and the French nuns.
There are many parallels to be drawn between the case of the Madres in Argentina and the
Madres de Soacha in a marginalized neighborhood of Bogotá, Colombia. This case refers to the
mothers of sons who were part of the “false positive” scandal between 2002-2010.40 In seeking
guarantees of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition for the disappearance, torture, and
murder of their sons, these mothers developed a unique form of transformational political
agency that they continue to express in their struggle against ongoing impunity and corruption.41
Moving beyond Latin America, parallel dynamics developed during Egypt’s Arab Spring, where
“women activists used their identities as mothers to negotiate with and contest the barriers to their
participation presented by patriarchal elements of society and the state.”42
Women as Peacebuilders
This assumption of inherent maternal-ness further leads us to another stream of thinking: women
as peacebuilders. To be clear, this article does not seek to negate the robust information that
recognizes the unique role that women can play in post-conflict situations. Rather, it seeks to
problematize the assumptions that are perhaps not always questioned when framing women in
35
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their unique ability to heal and rebuild communities. One clear example comes from the UNSC
Resolution 1366 which notes that the Security Council:
Reiterates its recognition of the role of women in conflict prevention and requests the
Secretary-General to give greater attention to gender perspectives in the implementation of
peacekeeping and peace-building mandates as well as in conflict prevention efforts.43

Multiple international resolutions, including the 1995 Beijing Platform for the Action, UN
Security Council Resolution 1325, and the nine subsequent “Women, Peace and Security” (WPS)
resolutions passed by the UN Security Council, include commitments to promoting women’s
agency in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.44 These resolutions seek to: “involve women in
conflict prevention, to protect them during and after conflicts, and to secure their full participation
in post-conflict reconstruction.”45 The UN Security Council has called on member countries to pay
more attention to the role of women’s leadership, to support women’s engagement in decisionmaking, and to focus on women’s empowerment in peacebuilding. Despite this, many barriers to
peace in women’s lives remain, as outlined by Berry and Rana who note that:
While formal peacebuilding interventions play an important role as scaffolding for
grassroots peacebuilding work, these efforts will be insufficient insofar as they fail to center
the informal, emotional, embodied, and creative ways that women pursue peace in their
daily lives.46

Indeed, in her gendered continuum of violence, Moser articulates the idea that assessments
of the impacts of violence on a country and its society’s capital can provide insight into the true
cost of violence.47 In situations of high levels of violence, she outlines that the relationship between
violence and social capital is highly complex: “violence can erode productive social capital when it
reduces trust and cooperation within formal and informal social organizations that are critical for a
society to function.”48 In communities where residents describe their lack of trust in terms of “lack
of social fabric,”49 women’s groups have the potential to forge new networks that have the dual
purpose of producing a private good (the benefits of support and kinship gained by individual
membership) and a public good (rebuilding trust in state institutions, which may eventually serve
to lessen structural violence that results, in the first place, in contexts of high violence).
Molyneux highlights that social capital50 has entered policy dates in a diverse network of fields,
including development and community regeneration. She further notes that women frequently
engage in collective survival strategies51 and that their efforts have “been essential in conflict and
post-conflict situations where by working on common agendas, women have helped to heal deeply
divided communities as well as to participate in the difficult task of post-conflict reconstruction.”52
In her chapter she highlights, however, that when women work together they still occupy gendered
social spaces that are located within unequal power relations.
She discusses, for example, women’s groups in Northern Ireland that became active in peace
43
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movements out of concern for their families. Indeed, solidarity around domestic concerns “can be
the basis for an informal citizenship that relocates women’s domestic concerns and activities from
the isolation of the family into public spaces and public life.”53 Women who originally mobilized
around practical interests (including their family’s needs) might go through a transformative
process, which leads them to question and contest strategic interests (like gender inequality more
broadly).54
Importantly, though, she discusses the problems that arise when policies begin to rely on
women’s organizations and their voluntary work (i.e. their ability to create social capital), including
their instrumentalism (i.e. they become a substitute for appropriate government action).55 Secondly,
she notes, grassroots organizations can be captured or co-opted by those looking to take advantage
of women’s participation for their own political gains. Thirdly, women can become overloaded by
the kind or quantity of work that women are asked to do by NGOs or state-run programs. In these
situations, the needs of the women themselves are not considered.56
What is instrumentalizing about this narrative is the perpetuation of the notion that women
are inherently ‘peaceful’. For example, Restrepo’s study on Colombian women explores the
ways in which some victims overcome their victimhood, emerging as leaders in peacebuilding,
despite the significant risks associated with the ongoing violence.57 It is not difficult to agree with
her assessment that “against all odds, these unsung [women victim] leaders have proven to be
powerful agents of change.”58 What is not always the case, however, is her framing of women
leaders as “capable of healing, empowering, and even reconciling broader society.”59 This echoes
what Mwaûra and Schmeidl note about the Horn of Africa, where “early warning and preventative
activities can be made more effective by using untapped potential for women (leaders), women’s
networks, and women’s organizations as actors for peace.”60
To once more reiterate, in this article I do not wish to deny the real and positive outcomes that
can result from including women in peace processes and peacebuilding efforts. Furthermore, I do
not want to discount the measured and tangible outcomes that can result from women’s unique
ability to build social capital in both violent and post-conflict societies. Rather, I wish to echo
Jacquette, who questions whether women can be “citizens if they always act in the interest of
others.”61
Importantly, Sahla Aroussi presents a feminist critique of the stereotypical associations of
women and peacefulness that are so often included in the literature, suggesting that these are
mythical and linked to maternal ideologies and sociological and biological traits.62 Goetz and
Jenkins further review the literature that demonstrates that a “pacifist/maternalist – as opposed
to equality-based – justification for participation depoliticizes women’s agency.”63 These authors
suggest that we tend to focus on women as nurturing peacebuilders (or mobilizing on behalf of
others), and that this does not allow the necessary space to understand where women’s agency fits
within this narrative.
The HRF framework offers this space, allowing an analysis of the motivations with which
women justify their mobilization. These are not necessarily related to the wider landscape of
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healing society more broadly. It is important to see women’s mobilization as an act of resistance
to protect themselves, and not necessarily in the interest of others. While Restrepo aims to change
the narrative of women as needy, helpless victims by painting them as potential peacebuilders,
this article suggests that a further step can be taken; women can overcome victimhood and claim
a feminist agency to resist the specific violences they face. This is a specifically feminist project, not
necessarily predicated on the greater good of peacebuilding.
New Focus: Emergent Lessons about High Risk Feminism:
In her 2018 article, Sandvik offers an important critique on existing studies of violent pluralism (as
included in Arias and Goldstein’s concept of violent democracies).64 She notes that gender-neutral
analyses fall short when explaining the ways in which violent pluralism impacts the relationships
between political organizing and gendered violence. She suggests that gendered violence can be
an obstacle to organizing, that women’s political organizing can be a response to gendered violence,
or that political organizing is a cause of further gender-based violence.65 This article focuses on
the second assertion: mobilization as a response to violence. There are many ways in which
women (for Sandvik, internally displaced women in the case of the Colombian conflict) engage in
political organizing; this mobilization, she highlights, “should be scrutinized for what it can tell
us about how collective feminist political subjectivities are construed through gender violence as a
mobilizing factor.”66 Anne-Kathrin Kreft’s work adds to this discussion by theorizing that women
mobilize in response to the collective threat that sexual violence during times of civil war poses
to them as women, eventually leading to a situation where: “women mobilize in response to this
violence and around a broader range of women’s issues with the goal of transforming sociopolitical
conditions.”67
High Risk Feminism is a framework that emerged from my research in El Salvador and
Colombia, which answered the questions: why and how do women mobilize in contexts of high violence
and insecurity? These questions are predicated on the assumption that when violence is rife, and
when acting collectively necessarily implies exposing oneself to even more violence, that women
would choose to protect themselves by keeping a low profile. As the following sections will show,
however, certain women in both El Salvador and Colombia are visible and present in the streets,
making demands about gender justice more broadly. The “how” of the above-posed question
can be answered using the HRF framework. In some situations, women living in highly violent
contexts take to the streets, courts, institutions of the state, social networks, and neighborhoods.
Their collective action takes the form of feminist resistance to gendered violence. In these situations
(domains of losses), women organize their mobilization around four pillars: building collective
identity, generating (bonding and bridging) social capital, employing legal framing, and engaging
in acts of certification.
This article will now outline the main emergent lessons that we can take away from the HRF
framework. These lessons have implications in terms of the way that we both study women in
conflict settings, but also about the ways in which policies and interventions can best serve these
marginalized populations. Finally, as these studies take place “in the gutter” – Hinton’s space
between frames – they serve to challenge the assumptions genocide and atrocity crime studies and
prevention.
Women Do Mobilize in High Risk Settings
The first lesson of HRF is that it allows us to see that women do mobilize in high-risk settings,
despite the potential for ongoing violence and retribution that this might imply. In other research, I
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detail the four component parts of HRF, mentioned above;68 a full discussion of how women choose
to exercise their feminist agency (i.e. the pillars of HRF) is not within the remit of the present
article. What is important to underscore, though, is that High Risk Feminism is a local response to
conflict dynamics, a grassroots brand of agency from below. In such a climate, we might expect
women – often portrayed as weaker or more vulnerable members of society – to shy away from
activities that augment their exposure to risk. These women transgress traditional gender barriers
and thus expose themselves to the additional risks of high violence, (including targeting by actors
for sexualized and violent forms of punishment).69 Not only are such women resisting violence,
their activism focuses on the pursuit of gender justice, as well as challenging patriarchal culture more
generally.70
According to classical social movement theorists, though, people would not choose to
participate in social movements if there is risk involved in doing so.71 This is the common-sense
explanation: people will not engage in activities that expose them to personal danger because
this is irrational.72 In order for action to be justifiable, the participant would have to have the
expectation of a positive and measurable outcome to outweigh the cost of action. Risking death
or likely personal injury, therefore, defies the logic of collective action. Loveman’s 1998 study on
human rights defenders mobilizing in the Southern Cone despite authoritarian repression further
seeks to answer why people engage in high-risk action. She asks:
If risk or cost is calculated as a high probability of “death,” while benefit is calculated at a
minimal probability of “maintenance of honor” or “respect for human rights,” how is this
“ratio” to be assessed in the grammar of rational calculation in order to predict the outcome?
If the likely result of action is death, rational choice models would predict inaction, unless
they determine ex post facto, with reference to the individual’s behavior, that the first order
preference is a certain “value” that requires such a sacrifice. This, of course, is tautological.73

The point of the present article is not to detail the multiple social movement theories that inform
HRF’s understanding of why women mobilize as feminists in high-risk settings.74 Rather, it is to
point out that empirical research points convincingly to the fact that women do mobilize, despite
the risks that doing so entails.
Beyond simply acting collectively, what is surprising (as Sandvik notes) is that we rarely talk
about the agency that women build because of the violence(s) to which they were/are exposed.
Indeed, some women mobilize for the first time because of their exposure to conflict dynamics. This
was the case with women in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, as violence forced
them engage in new social roles tied to everyday life, leading them to then form and participate
in organizations to support everyday needs, and then leading to participation in formal and
informal politics.75 These particular groups did not necessarily choose to mobilize before – around
inequality or lack of education or land rights (in Colombia, for example)76 – but were spurred into
68
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action precisely because of their exposure to violence. In my research, I found that being thrust into
situations whereby it became apparent that mobilization was a good way to protect themselves
(whether or not this protection is real or psychosocial, as will be discussed presently), women were
given the incentives to mobilize, despite the ongoing and augmented risk of violent retribution. We
know that there is something unique about this mobilization.
Indeed, (drawing on social movement theory) McAdam notes that “the mobilization dynamics
of high-risk movements are likely to be qualitatively different from those of low-risk movements.”77
Moreover, studies have shown that severe repression may actually stimulate collective action,
instead of causing demobilization.78 HRF goes beyond this notion, to posit that conditions of high
risk can lead to the creation of a feminist identity that catalyzes mobilization.
In reviewing the ways in which we study and understand women who mobilize or operate in
conflict settings (above), we have not encountered explanations that adequately explain why women
might act collectively as feminists despite the associated risks of doing so. In high-risk conditions,
previously safe spaces for women (like the home, for example) become unsafe.79 It is here that
women are making the decision to (re)claim their access to safety. In doing so, their encounters
of, and experiences with violence – themselves deeply gendered – mean that this mobilization
necessarily involves challenging entrenched gendered power dynamics. Fundamentally, then,
participating in a mobilization under these circumstances is a feminist act.
This identity is strengthened through participation in mobilization; recursive repertoires
entrench a feminist identity for a feminist mobilization. That women’s behavior transgresses
traditional gender boundaries (particularly in machista Latin America) makes it feminist. Such
transgression augments the existing risks of mobilizing in the first place, as opposing actors seek
to repress women’s transformational aspirations. Furthermore, the pursuit of gender justice puts a
target on organization members’ heads, as their strategies that denounce perpetrators of violence
create a challenge to the status quo of violence.80 Importantly, these women are not mobilizing for
others (necessarily), but rather, for themselves.
It is important, again, however, not to flatten the categories of “woman” or “feminist.” The
women of AFROMUPAZ in Bogotá, for example, have a complicated relationship with the term
feminism, which for them refers to a formalized or institutionalized – and largely white, Western
– project to which they do not ascribe. Rather, they celebrate feminism in “cuerpo y cara de mujer”
(with a woman’s body and face), a category that is deeply tied up with Afro-Colombian racial
identity.81 The Colectiva Matamba in Bogotá contends with inter-group differences regarding
feminism, as outlined by an interviewee:
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…“There are some members of the Colectiva who don’t call themselves feminists…this is
because we have had lots of struggles with white feminists in the past. They only defend
what they consider women’s rights….” “Feminism is a political movement that fights for
social equality…but when Black women have never [properly] been understood as women,
I can’t buy into this understanding.”82

These differences do not necessarily impede women’s ability to form a collective identity that
permits collective action. Indeed, collective identity formation in the face of threats is one of the
take-away lessons of HRF. With that said, it is important to unpack what feminism means and how
it interacts with intersectional identities in order to avoid falling into the same reductionist trap
that I critique in this article.
This leads me to reflect on the work of Levitt and Merry, who examine “how ideas and
strategies generated by human rights and global feminist movements are vernacularized to
fit particularly historical and social contexts.”83 They interrogate the trends to focus on “top
down” cultural transfer, and instead call for a focus on how global rights packages need to be
vernacularized for local cultural repertoires. This seems fitting when discussing atrocity crime
and genocide prevention; both critical studies and practical efforts should be able to unpack the
intersectional nuances related to local context, identity, experience, and agency. These themes are
compelling discussed by Mertens and Myrttinen in their article on SGBV policy and programming
in the DR Congo. They examine how the humanitarian sector, by placing primary attention on
conflict-related rape of women and girls as opposed to other, more nuanced forms of gender-based
violence, “wittingly or unwittingly [reproduces] heteronormative and neo-liberal understandings
of what a ‘proper’ individual and family should look like…” and how this reproduction is not
necessarily congruent with the “lived realities of the affected communities in question.”84
Women Develop Sophisticated and Nuanced Senses of Agency, Resilience, and Purpose
HRF goes beyond the simple assertion that some women mobilize in high-risk contexts (when
we might not expect them to do so). It is a feminist strategy of resistance that offers women the
ability to reconstruct (intersectional) identities and create an empowering sense of agency during
seemingly out of control circumstances.
In an article that reflects on measurements of women’s empowerment, Kabeer offers a nuanced
definition of agency. This definition is multidimensional:
Agency is about more than observable action; it also encompasses the meaning, motivation,
and purpose which individuals bring to their activity, their sense of agency, or ‘the power
within’…it refers to people’s capacity to define their own life-choices and to pursue the own
goals, even in the face of opposition from others.85

It allows us to understand that the conflict-affected context in which women operate is
constrained by myriad (gendered) power dynamics. These dynamics victimize women and make
them feel powerless. Moreover, they shape their ability to make choices. Joining a HRF organization
amplifies the range of choices that women are able to make. Not only does participation in an HRF
organization highlight that “the pain of one is the pain of all”86, but women victims of the conflict
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are able to find (real and/or perceived) safety in community. There are both material and nonmaterial (psychosocial) benefits to joining, and ultimately these become more important in the
victim’s life –and indeed to her identity87 – than does avoiding the augmented risks that come with
mobilizing. HRF organizations allow women to individually and collectively develop resilience.
Indeed, when Bridget Conley-Zilkic asks “who is the subject of atrocities prevention?” she
draws on the concept of resilience and cites Pain and Levine88 when she notes: “the term can be
used to describe the ability of a community or individual to alternatively avoid collapse, recover,
or adapt.”89 In order to gain more insight into this resilience, Pain and Levine continue, we must
“focus on reducing people’s vulnerability and enhancing their agency” within a context whereby
people’s choices and actions are constrained by inequality and exclusion.90
Here, however, it is important to put some meat on the bones of concepts like “resilience.”
As Elisa von Joeden-Forgey notes: “Because gender operates in ways that are often unspoken,
gender research requires that we interpret the nature of the forces and processes we study through
myriad means that go well beyond the language of the actors involved.”91 She suggests that gender
research allows us to read genocide from the bottom up, which is a valuable contribution to
genocide prevention efforts.92 HRF can add to this conversation by studying the agency that some
women themselves develop during and after experiences of trauma. In assessing how women
choose to be the protagonists in their own futures, we can extrapolate on the most effective ways
to support these efforts. Given the dynamics of war and conflict, most of the women with whom
I have conducted fieldwork have felt, and continue to feel93, systematically ignored by the state.
They further feel that their differential needs have not been considered by either the state or aid
agencies.
For example, in Sueño de Vida Digna94, a report about the history of the Liga de Mujeres
Desplazadas, Guerrero (the leader of the organization) writes about the ways in which aid provided
by the Catholic Church was ignorant to the specific needs of women (especially those who had
suffered sexual violence). For example, the Church did not provide aid that related to women’s
sexual and reproductive health (including condoms or sanitary products). In a zone where women
were highly vulnerable to sexual abuse, she notes that the Church judged and stigmatized women
who had become pregnant: “From that moment on, we decided to manage our own humanitarian
aid, whose meaning would be re-defined by [the very women it was intended to reach].”95
HRF organizing develops a strong sense of collective identity focused around survivorship,
self-dependence, autonomy, and agency. It is about identity, about taking control of seemingly
out of control circumstances to create – essentially from nothing – an agency that was taken away
from them during periods of violence and displacement. HRF offers a lens through which to see
the independent strategies that women in high-risk contexts have adopted. Indeed, when women
felt the most isolated and the most abandoned – times in which their specific gendered needs were
not considered by either the state or aid agencies – they decided to come together in the pursuit of
87
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gender justice.
Recognizing What Women Want:
As mentioned above, women suffer conflicts differentially. When violence is widespread and
gendered, women are left in situations that are different from those of men. For example, in the
Colombian case, Meertens notes:
The armed conflict has had a considerable and disproportionate impact on women, as they
suffer specific risks and confront specific vulnerability because of their gender. Examples
include: forced displacement in conditions of marital abandonment or widowhood (leading
to an increasing number of women-headed households in displaced populations in cities);
gender-based violence and especially sexual violence by armed actors as a weapon of
war; the imposition of patriarchal models of social control by local power holders; and the
historical lack of recognition of women’s rights that has facilitated their dispossession and
violent seizure of their land.96
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Beyond this, however, and given the protracted nature of the conflict and its legacies (Nordstrom’s
“tomorrows of violence”),97 individual women can feel helpless, abandoned by the state. We saw
this in the section above; one of the outcomes of longstanding feelings of abandonment by the
state led to women developing an identity and a sense of agency that is both autonomous and
independent.
The development of this agency, identity, and purpose, however, means that women also
have formulated demands. They have spent decades fighting for their basic needs and for gender
justice, despite the exposure to violence that this has involved. As such, HRF organizations foster a
“no research about us without us” ethos. Molyneux recognizes that “one lesson that can be drawn
from the experience of working with women’s organization is that the question of ownership is
central.”98 She notes that it is not effective to impose external programs, projects, and goals: “the
question of the “ownership” of projects and goals as well as participants’ identification with the
values of the project are all critical to its success.”99
McEvoy and McConnachie warn us against co-opting women’s agency during transitional
justice processes. They discuss dynamics in which “transitional justice entrepreneurs” speak on
behalf of victims and seek to represent victims without problematizing the power relations at
play.100 This is arguably a similar dynamic to the (masculine) dynamics of genocide prevention.
This falls into traps outlined by Spivak in which the subaltern is not able to speak or represent
herself.101 Importantly, interlocutors run the risk of “re-silencing victims, negating their potential
agency, and reproducing a sense of powerlessness.”102 Beyond re-silencing, there is also a risk in
post-conflict situations of revictimizing survivors.
Broadly speaking, then, this section has shown that women who mobilize – including in nonprofessionalized, grassroots ways – do know what they want.103 They have years of operating in
dire circumstances, and through this experience have developed sophisticated, nuanced senses of
agency and resilience. As such, any interventions or policies need to respect this history. Indeed,
Sandvik and Lemaitre ask: “who gathers evidence on humanitarian crises? What counts as
evidence? How is evidence used?”104 Their article outlines a study whereby a group of women was
able to develop its own research data and use this to advance its own agenda in its interactions with
donor bodies and the government; “beneficiaries of humanitarian aid can, and do, use participatory
research to advance their own ends in the legal and political spaces created around humanitarian
crisis.”105 Studies like this highlight that: “beneficiaries’ priorities and agency in the production of
data on humanitarian crises are in need of further study.”106
Informing Intervention: Resilience and Women’s Agency
The above three points – (1) that women do mobilize despite (and because of) violent contexts,
(2) that women have developed sophisticated and nuanced identities based on their autonomous
agency, and (3) that women know what they want in both ongoing and post-conflict situations – are
salient lessons that have policy and intervention repercussions. The take-away lessons are examined
in this final section.
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As mentioned, Pain and Levine examine the concept of ‘resilience’ and the hope that ‘resiliencebuilding’ can “help bridge the persistent and much-criticized divide between emergency response
and development assistance.”107 They note that much of these discussions take place within
humanitarian circles, in crisis- and disaster-prone areas. Their paper argues, however, that instead
of focusing on building resilience, conceptual coherence will be more available if humanitarian
debates focus on reducing vulnerability and enhancing agency. They continue: “while resilience
has value as an organizing concept or mobilizing metaphor, analytically it has rather less traction
unless the discussion can move to one of understanding agency and the capacity of people to act.”108
There is compelling evidence that shows that this agency exists independently of outside
intervention. Women like those I worked with in Colombia have historically demonstrated
their ability to act collectively in the absence of resources or support. As such, when it comes to
organizations and actors who do want to intervene, such interventions should be framed within a
relationship of alliance. Women have already laid the groundwork and put in the effort – instead
of reinventing the wheel, agencies and actors should recognize the organizations’ autonomy and
find creative approaches to being allies rather than co-opting them or attempting to represent their
struggles and their demands. Figure 1 represents a mural designed and painted by a women’s
organization, the Alianza de Mujeres Tejedoras de Vida, in Bajo Putumayo, Colombia. Here, they
remember their dead, and they highlight their resilience with a text that reads: “They pulled out
our fruits, they cut our branches, they burned our trunks, but they were not able to kill our roots.”
The women continue to be threatened with violence and death by illegal armed actors in the region
because of their community activism. Preliminary research in November 2018, however, points to a
relationship that suggests the organization is able to effectively “vernacularize” and claim agency
and autonomy over the values packages promoted by the international organizations who sponsor
it (for example, the UNHRC).109

This Truth Mural, which includes the names of women murdered during the conflict, was painted
by the Alianza de Mujeres Tejedoras de Vida in Putumayo, Colombia. (Villagarzón, Putumayo,
November 2018. Credit: Julia Zulver).
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Pain and Levine conclude their article by noting that a focus on people’s agency (“their
ability to make their own choices”) will allow policymakers to design policies and interventions
that “reduce as far as possible the degree to which people live in ‘dependent security’, and the
degree to which they can be helped to have greater ‘autonomous security.’” Indeed, they continue,
“this would also ensure that policy and interventions are properly grounded in the lives of the
people affected by crises, and in the their wider political-economy context.”110 Indeed, Albright
and Cohen highlight that one of the strategies for preventing genocide is to strengthen social and
institutional safeguards: “a strong civil society will provide a bulwark against the designs of conflict
entrepreneurs.”111 Accordingly, groups that promote women’s rights should “be a particular focus
of assistance efforts.”112
What, then, can the emergent lessons of HRF offer to genocide and atrocity crime prevention?
In order to assess this question, I am drawn to reflect on a new initiative led by the Canadian
government. In 2017, the government of Justin Trudeau announced Canada’s new Feminist
International Assistance Policy.113 This policy claims that “Canadians are safer and more prosperous
when more of the world shares our values. Those values include feminism and the promotion
of the rights of women and girls.”114 Canada’s feminist approach to international assistance “has
committed to support that which is human-rights based, strategic and focused, transformative115
and activist, and evidence-based and accountable.”116 The country’s efforts specifically make
the commitment to employ evidence-based decision-making through better data collection and
evaluation of gender equality, which includes a $150 million investment (over five years) into
policy research, data collection, and evaluation.117
Starr and Mitchell, themselves Canadian researchers of sexual violence in Ethiopia, ask what
better data collection and evaluation of gender equality might mean “in the context of an explicitly
feminist international assistance policy.”118 Their article concludes with a hopeful outlook:
“[Canada’s] feminist assistance policy has an excellent chance of doing something right … if the
idea of advocacy for the local through participatory approaches with women (rather than about
women) is supported financially and in spirit.”119
As a feminist Canadian researcher myself, I too share their enthusiasm. As a note of caution:
adding women’s voices or listening to women should not be considered policy panaceas. Indeed, these
should also not be considered synonymous to full gender analysis of the dynamics of violence
(including a focus on masculinities).120 The Feminist International Assistance Policy may be the
opportunity to move away from models of intervention and development that seek to “add women
and stir” and instead actually seek to untangle the nuances and specificities of women’s agency in
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conflict settings. As Albright and Cohen suggest, finding effective ways to support women and the
“integral role” they play in civil society may in fact serve to mitigate the risks of conflict.121
What’s more, as Starr and Mitchell point out, Canada is not the only country that is taking
steps toward including gender inequality more substantially within its international assistance
programs. The United Kingdom has a new Special Envoy for Gender Equality, Sweden has a
new policy framework for development that includes global gender inequality, Norway has an
Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy, Australia has
a Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy.122 Given this host of opportunities to involve
women, to recognize their agency and their needs, and to support them in building safer worlds
for themselves, I hope that there is indeed reason to be optimistic about a future in which women’s
grassroots and local approaches to gender justice are adequately bolstered and supported by
international allies.
Conclusion
As mentioned above, HRF is not a prescriptive framework. It is further not the goal of this article to
outline a replicable, step-by-step plan under which women will decide to build and fortify a uniquely
feminist style of agency. Rather, it offers us a chance to reflect on how, in the actual or perceived
absence of any other source of aid, certain women choose to make their own decisions and take
care of themselves, despite the ongoing risks to which this exposes them. This has repercussions
that relate to genocide and atrocity crime prevention; listening to women’s experiences of violence
and focusing on grounded responses to this same violence might provide insight about how to
engage in preventative practice. In turn, this will move us away from gendered essentialism that
relegates women to the instrumentalizing role of peacebuilders.
Sandvik notes: “there can and should be many theories on the gender of violent pluralism.”123
High Risk Feminism is one of these theories; it presents a new lens through which to study
women’s mobilization and agency. Instead of viewing women solely as victims of the conflict,
or through their capacity to act as mothers (or on behalf of others), the framework allows for a
nuanced reading of women as survivors, activists, and luchadoras (fighters) in contexts of high risk.
This is an example of resilience and also of agency-building. It fulfills the imperative outlined by
Pain and Levine to focus on interventions that are grounded in every day realities, and expands on
Levitt and Merry’s call to avoid “top down” focuses on cultural (values packages) transfer.
The value of HRF, then, is that it considers not only that mobilization can take place in high-risk
contexts and improves the life of women, but also why and how such mobilization can take place.
Prevention interventions and programs – for example, like the Canadian International Feminist
Assistance Policy – do not need to reinvent the wheel but can rather offer support to strategies that
have been developed and established throughout years of struggle.
Indeed, my research in Colombia and El Salvador shows that in the absence of support, women
autonomously organized themselves into collectives that provide both material and non-material
benefits that give purpose and meaning to daily life. These organizations further provide a sense
of agency; the ability (or the perceived ability) to overcome the “tomorrows of violence” provides
hope for a better future. This feminist resistance moves beyond national peacebuilding projects
and contributes, at the grassroots level, to a larger gender justice project that calls for the undoing
of historic and engrained patterns of inequality.
While my research focuses on Latin America, there are plenty of conflict situations that could
potentially benefit from research that searches for local, feminist responses to (gender) violence
and conflict. Bearing in mind the HRF framework, scholars and policymakers could dedicate
time to identifying islands of feminist agency in high-risk contexts where we might not expect
mobilization for gender justice. A quick scan of newspaper headlines shows us that women are
taking matters into their own hands and seeking autonomous – and I would argue, feminist –
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security in the context of ongoing violence. From women’s only villages in Kenya where women
go to escape sexual violence,124 to tents that offer feminist education in women friendly spaces
in insurgent destroyed towns in the Philippines,125 to a City of Women in a northern Colombian
conflict zone,126 we can see myriad examples where women are creating spaces in which to learn
about their rights and to generate a collective feminist identity. These spaces offer reprieve from
spaces where gendered violence is pervasive and ubiquitous. Accordingly, frameworks like HRF
add to a larger conversation about how to include marginalized, silenced, or forgotten voices into
debates about prevention, inclusion, and justice.
Violence, atrocity crimes, and genocide present ongoing challenges to many women’s everyday
lives. If there is the possibility to translate academic research on HRF mobilization into action
that modifies the intensity of the “tomorrows of violence”, it is imperative that it be undertaken.
Leaving the lessons of resistance, resilience, and agency on paper would be doing a disservice to
those women who have suffered – and resisted – during and in the aftermath of violent conflict.
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Reframing Intractable Conflict
In the fields of atrocity and conflict prevention, certain cases continually serve as counterpoints for
those advocating for the potential of bringing an end to cycles of violence. They are the cases where
the divides among relevant groups seem particularly engrained, where the possibility for true
peace (and not only the absence of violence) seems specifically unlikely. Some refer to these cases
as deeply divided societies,1 but more often, particularly in the conflict prevention literature, they are
referred to as intractable conflicts. In these cases, societies are divided into specific identity groups,
which serve as predominant organizing features in their lives and their senses of belonging. Each
group tends to have its own distinct understanding of the past, which serves as a foundation for
continued division. These understandings of the past are also used to legitimate continued acts of
physical, institutional, economic, and social violence.
Although each has its own particularities, there are similarities present across the cases.
I argue, however, that by referring to these cases as “intractable conflicts,” their intractability
becomes somehow naturalized, appearing as an essential and immutable quality of these conflicts.
In other words, the very way that the field describes and understands these specific instances of
conflict is already foreclosing options for engagement and prevention, just as it is serving to obscure
interventions that may have already emerged from within these conflicts that can transform the
way they play out. Moreover, the language of intractability is frequently used to justify outside
intervention, often in the form of trained and supposedly disinterested parties from the conflict
resolution/mediation field, reinforcing a notion that the answers to transforming conflict come
from without, not from within a society.
To change the way one conceives of such conflict, I advocate turning to the analytical tools
of performance studies, a field based on the idea that our lives are often guided by certain
scripts–predetermined behaviors that play out at all levels of society, from daily interactions with
individuals to the policies initiated within the halls of government. Within these scripts, we all play
certain roles.2 Certain actions are acceptable for each role, while others seem “out of character.”
Furthermore, history and our interpretations of it have a significant impact on these scripts. What
has occurred in the past shapes what seems possible and desirable in the present and future. The
past, in other words, also performs. That is, it does things.3 Nowhere is this multi-level performance
more evident than in post-atrocity societies, where the past is one characterized by large-scale,
systematic violence against certain identity groups. And within this pool of societies that are, in
some way, post-atrocity or post-conflict, there exists a smaller subset of societies in which conflict
based on identity seems especially dogged and prolonged, and the hope for social cohesion and an
end to identity-based discord seems particularly unlikely.
This article applies a performance studies lens to illuminate the various ways that scenarios
and historical narratives inform understandings of the present and influence visions of the future
in post-atrocity societies. In particular, I focus on cases of so-called intractable conflicts. Daniel
Bar-Tal writes that intractable conflicts “are characterized as being protracted, irreconcilable,
violent, of a zero-sum nature, total, and central, with the parties involved having an interest in
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their continuation.”4 According to Louis Kriesberg, intractable conflicts exhibit four features:
1) they persist over long periods of time, including multiple generations; 2) they have, at some
point, involved physical violence; 3) members from all associated groups perceive the conflict as
irresolvable; and 4) these conflicts require the investment of massive financial, physical, mental,
emotional, and psychological resources on the part of all those involved.5 It is not difficult to call
to mind the cases that fit this bill: Israel/Palestine; Northern Ireland; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Kosovo;
Cyprus; and, in many ways, the relationship between indigenous communities and settler colonial
states. The intention of this article is not to describe in detail any one of these specific cases—as
their complexity renders such a task impossible in this article. It will include, however, examples
from some of these cases to illustrate what is ultimately a conceptual project of reframing the way
the field thinks about intractability. Rather than adding to an already long list of “best practices”
for responding to cases of intractability, this article asks to widen the lens through which those
studying and seeking to intervene view these situations. As such, this article does not intend to
provide concrete steps for conflict and atrocity prevention, but instead to redirect prevention
efforts toward supporting interventions from within these societies that are already succeeding at
re-writing the scripts that allow “intractable conflicts” to continue.
Before proceeding, it is important to delineate how and why I am eliding atrocity prevention
and conflict prevention–two fields that are often perceived as separate, particularly by their
practitioners. Traditionally, atrocity prevention is understood as necessary in the midst of largescale violence, while conflict prevention comes before and after that violence to address the
underlying, structural issues that can lead or have led to mass atrocities. If one views atrocity
prevention, however, not only as intervention at the height of crisis, but the actual attempt to
prevent such crisis from occurring at all, then it inherently also involves addressing the structural
factors that could lead to atrocity violence.6 In many cases, those underlying factors are related to
the identity-based divisions one finds in seemingly intractable scenarios. As such, in this article I
speak about conflict prevention and atrocity prevention as two sides of the same coin, given that
it is difficult to name any so-called “intractable conflict” that has not experienced mass atrocity at
some point.
Just a few synonyms that pop up from a Google search of “intractable” include “unmanageable,”
“out of control,” and “impossible to cope with.” This attitude of “impossibility” tinges not only
external attempts to moderate intergroup conflict in these cases, but also limits the potential that
those living within these societies see as solutions for these “out of control” situations. Because of
this, I suggest in this article that, rather than conceptualizing these conflicts as somehow essentially
intractable, it is more useful to perceive them as embodied enactments of scenarios of intractability,
which I define below.
In this article, I argue that scenarios of intractability exhibit several specific characteristics, each
of which increases the perception that identity-based divisions are an insurmountable and natural
reality within their societal context. These characteristics are deeply ingrained because they have
been essentialized through a long history of discursive and embodied actions that further division
among groups, rather than offering opportunities for social cohesion and the dissipation of violent
conflict. Furthermore, these divisions are often reinforced rather than mitigated through external
conflict resolution and atrocity prevention efforts. I begin by defining scenarios of intractability
and outlining their characteristics, focusing on the ways in which past conflict continues to present
itself in the present and shape visions of the future. By recognizing these common characteristics,
actors within scenarios of intractability can modify their own performances by engaging in what I
call mitigating interventions–embodied or discursive actions emerging from within a given society
that rewrite the script and push the scenario toward an alternative ending. This article outlines
some potential mitigating interventions that have emerged within scenarios of intractability to
4
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demonstrate how these interventions can transform the way these conflicts play out, mitigating
the risk factors associated with mass atrocity violence in the process. Additionally, echoing the
call of scholars like Bridget Moix to “turn atrocity prevention inside-out,”7 it calls for a reframing
of atrocity prevention and conflict prevention/resolution/transformation as phenomena that can
and perhaps should emerge from within these scenarios of intractability, rather than from external
actors.
Scenarios of Intractability
I take the term scenario, as it is herein conceived, from performance studies scholar Diana Taylor,
who defines a scenario as “a paradigmatic setup that relies on supposedly live participants,
structured around a schematic plot, with an intended (though adaptable) end.”8 They exist, she
continues, as “culturally specific imaginaries–sets of possibilities, ways of conceiving conflict, crisis,
or resolution–activated with more or less theatricality.”9 In other words, scenarios are like social
scripts that get played out repeatedly, with the specifics changing, but the underlying themes,
actions, and players remaining the same.10 Scenarios include discourse and are impacted by, for
instance, historical narratives–that is, interpretations of the past presented through the written or
spoken word. Analyzing these cases of conflict as scenarios rather than only narratives, however,
allows us to attend to the spoken and unspoken, the discursive and the embodied, ways in which
identity-based division plays out in cases of so-called intractable conflict. Herein lies a central
contribution of performance studies to genocide studies: it forces us to understand genocide and
violence more broadly as an embodied phenomenon, which is certainly enacted through words and
narratives, but also through daily social interactions, public policy, the organization of public space,
and the flow of capital. Richard Schechner, one of the founders of the field, describes performance
as “restored behavior,” or the embodied actions that are played and replayed in our lives, whether
they be in the context of a theatrical production or one’s daily routine.11 These embodied actions
or interactions take place within the context of a scenario, and depending on that scenario, each
action can take on a different valence. Understanding the rules of the scenarios playing out within
deeply divided societies both offers a new lens for comprehending these conflicts and opens up
opportunities for “flipping the script,” thereby creating alternative pathways that might break out
of these scenarios that get performed and reperformed in more or less similar ways on a daily basis.
I posit, then, that a scenario of intractability is one in which the “script” of identity-based division
and conflict has become so central to daily interactions and discourse, as well as social, political,
and economic structures, that it is perceived as natural, immutable, and irreversible. In scenarios of
intractability, division among identity groups is so deeply ingrained that it has become part of what
Pierre Bourdieu refers to as habitus–the structures and presuppositions within a society that underly
all actions and discourse, but which are so taken for granted that they are assumed to be natural
and inalterable, even if they are, in fact, not.12 Habitus shapes what is perceived to be possible. This
sense of conflict as habitus is supported in certain of the conflict resolution literature. For instance,
Howard Gadlin writes, “When caught up in an intractable conflict, […] it often appears as if it is
the conflict directing the disputants rather than the other way around.”13 Adrian Guelke describes
7
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deeply divided societies as existing within a “force field” that exacerbates and reproduces internal
divisions.14 This force field metaphor connotes both the insular, self-perpetuating nature of these
scenarios, but perhaps also alludes to the difficulty of external intervention. The force field of these
deep divisions makes it more challenging for disinterested actors both to enter into the scenario
and to provide the tools for resolving the divisions. In scenarios of intractability, the habitus is such
that identity divisions among groups are perceived as not only essential, but also as the source of
an unbridgeable gulf. Furthermore, the source of conflict between these groups is understood both
as historical–having some former precedent that justifies the conflict–and as irreversible–extending
far into the future, without much hope for resolution.
The great hope of seeing cases of intractable conflict instead as scenarios of intractability is that
participants within these scenarios can begin to understand the underlying scripts that surround
them, as well as the roles that they are asked to play in reinforcing those scripts. By making obvious
the components that go into creating scenarios of intractability, their constructed nature becomes
more evident. As a result, it presents participants with opportunities to “flip the script”–to reject
the roles that habitus would have them play and introduce new dialogue and embodied actions
into these scenarios that can lead to alternative endings. Importantly, these new interventions could
emerge from within the “force field” of the scenario, rather than relying solely on interventions
from without, in the form of the external mediation tactics or preventive diplomacy efforts that are
often advocated.15 In many ways, thinking about intractable conflicts as scenarios of intractability
echoes a call by some scholars to move to a more systems-based understanding of these cases.16
Such an approach understands these conflicts “as dynamic, complex systems,”17 or, as Coleman
puts it, “living entities made up of a variety of interdependent and interactive elements, nested
within other, interestingly complex entities.”18 A complex, systems-based approach to these cases,
then, allows interested parties “to stop approaching conflicts as problems that need to be fixed […]
and instead think of them as systems with underlying dynamics that need to shift.”19
From this perspective, a scenario paradigm aligns in many ways with a systems paradigm in
that it captures the vast complexity of actors, institutions, and practices that contribute to social
division. This systems approach to conflict resolution, however, has until now been developed
by scholars from fields like economics, political science, biology, and other fields that rely largely
on quantitative methodologies.20 A performance studies approach via scenario thinking expands
the focus from quantifiably measurable data sets to the qualitative analysis of embodied practices,
historical narratives, and daily social interaction as key components in understanding and shifting
the dynamics that underly division. Those working within a systems paradigm are also still
susceptible to the notion that the key to conflict resolution comes from without. For instance,
Gadlin, citing Coleman, asserts that “people in intractable conflicts are often trapped in those
conflicts and need help to get free.”21 Thinking in terms of scenarios of intractability, on the other
hand, opens the door to explore what mitigating interventions are already taking place within
the scenario itself. The question then becomes not what can be done from the outside to “fix” the
problems of another society, but rather how those mitigating interventions can be supported and
amplified to lead to more lasting change created from within.
Before delving into the ways scenarios of intractability can and have been mitigated, I begin
by highlighting four characteristics that can be found across these scenarios that increase the risk
14
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for identity-based violence, providing cursory examples from specific cases to illustrate these
characteristics. These illustrations are admittedly oversimplified and brief. They are intended
merely as a means of illuminating the theoretical underpinnings of the article, rather than providing
an in-depth case study of any one instance of a scenario of intractability.
Competitive Victimhood
First, scenarios of intractability are supported by an underlying logic of us-them thinking–a
necessary precondition for identity-based violence. Scenarios of intractability enhance us-them
divisions, allowing each group involved to depict the in-group as victims and the out-group as
victimizers. This feature of scenarios of intractability pushes all groups involved to focus on the
assignment of blame/responsibility, rather than attempting to forge a new path forward in which
opposing groups can co-exist. As such, scenarios of intractability encourage what Noor, Brown,
and Prentice refer to as a subjective evaluation of past violence.22 Each group involved chooses to view
the violence only from its own perspective. When a group has perpetrated violence, subjective
evaluation encourages them to justify that violence either as a defense against an existential threat
from the other group or as somehow righteously motivated. When it comes to victimization,
subjective evaluation pushes groups to see only their own suffering, rather than how other groups
may have also suffered, albeit in different ways.
Another result of this characteristic of scenarios of intractability is the fostering of competitive
victimhood.23 Noor et al. write:
This concept refers to each group’s effort to claim that it has suffered more than the outgroup. Moreover, this competition over the quantity of suffering also implies some
dispute over the illegitimacy of suffering. That is, “not only have we suffered more than
you, but it is decidedly unfair that we have.”24
Competitive victimhood (CV) keeps division going, as it serves as an undergirding source of
enduring conflict, even in periods in which physical violence has ceded. Noor et al. write that
CV directly contributes “to conflicts’ continuation, escalation, and the impediment of potential
resolutions.”25 As groups seek to underscore their own suffering, framing it as either the only true
example or, at the very least, the worst example of suffering, CV prevents the development of
empathy, which many argue to be an essential component of reconciliation or, at the very least, the
prevention of future violence.26
Competitive victimhood can be found in most, if not all, of the scenarios of intractability listed
at the beginning of this article, but one of the most obvious examples of this first characteristic of
scenarios of intractability comes from Israel/Palestine. In this scenario, both Jewish Israelis and
Palestinians cast themselves in the role of victims who have suffered and continue to suffer at the
hands of the other group. To varying degrees, members from both sides have been responsible for
the perpetration of violence, but each frames their use of violence as defensive and necessary, while
explaining the other group’s use of violence as excessive and as an existential threat. Furthermore,
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both groups have historical experiences of trauma–the Holocaust for Jewish Israelis and the Naqba
for Palestinians–that continue to frame their understandings of the present and serve as a source
of competitive victimhood. This appeal to victimhood on both sides increases at least partly due to
what Pilecki and Hammack describe as the empowering potential that comes from victim status.27
They write that, in their study, victimhood narratives “allowed Palestinians to explain their low
status within the conflict by framing it as a product of Jewish Israeli aggression.”28 Likewise, they
write that Jewish Israeli participants used a similar narrative “to reestablish moral status while
also engendering sympathy and understanding for Jewish Israeli actions.”29 For both sides, then,
victim status is used to establish a position of power and justification, rather than to assert some
self-deprecatory or self-defeating feeling at the heart of the in-group’s identity.
Mutually Exclusive Historical Narratives
Second, in scenarios of intractability, historical narratives–that is, the stories each group tells itself
about its past and uses to justify its actions in the present–rest on a claim of mutual exclusivity. The
narratives of each group do not allow for disagreement, contention, or alternative perspectives.
Most important, they do not allow for the existence of the out-group’s narrative or understanding
of the past. The very presence of the out-group’s narrative is perceived not only as an attack on the
in-group, but as an existential threat to the in-group’s existence. Social psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal,
one of the foremost experts on intractable conflicts, writes that historical narratives within cases of
intractable conflict “do not intend to provide an objective history of the past, but tell about the past
as it is functional to the society’s present existence, especially given its confrontation with the rival
society.”30 He continues, “Thus, they create a socially constructed narrative that has some basis in
actual events but is biased, selective, and distorted in ways that meet the society’s present needs.”31
I would only add that, although these narratives are subjective and selective, they present themselves
as objective and total, hence their mutual exclusivity.
In his essay “Public Memory in Place and Time,” philosopher Edward S. Casey lays out a fourpart typology of memory.32 Individual memory describes the recollections that an individual has about
events she has experienced directly. Social memory is his designation for “memory held in common
by those who are affiliated either by kinship ties, by geographical proximity in neighborhoods,
cities, and other regions, or by engagement in a common project” 33–that is, by members of a given
identity group. Collective memory occurs when “different persons, not necessarily known to each
other at all, nevertheless recall the same event”34–that is, when an event exceeds the frame of any
one identity group, creating new opportunities for “plural remembering.”35 The final category,
public memory, emerges when these group memories bring people together in the public sphere.
Public memory occurs through shared practices of memorialization and commemoration, which
create new collectives, at least in the moment of togetherness.
Elsewhere, I write about the political potential that exists through public memory–the power
and agency that can emerge through groups of people, once isolated, coming together around
experiences of the past.36 Historical narratives in scenarios of intractability do not allow for the
27
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breaking down of walls and divisions necessary for public memory to emerge. In fact, they do not
even allow for collective memory, because they fail to acknowledge the realities and emotions of
any group other than the in-group. Historical narratives in these scenarios belong only to the realm
of social memory. They exist within the framework of one identity community. At the same time,
however, these narratives claim to be collective, public, and authoritative. They do not make space
for alternative understandings of the past.
In the United States, for instance, historical violence against Indigenous communities is
viewed completely differently by the US government and the Indigenous communities themselves.
Although most Indigenous communities understand colonialism and the historical and continuing
dispossession of their land as an act of genocide, the US government (like many other settler
colonial governments) prefers to see such violence and dispossession as a reality of the past that
is unfortunate but is no longer up for debate in contemporary political discourse. There has been
little real conversation regarding land restitution in the United States, nor is there likely to be in
the future. Furthermore, the US government depicts Indigenous communities that make claims for
land restitution as unrealistic and unreasonable. There is no room for the co-existence of these two
narratives in the discussion.
Past Violence as Justification for Present and Future Violence
Third, in scenarios of intractability, actors recall past conflicts as a continual justification for action–
including discrimination, violation of human rights, and violent conflict–in the present. I have
already presented that one of the key features of scenarios of intractability is that they frame the
in-group as victims of the out-group. Through this third feature, the in-group frames itself not only
as victims, but as what Pilecki and Hammack refer to as righteous victims.37 That is, in scenarios
of intractability, the in-group frames itself as the protagonist and justifies its use of violence and
discrimination based on a right to self-defense and self-preservation. Within these scenarios, the
in-group sees itself as under an existential threat from the out-group(s). Under these conditions,
their use of violence is presented as righteous, while the victimization of the out-group is equally
justified, given that, were it not for the in-group’s actions, the out-group would surely attack and
eliminate the in-group.
A prime example of this behavior comes from Serbia during the civil wars that subsumed
the Balkans in the 1990s. In the years preceding this conflict–and indeed still today–leaders from
Serbia and Republika Srpska constantly evoked the 1389 Battle of Kosovo in public speeches and
discourse. During this historic battle, Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and his forces faced the
invading Ottoman Empire in battle and ultimately lost (though the Ottomans faced losses, as well).
Today, Serb nationals evoke this historic battle as a means of justifying violence against Bosnian
Muslims, who, in this narrative, are framed as the invading Ottomans. Similarly, Serb nationalists
also speak of the ultranationalist Croatian Ustasha and their actions against Serbs during World
War II. The Ustasha, which was aligned with the Nazis, persecuted not only Jewish people, but also
Serbs within Croatian territory. Ethnic Serbs faced genocidal violence at the hands of the Ustasha
during the 1940s. Today, Serb nationalists use the memory of this violence to justify violence and
discrimination against ethnic Croats.
Both these instances are examples of what Vamik Volkan calls time collapse, through which
“the interpretations, fantasies and feelings about a past shared trauma commingle with those
pertaining to a current situation.”38 Volkan points out that, in cases of time collapse, subjects may
be very well able to understand intellectually that an historic event is not connected to the present
moment, but the emotional tie between the past and present remains completely real. I would go
even further to say that, in fact, public memory itself is an example of time collapse, through which
actors tie the past with the present. Time collapse itself, then, is not always bad. Rather, it is how
this collapse of time justifies division and violence where the true problems lie.
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 321–351; Kerry Whigham, “Remembering to Prevent: The Preventive
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A Divided Future
Finally, scenarios of intractability paint a picture in which the only positive future is one without
the out-group. Whether the out-group is annihilated or simply removed from the territory, these
scenarios leave no room for a heterogenous society within which the in-group and out-group can
peacefully co-exist. They do not only depict the in-group as justified and righteous; they depict
the out-group as unreasonable, underhanded, and dangerous. Because of this, conversation and
consensus do not appear as viable options. Furthermore, through framing the only viable future in
this way, scenarios of intractability reinforce their own perpetuation. By default, the scenario must
continually be replayed until this vision of the future without the out-group comes into being.
In all the scenarios of intractability I have enumerated earlier in this article, the stop-gap measure
that has been implemented to deal with the reality that a significant portion of all groups cannot
envision a peaceful future with the out-group in it has been territorial separation, as evidenced
through, for example, the partitioning of the Gaza Strip and West Bank in Israel/Palestine; the
separation of Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods in Northern Ireland; the “Balkanization” of
former Yugoslavia and the stark segregation of most cities and towns across Bosnia-Herzegovina
based on ethnic identity; and the demarcation of reservations for Native American populations in
the United States. Even if these territorial divisions serve to dispel some (though certainly not all)
violent conflict, they are completely unsustainable, as they allow for and even encourage identity
divisions to continue. Even more, these territorial divisions promote the replaying of the scenarios
of intractability that underly these divisions and that have contributed to violence in the past,
putting these societies at continued risk for violent conflict in the present and future.
Underlying this entire reality is a dehumanizing impulse that categorizes the outgroup as
immoral and, therefore, not worthy of the same rights and recognitions as the in-group. Ultimately,
it is impossible to imagine a liberal democracy,39 free of violent conflict, that is not based at its core
on the idea that every human has basic rights that are inherent to her humanity. Concomitantly,
a democratic system must be based on the belief that all are equal before the law. According to
Ernesto Verdeja, this basic form of mutual respect lies at the heart of bringing an end to scenarios of
intractability.40 He writes: “Respect is not reserved for exceptional circumstances or for exceptional
people; rather, it follows from recognizing others as having inherent rather than instrumental
moral worth by virtue of being persons.”41 Without nurturing an understanding that all human
beings have not only moral worth, but an array of internationally agreed-upon rights that come
along with their very humanity, it will be impossible to bring an end to scenarios of intractability
like those discussed here.
To reiterate, scenarios of intractability are self-perpetuating scripts that shape embodied
actions, discourse, and social interactions, increasing division among groups and keeping alive the
tensions that can lead to further violence in the future. They are characterized by four qualities.
Scenarios of intractability: 1) promote us-them thinking and competitive victimhood; 2) foreclose
the possibility for alternative interpretations of the past; 3) recall the past to justify discrimination
and/or outright violence; and 4) offer no option for coexistence in the future. Through the enactment
of these characteristics, scenarios of intractability keep the affective force behind violent conflict
alive, pushing participants within these scenarios to re-perform these conflicts at all social levels
and on a daily basis. That is to say, these scenarios increase or sustain the risk factors that make
mass atrocity violence more probable.42 When actors within these scenarios begin to recognize the
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way they play out, however, there exists the opportunity to “flip the script,” offering mitigating
interventions that can potentially lead to alternative, more positive endings.
Mitigating Interventions, or “Flipping the Script”
Mitigating interventions are embodied actions performed by participants within a scenario that
divert it toward unexpected ends. In the cases of scenarios of intractability, mitigating interventions
disrupt the four characteristics of scenarios I detail above. Rather than stoking the flames of identitybased division and, thus, heightening the risks associated with mass atrocity violence, mitigating
interventions open the door for connection and cohesion across differences. In the process, they
can help reduce some of the risk factors most commonly associated with mass atrocity violence,
and consequently serve as a preventive force.
Currently there are numerous risk assessment models, all of which use quantitative and/or
qualitative data to evaluate the risk that a society will fall victim to genocide or mass atrocity
violence. The first was developed by Helen Fein43 over 25 years ago, and it has since been followed
with models developed by Barbara Harff,44 Benjamin Goldsmith et al.,45 the United Nations,46 the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,47 and James Waller.48 Each of these models asserts that
certain factors, when present, make identity-based violence or mass killing more likely (though not
certain). Scenarios of intractability are particularly dangerous because they increase or maintain
certain of the risk factors identified by these models, and thus make the recurrence of mass atrocity
violence more likely. It is for this reason that one can consider the transformation of conflict in the
scenarios as part and parcel with long-term atrocity prevention.
Traditionally, measuring the ability of any initiative or intervention to prevent genocide or
mass atrocity violence has been a difficult task. Many believe that, in order to prove an intervention
prevented mass violence, one would first have to prove that mass violence was inevitable and
would have occurred were it not for a specific intervention. Of course, this standard of proof is
too high, as proving a non-event is an impossibility. Instead, we must refocus our standards for
evaluating preventive impact.49 There is large-scale agreement on the risk factors that often precede
mass atrocity violence, and risk assessment models offer quantitative data as evidence that these
factors are, in fact, predictive. These risk factors fall into a number of categories that impact a wide
array of aspects of socio-political life, including factors related to governance, economic conditions,
conflict history, and social fragmentation.50 Given the consensus that has developed around many
of these risk factors, I assert that we can evaluate the preventive potential of any intervention by
assessing its capacity to reduce any one of the risk factors associated with mass atrocity violence.
Scenario thinking helps to explain how these risk factors manifest through words and practice in
social and political life. When participants within scenarios of intractability recognize these tropes,
their constructed nature becomes evident, and participants can perform mitigating interventions
that take the scenario in unexpected directions that can reduce, rather than reproduce, some of
these risk factors. Recognizing these unexpected moments may be key in finding the successful
means for emerging from the constantly looping cycle of intractability.

from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,” The American Political Science
Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 57–73; Waller, Confronting Evil.
43

Helen Fein, “Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and Some Findings,” International Journal on Group Rights 1,
no. 2 (1993), 79–106.

44

Harff, No Lessons Learned.

45

Goldsmith et al, Forecasting the Onset of Genocide and Politicide.

46

United Nations, “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention” (UN Office of the Special Advisers
on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014).

47

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Early Warning Project — United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,”
accessed June 21, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/how-to-prevent-genocide/early-warning-project.

48

Waller, Confronting Evil.

49

Whigham, Remembering to Prevent.

50

Waller, Confronting Evil.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.3.1671

Scenarios of Intractability

53

Thus far in this article I have explored some of the ways in which scenarios of intractability
increase or sustain the risk factors associated with atrocity violence. I now turn to how mitigating
interventions can decrease these risk factors and open opportunities for breaking the loop inherent
to scenarios of intractability. Scenarios of intractability produce discourses and practices of division
that sustain the risk factors for mass violence, but mitigating interventions, to which I now turn, are
performative in the way that, through their enactment, they diminish certain risk factors, making
mass atrocity violence less likely.
Recognizing and Acknowledging
First, whereas scenarios of intractability promote us-them thinking that highlights the divisions
among groups and encourages competitive victimhood, mitigating interventions can foster empathy
for the suffering of others as a key aspirational value. Typically, in scenarios of intractability,
members of the in-group are resistant to acknowledge any responsibility for the violence
perpetrated by their group, instead focusing on the suffering they themselves have experienced.
This unwillingness to acknowledge the suffering of others sustains several risk factors associated
with mass atrocity crimes. For instance, Waller’s risk assessment model51 points out two indicators
of risk, in particular, that are strengthened by an unwillingness to engage with the suffering of
others. First, denial of others’ suffering strengthens identity-based social divisions, given that
denial and competitive victimhood only fortifies in-group/out-group distinctions. Second, it can
also cultivate what Waller calls a “legacy of vengeance or group grievance,” whereby the group
whose suffering goes unacknowledged finds it impossible to make inroads into new relationships
with the outgroup because resentment toward that group is too high.
Mitigating interventions start from a basis of mutual respect, that is, as Verdeja puts it, “the
reciprocal recognition of the moral worth and dignity of others.”52 Mutual respect is, at its core,
empathic, because it supposes that all individuals, regardless of their identity, are subject to the
same rights and responsibilities, and when those rights are violated for one group, it is an affront
to all groups. Rather than starting from a place of competitive victimhood, mitigating interventions
acknowledge the suffering of others. Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that groups deny
their own suffering–only that they permit that other groups have also suffered.
Acknowledgment of the suffering of others is often a key opening step in improving
relations among conflicting groups and breaking the cycle of scenarios of intractability. Lack
of acknowledgment of all groups’ experiences can lead to a social imbalance that inhibits
peacebuilding efforts and encourages social fragmentation and vengeful feelings. Acknowledgment
of the suffering of others coincides with a recognition of the out-group as moral agents who
have had their rights violated.53 As Elazar Barkan puts it, “The road to reconciliation begins with
acknowledgment.”54 This recognition of the other group’s pain, however, requires some level of
empathy, and empathy is never a given in these situations. One study conducted by Cehajić and
Brown finds that “lack of empathy and perspective taking” is one of the key factors that prevents
groups from acknowledging their own misdeeds in the aftermath of violent conflict.55 Too often,
it is difficult to develop empathy for the out-group because high levels of social fragmentation
prevent the in-group from ever being in contact with out-group members. As a result, many ingroup members hear only the divisive rhetoric of intractability repeated back to them in an echo
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chamber. One method of generating empathy is through facilitating intergroup contact.56 Cehajić
and Brown write, “Exposing perpetrators to the stories of survivors may facilitate perspective
taking and, hence, empathy. In turn, this might increase psychological readiness to acknowledge
the in-group’s morally objectionable behavior.”57 Contact theory has also generated critiques,
however, which argue that intergroup contact often occurs in non-optimal conditions and over too
short a period of time to have a lasting impact.58 One recent study finds that, in fact, contact may
do very little to eliminate prejudice (discriminatory thoughts) toward others, but can do quite well
at mitigating the enactment of those prejudices through discriminatory behavior.59
Aside from these issues relating to contact and empathy, the process of recognition must
also be reciprocal for it to open the paths to reconciliation. The in-group may make the step of
acknowledging the out-group’s suffering, but this recognition must be met with a recognition in
turn. In many scenarios of intractability, violence has been perpetrated by both sides. This said,
the violence perpetrated or experienced by each side may not have been equal. Indeed, in some
scenarios of intractability, the levels of violence are so imbalanced that it is difficult and, indeed,
insensitive to even speak of equality of responsibility in any way. Because of this, it is important
to point out that the reciprocal recognition I advocate is not one that promotes full-out forgiveness
with no accountability. Rather, it is a recognition of each group’s moral worth. Furthermore, it
is a recognition that, should some form of accountability be necessary, this accountability will
take place through the avenues of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Recognition, then,
does not necessarily mean full recognition of what the out-group wants recognized. Instead, it is
a requirement that each group recognizes the other’s humanity, their rights, and their equality
before the law.
An example of a mitigating intervention based on the precepts of recognition comes from the
state of Maine in the United States. In 2012, five chiefs from the Wabanaki nation and the governor
of Maine signed a mandate officially instituting the Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. The TRC was established in response to decades of abuse, during
which Indigenous children from the Wabanaki people were taken from their families and placed
in the state child welfare system. The result was decades of forced assimilation to non-Indigenous
culture and the concomitant destruction of Native culture and community. According to the
Commission’s mandate, its goals were “to uncover and acknowledge the truth, create opportunities
to heal and learn from that truth, and collaborate to operate the best child welfare system possible
for Wabanaki children.”60 Over the course of three years, the five commissioners, which included
both Native and non-Native individuals, collected testimony and gathered information on the
abuses experienced by the Wabanaki. Their findings were published in a final report in 2015.61 For
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centuries, the relationship between Native nations and the United States government has played
out as a scenario of intractability, characterized by all the four elements detailed earlier in this
article. The Maine Wabanaki TRC is the first in US history in which a state government and a
Native community agreed to come together to investigate the crimes that occurred. As such, it
served as a powerful mitigating intervention that disrupted the traditional script of the scenario of
intractability, principally through the act of recognition and acknowledgment of the Wabanaki’s
experience and the state’s role in that experience.
Allowing for Alternative Perspectives
According to the UN’s Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes one risk indicator of atrocity
violence is the presence of “ideologies based on the supremacy of a certain identity or on extremist
versions of identity,”62 and one way these supremacist ideologies are enacted in scenarios of
intractability is through mutually exclusive historical narratives that do not allow room for
alternative interpretations of the past. To counter the mutual exclusivity that characterizes
scenarios of intractability, mitigating interventions open space for alternative understandings of
the past to exist in parallel. These other versions of the past are not understood as an existential
threat, but are instead indicators of an open public sphere, in which differences can be debated
without leading to violent conflict. This statement requires several important caveats. Allowing
alternative understandings of the past does not mean acknowledging the factuality of assertions
that are empirically untrue. Nor does it mean that actors on either side should not try to influence,
contest, and alter the historical narrative of the other side. Rather, what mitigating interventions
can do is reshape the terms of the debate.
The goal for which all sides in scenarios of intractability should work is not one in which
conflict disappears, but one in which violent conflict and the threat of such violence is eliminated.
Mitigating interventions are not necessarily directed at eliminating conflict itself but allowing
for differing perspectives to co-exist. The distinctions between these opposing narratives or
perspectives–which are often important distinctions, especially from the subject position of each
group–are negotiated in the public sphere through democratic discourse and healthy, agonistic
debate. This reframing of conflict underscores that discord, in and of itself, is not a risk factor;
rather, disagreement is dangerous when it is perceived as existentially threatening, and therefore
worthy of response through physical violence. One of the most compelling recent arguments for
this agonistic perspective of conflict in scenarios of intractability comes from Sarah Maddison.
She writes, “Conflict is an essential democratic dynamic that may enable political actors to contest
unjust situations, suggesting that there may need to be more rather than less conflict in order for
political goals to be achieved.”63 In all cases, it is not the existence of conflict itself that is the problem,
but the kind of conflict. In response, Maddison argues for a model of political agonism, which is a
mode of understanding and managing conflict as a reality that is constitutive of democracies and
constructive in building more resilient societies, as long as that conflict remains civil and plays out
within the realms of democratic institutions. Maddison writes that “the primary task of democracy
is to convert antagonism into agonism and enemies into adversaries.”64 Mitigating interventions,
then, are ones that reframe the out-group not as an existential enemy, but as a contentious partner
in constructing a democratic society together. As any multi-party political system in the world
demonstrates, this is not always an easy process. All sides can still have completely different ideas
about what occurred in the past, what their new society should look like, or how a collective future
can be achieved. What is important, however, is that these disagreements play out in an open
public sphere in which all groups have a seat at the table, and mitigating interventions allow that
different views of the past do not foreclose interactions in the present.
As I mentioned, however, the need for mitigating interventions that allow for alternative
understandings of the past to exist in parallel does not mean that empirical facts should be thrown
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out the window. For instance, there is no room in a democratic society to allow for genocide
denial as a viable alternative perspective of the past. It is not based on factual truth, and it only
serves to create division, as well as to devalue and dehumanize victims. As Verdeja puts it, truth
telling in the aftermath of mass violence is both a right (of the victims) and a duty (to the victims).65
That said, Verdeja also contends that successful reconciliatory efforts should acknowledge three
different aspects of truth. First, there is factual truth, which is understood and produced through
investigations of evidence relating to acts of violence. Factual truth “is concerned with empirically
ascertainable events and actions, as well as the concomitant rules and procedures of verification
that these require.”66 Phenomenological truth, on the other hand, describes the subjective and felt
truth that is experienced and understood by individuals who have lived through large-scale
violence. Finally, narrative truth describes how these other two components of truth get combined
with current social and political realities to shape the stories we tell each other about the past.
In scenarios of intractability, where perspectives and worldviews are typically understood as
mutually exclusive and existentially threatened, to consider the reality that the out-group also has a
phenomenological truth that, even if it may not be factually true, is no less true to them, subjectively
speaking, is in and of itself a mitigating intervention. By granting the possibility that the out-group
has a view of the world that, at least from its own perspective, is valid and truthful, a participant
within the scenario of intractability derails a central characteristic that keeps the scenario on track.
Recognizing this phenomenological truth also corresponds with the sort of recognition I mention
above–a form of acknowledging the out-group’s humanity, making them more willing and more
likely to take a seat at the table to begin the difficult work of transforming enemies into adversaries.
An example of a mitigating intervention that literally and figuratively acknowledges that
multiple truths can exist in parallel comes from Israel-Palestine. In 2001, in the midst of the Second
Intifada, the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME) brought together Palestinian
and Israeli teachers to create a textbook that told the story of Israel-Palestine’s most contentious
historical moments from the perspective of both Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians. The teachers
worked to craft the narratives, which recognized the factual, phenomenological, and narrative
truths of both sides. These narratives were then placed side-by-side in a textbook so that, for
instance, as the left side of the page talks about the “War of Independence,” the right side of the
page discusses “The Catastrophe [An-Nakbeh].” The teachers then began to use the book in their
classrooms, and for many of their students, it was the first time they were exposed to the outgroup’s understanding of the past.67 The mitigating intervention of this textbook thus disrupted
one of the key characteristics of scenarios of intractability by showing that the narratives can, in
fact, exist in parallel without necessarily taking away from identity of the in-group.
Directing Negative Emotions to Positive Ends
The UN’s Framework also describes the “politicization of past grievances, tensions, or impunity”
as a key risk indicator for atrocity crimes.68 Although the violent past is typically understood as
a painful one, mitigating interventions are those that work against the tendency for scenarios
of intractability to politicize that pain, transforming it into vengeance or revenge fantasies. It is
without question that victims and people who have suffered during periods of mass violence have
the right to feel pain–and feel it fully. I say this to emphasize that cultivating a culture that allows
for antagonistic groups to move forward and build a society together is not synonymous with
either a lack of memory or a lack of justice. Too often a rhetoric of “moving forward” or “moving
on” is taken up by the groups who are responsible for causing the gravest amounts of suffering
during periods of violence. Because of this, “moving forward” is typically a euphemism for two
things: denialism and impunity. Both only play into and perpetuate scenarios of intractability,
Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree.
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and neither should be cultivated or encouraged if what a society wants is actually to move forward
together.
Elsewhere, I offer a strong critique not only of these calls to forget the past, but even of
their realizability.69 Although it may be easier for former perpetrators and bystanders to forget
the violence that occurred, victims inevitably have a much harder time forgetting. Furthermore,
as Verdeja70 and Mihaela Mihai71 rightly note, given that victims are the ones whose rights were
violated, any newly established state has the responsibility to ensure that those victims are doubly
recognized: assured that their rights will be respected by the new regime and that the rule of law is
re-established, so that other’s rights are not similarly violated. The rule of law, of course, cannot be
fully established if those who perpetrated crimes are not brought to justice.72 Therefore, a state that
claims to have reinstated the rule of law but has not developed any mechanisms for accountability
is speaking out of both sides of its mouth.
This focus on the rule of law and democratic institution building is an essential aspect of the
mitigating interventions that will truly transform scenarios of intractability to bring about a future
in which more violence is not always on the horizon. This does not mean that negative emotions
do not and should not exist in the context of post-atrocity societies on all sides of a conflict, but,
as Mihai elucidates, that these emotions should be siphoned into appropriate avenues of redress–
those that reinforce democratic institutions and the rule of law.73 Mihai points out that, in postatrocity contexts, two negative emotions tend to present themselves: resentment, or the negative
feeling that stems from having experienced an injustice, and indignation, or the negative feeling
that stems from witnessing an injustice done to others. In many cases, these feelings of resentment
and indignation fuel a public discourse that justifies vengeance. One clear example Mihai gives is
the show-trial and execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceașescu in the aftermath of the 1989 revolution
in Romania. Another example can be seen in the historical narratives of post-civil war BosniaHerzegovina, in the ways that Serbs cite the Battle of Kosovo as a means of stoking feelings of
resentment that can then be used to justify violence.
Mihai accurately points out that not only is it a futile task to try to eliminate these emotions in a
post-atrocity context, but ignoring these emotions also ignores the opportunities that they present.
Post-atrocity regimes can take advantage of these emotions to build democratic institutions and
model the sorts of civic behavior that can lead to the reduction of risk factors for further atrocity
violence. Rather than allowing resentment to fuel vengeful acts that deny the human rights and
moral value of perpetrators–acts that only reinforce the script of the scenario of intractability–
democratic regimes can direct these emotions to support the rule of law. Through democratic judicial
proceedings and the establishment of public policy that protects the rights of all individuals, these
institutions model what Mihai calls “democratic appropriateness,” meaning they acknowledge
and offer redress for the injustices experienced by an individual or group without violating the
human rights of another individual or group.74 This approach also recognizes that the resentment
expressed by perpetrators who are brought to justice within a democratic framework is not, in
fact, democratically appropriate–an understanding that is equally important to model within a
post-atrocity context.75 Mitigating interventions of this sort acknowledge the legitimate injustices
that have been experienced while at the same time ensuring these injustices are answered within a
system that protects the human rights of all individuals.
It is admittedly more difficult to find examples of negative emotions being directed toward
measures of justice and accountability in the midst of scenarios of intractability, but there is at least
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one clear example where these negative emotions have been siphoned into democratic institutionbuilding, even as tensions remained high and the scripts of the scenario of intractability continued
to perform itself. The Good Friday Agreement, which brought an end to decades of physical
violence and fighting in Northern Ireland, was principally an instrument for the creation of several
democratic institutions meant to maintain peaceful relations, transforming violent conflict taking
place on the streets into political conflict taking place within the halls of government. Within
Northern Ireland, it established the Northern Ireland Assembly, which operates on a model of
cross-community voting, where both unionists and Irish nationalists must agree on measures to
make them law, along with the Northern Ireland Executive, which operates on a basis of powersharing among conflicting groups. The Agreement also established democratic mechanisms for
maintaining relations with both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Admittedly,
the peace negotiations in Northern Ireland and the subsequent accords did not emerge solely
from within Northern Irish society but were also the result of external intervention. Furthermore,
to argue that the institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement have led to a complete
rewriting of the scenarios of intractability that still play out in Northern Ireland today is sadly overly
optimistic, especially at the time of this writing, when the government of Northern Ireland is in a
state of collapse, and as the potential of Brexit threatens to reignite violence in the region. It is also
probable that the consociational peace agreement is at least partly responsible for institutionalizing
the identity-based divisions at the root of the conflict—not a small caveat, to say the least. Twenty
years after the passage of the agreements, however, conflicting groups have certainly succeeded at
diminishing violent conflict, and have thus disrupted these scenarios in an important way.
Rewriting the “Ending”
Finally, scenarios of intractability always presume certain endings–endings in which one group
succeeds and one group ceases to be, if not on an existential level, then at least within the daily lives
and socio-political interactions of the other group. In scenarios of intractability, the future is bright
only in as much as the out-group is not a part of it. In these scenarios, mitigating interventions
propose alternative endings. Rather than depicting the success of one group and the elimination of
another, they underscore shared values and common goals, presenting a future where all groups
can co-exist.
One clear way of reshaping social relationships in these cases where public discourse paints
a picture of a forever-divided future is through the creation of new, superordinate identities that
override the identity markers that divide groups. Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, and Nadler, for instance,
write that “encouraging members of conflicting groups to think about themselves as members of
a common superordinate group, for example, to recategorize themselves as Americans instead
of as Blacks and Whites, can reduce negative attitudes and biases toward out-group members.”76
Forming superordinate identities can create solidarity across difference, providing new “roles” for
those living within scenarios of intractability to assume.
An example of the power of superordinate identities comes from Tuzla, a Bosnian city that
largely avoided the inter-ethnic conflict that had subsumed Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s,
even as Bosnian Serb forces laid siege to the city and bombed it repeatedly. Throughout the conflict,
this diverse city eschewed interethnic tensions by reinforcing their “Tuzlan” identity. According to
Marshall Wallace, locals saw their identity as Tuzlans as being characterized by multiculturalism
and an openness to difference. This identity based on multiculturalism and acceptance was
reinforced through everyday practices. Residents of Tuzla attended and celebrated the religious
holidays of all religious groups within the city, for instance. When Bosnian Serb bombs destroyed
an Orthodox church in Tuzla, the city’s mayor rallied citizens from all groups to participate in its
reconstruction. The mayor also formed an orchestra during the war, and this musical group began
composing new patriotic songs based on themes of togetherness and plurality. These new songs
became a rallying cry for Tuzlans–a new repertoire that shunned ethno-nationalism for a citizenship
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based on inclusivity. During the height of inter-ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the people of
Tuzla rallied behind their shared identity, creating a new scenario based on overcoming collective
hardship. As such, they were able to stave off the internecine conflicts that consumed the rest of
the country.77
Importantly, however, emphasis on superordinate identities is not always the answer, and
can even have negative effects. Stressing superordinate identities where subordinate identities
constitute a salient part of the identity and daily interactions of individuals can lead individuals
to emphasize and focus on the minor differences between groups.78 Because of this risk, Dovidio,
Gaertner, and Saguy, offer two alternatives.79 First, individuals can focus on maintaining both
super- and subordinate identities through a model where some common identity is acknowledged,
but difference and pluralism is also celebrated within that model. Here, one can call to mind the
common practice of hyphenated identities in the US American context. The researchers find,
however, that this dual identity model only works in contexts where pluralism is a value that is
celebrated. As such, within scenarios of intractability, this formation may not be easy to enact.
The second possibility, however, is one that is reflected in basic social identity theory, as well.80
Rather than re-writing or imposing superordinate identities, groups can be brought together by
having them work on common exercises or activities. By focusing on shared goals rather than
trying to rewrite the saliency of identity, groups can come together across difference, while still
maintaining the identity markers that are so important to them. A recent study by Scacco and
Warren supports this idea. By bringing together Christian and Muslim participants to participate
in a multi-week computer training workshop in a divided city in Central Nigeria, the researchers
found that participants working with non-in-group partners demonstrated a marked decrease
in discriminatory behavior toward the out-group (though there was no decrease in prejudicial
beliefs).81 Importantly, identity was never explicitly addressed during the workshop; the
participants were only working together toward the goal of learning how to use a computer. This
option of transforming conflict by refocusing attention away from identity and toward a shared
outward goal seems particularly apt in the case of scenarios of intractability. Rather than trying
to rewrite identities, mitigating interventions can call for people from all identity groups to come
together in the common project of building a society in which all their rights are respected and
valued. This assertion is also supported by recent research that finds intractability to be more likely
mitigated in situations where collectivist, rather than individualist, orientations are reinforced.82
The people of Tuzla coming together to rebuild the bombed church is one example of such
a mitigating intervention taking place at a social scale. The cross-community voting and powersharing agreements of the Good Friday Agreements are an example of it taking place at a national,
political level. A third example of this comes from South Africa, where, for over four decades
of Apartheid, South Africans lived within a scenario of intractability that favored white South
Africans over Black, Coloured, and Asian South Africans. One mitigating intervention initiated
by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and propagated by Nelson Mandela upon the return of democracy
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was their characterization of South Africa as a “rainbow nation.” The metaphor of the rainbow
helped these leaders initiate a specific political project, in which people of all colors contributed to
the beauty of the nation, but the true beauty came from their coming together. Many have argued,
of course, that the rainbow imagery also served to cover up the legacies of violence that it sought
to overcome, and there is great truth in this assertion. Nevertheless, the idea of a rainbow nation,
along with its manifestation in a government structure that incorporated all races–when, in fact, it
may have been possible for Mandela to form a government that excluded minority whites–served
as a mitigating intervention that performed against the scenario of intractability that had been
playing out for decades.
Conclusion
Labeling conflicts as intractable implies that this intractability is somehow an essential characteristic
of the conflict itself. As such, there is a strong risk that the denomination serves to limit the scope of
possible remedies that exist for transforming the conflict away from one characterized by violence
and toward one facilitated through democratic institutions, the rule of law, and a healthy debate
in an open public sphere. Participants within these scenarios replay the scripts of conflict that
have been written and played out in the past. With each repetition, alternative endings seem less
imaginable. The entire habitus of a society is shaped in relationship to conflict, and the realm of
possibility becomes so constricted that any other way of being and feeling seems impossible. On
the other hand, thinking in terms of scenarios of intractability recognizes that one central source
for the continuing nature of the conflict is that division among groups has become, in many senses,
a force of habit. Scenario thinking allows–indeed, forces–us to think beyond spoken discourse
in understanding how conflict functions and reproduces itself. The spoken word and narratives
certainly play a huge role in constructing scenarios of intractability, but so too do all other elements
within a society, including geographical and/or architectural divisions, geopolitical realities, rituals
and social practices, customs and traditions, and public policy initiatives. Indeed, a comprehensive
strategy for preventing mass violence requires that we attend to all of these aspects that contribute
to division.
Within the context of a scenario of intractability, mitigating interventions are actions by
participants within the scenario that first highlight its constructed nature, thus making it appear less
essentialized, and then offer alternative ways of being, thinking, and behaving within the scenario.
Importantly, these mitigating interventions often come from within, rather than as a result of
external intervention. As such, it may be better to conceive of them as intraventions. Enacting such
mitigating intraventions is not easy, because one of the central aspects of a scenario of intractability
is the way in which it makes such interventions feel either impossible or insufficient. Furthermore,
for those of us working in conflict and atrocity prevention, it requires that we recognize that real,
systemic prevention is much more about supporting domestic initiatives, rather than coming in
from without with a bundle of recipes and best practices that “need to be” enacted. Additionally,
in many of the scenarios of intractability I have discussed here, state actors and politicians are
often working directly against the mitigation of risk because they benefit politically from keeping
conflict and division alive. Because of this, it is often (unfairly) civil society that must be the first
sector to offer these alternative examples of what undoing intractability may look like. The only
hope for their actions to spread upward from the grassroots is through the contagious effect that
public action can take. And it is here, in supporting and sustaining this growth, where the efforts
of international actors can be much better exercised. For a scenario of intractability to be rewritten
fully, these alternative scripts must be embraced by individuals and groups at all levels of society,
across sectors and across group identities. It is only then that a totally new scenario can emerge–
one based not on division and violent conflict, but on creating a pluralistic society with a vibrant
public sphere together.
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In the early hours of August 3, 2014, ISIL militants swept across the Sinjar region of northern Iraq,
which is home to the majority of the world’s Yazidi people. The next day, the Emir of the Yazidi pled
for world leaders to intervene as ISIL kidnapped children and systematically massacred civilians.
The entire male population of the village of Khocho was executed, while the Yazidi residents of
another village were presented with an ultimatum: convert or be killed.1
Numerous scholars have called this violence genocide,2 and the International Association of
Genocide Scholars deemed it a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide.3 Multiple early warning models of genocide, however, did not warn
policymakers about these events. Iraq was not on the Atrocity Forecasting Project’s list of 10
countries at risk of genocide between 2011 and 2015,4 nor was it in the top 10 countries Harff and
Gurr predicted as at risk.5
Although there are several reasons behind this oversight, it is clear that early warning models6
are not designed to alert policymakers about genocides committed by non-state actors. Instead,
these models typically evaluate whether genocide is likely to occur within a state; and they rely
upon theories that were generated to explain state-led genocide and accompanying data measured
at the state level. Such models and the theories undergirding them may consequently underperform
in situations where violence was not committed by a state but rather by a non-state actor.
As the genocide committed by ISIL illustrates, state-centric assumptions that inform genocide
prevention endeavors do not apply to every genocide. In line with this premise, this article argues
that genocide forecasting efforts must move beyond the state-centrality that has characterized
the field to date. It begins by addressing why predominant theories and corresponding genocide
prevention efforts have largely focused on states. After describing the limits of a state-centric
approach, I suggest three major avenues that will refine and complement the current state-centric
paradigm that guides genocide prediction endeavors. These include 1) theorizing and analyzing
non-state actors who commit genocide, 2) engaging in conflict-centered approaches, and 3)
addressing the onset and triggers of genocide within subnational spaces. The article concludes with
a discussion of how theory and research incorporating these proposals could ultimately contribute
to more robust genocide prevention efforts.
State-Centric Approaches to Genocide Prediction
A long line of scholarship on genocide has established that the state—broadly defined in this
article as an internationally recognized government and the territory it governs7—is integral

United Nations Human Rights Council, “They Came to Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis,” Advance Version,
2016, (UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2), 6-8; Yazda Documentation Project, Mass Graves of Yazidis Killed by the Islamic State
Organization or Local Affiliates On or After August 3, 2014, (Yazda: Global Yazidi Organization, 2016), 4.
2
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International 10, no. 2 (2016), 121; Sefik Tagay et al., “The 2014 Yazidi Genocide and its Effect on Yazidi Diaspora,” The
Lancet 390, no. 10106 (2017), 1946.
3
International Association of Genocide Scholars, “Resolution on ISIS,” March 18, 2016, accessed August 4, 2019, http://
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Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965) for more). Although non-state organizations like ISIL
exercise force within a territory and can even perform some of a state’s duties, I refer in this article to internationally
recognized states that have garnered at least some legitimacy.
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to understanding the onset of genocide.8 Though the international legal definition of genocide
does not restrict genocidal violence to state-led action, many genocides that occurred over the
last century were committed by states,9 and others were undertaken with tacit state involvement.
Moreover, states have historically used genocide as a form of repression.10
Researchers concerned with predicting genocide have accordingly focused on the state-level
conditions that influence the possibility genocide could occur within a country. Some of this
research has specifically addressed the government itself. For instance, comparative historical
scholarship, like Rummel’s Death by Government,11 has emphasized how the type of government
influences the likelihood of genocide. As the state also includes the territory that a government
controls, many other case studies have addressed additional country-level factors, such as a state’s
capacity across its territory.12
Such case studies were integral to the quantitative research that emerged during the 1990s and
early 2000s as the cornerstone of genocide forecasting efforts.13 Generally, these models analyze
country-level data and find that genocide is more likely in states with political upheaval, autocratic
governments, exclusionary ideologies, contention regarding the ethnicity of those in power, stateled discrimination,14 and a prior history of genocide. Scholars have further refined these state-level
factors—often in pursuit of informing genocide prediction efforts—over the past decade. Much
of this work has identified the forms of upheaval that are most likely to influence genocide, such
as assassinations, riots15, and other crises16—all measured at the state level.17 Other scholarship
has specified a two-step model of the onset of genocide. For instance, Goldsmith and co-authors18
estimate the likelihood of instability within a country for a given year and then incorporate this
estimate as a predictor in models of the likelihood of genocide.19 Straus and Valentino20 likewise
Empires were certainly core to understanding genocide during colonialism, though I restrict this article to more recent
genocides given my emphasis on early-warning and forecasting efforts tied to genocide prevention.
9
Some scholarship does not disaggregate the state into its constituent parts, though the state is not monolithic and
consists of numerous actors. Additional work should further disaggregate the state itself. For instance, Kim found that
revolutionary leaders were more likely to commit mass killing, see Nam Kyu Kim, “Revolutionary Leaders and Mass
Killing,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 2 (2018), 289.
10
Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007), 1.
11
Rudolph J. Rummel, Death by Government (New York: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 1-27.
12
Far too many case studies have examined the causes of genocide to summarize here. I instead focus on quantitative
models, as these models directly inform early warning systems and genocide prevention efforts.
13
Helen Fein, “Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and Some Findings,” International Journal on Group
Rights 1, no. 2 (1993), 79; Matthew Krain, “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides
and Politicides,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 3 (1997), 331; Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the
Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,” American Political Science Review 97,
no. 1 (2003), 57; William Easterly et al., “Development, Democracy, and Mass Killing,” Journal of Economic Growth 11,
no. 2 (2006), 129.
14
State-led discrimination was not included in the 2003 model but rather was added upon a later iteration in 2012.
15
Nicolas Rost, “Will It Happen Again? On the Possibility of Forecasting the Risk of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide
Research 15, no. 1 (2013), 59.
16
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“Re-examining Risk Factors of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 19, no. 1 (2017), 62.
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Others have examined mass killings, which do not necessarily target a particular group. As noted in more detail below,
I draw upon literature on mass killings due to the overlap between mass killing and genocide.
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Benjamin E. Goldsmith et al., “Forecasting the Onset of Genocide and Politicide: Annual Out-of-Sample Forecasts on a
Global Dataset, 1988–2003,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 44 (2013), 437–452.
19
This model also included several novel predictors, such as the proportion of a country’s population in the army and
whether the country was in an election period.
20
Valentino analyzed the triggers of 32 state-sponsored mass killings and concluded that anti-government protests,
strikes, coups, and initial major attacks by rebels were among the most common triggers (see Benjamin Valentino,
“Triggers of Mass Killing,” Report on a Research Project for the Political Instability Task Force (Hanover: Dartmouth
College, February 2016), 1). In a similar vein, Straus examined the triggers of 18 atrocity events, finding that threats
to the political elite—such as battlefield advances, assassinations, coups, or protests—are among the most prominent
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each contribute to two-step models by examining triggers, or the events and processes that more
immediately precede the onset of genocide, such as major attacks by rebels.
All of the aforementioned studies have examined genocide by analyzing state-level factors.
This approach has been guided both by theories of genocide as well as by available data, as most
major data collection efforts catalogue state level factors (e.g., Gross Domestic Product). In turn,
the state-centric approach in scholarship directly influences genocide prediction efforts, which
draw upon this research to create forecasting systems. For instance, the Political Instability Task
Force (PITF) analyzes a dataset of country-years to produce a list of countries for policymakers to
monitor. The University of Sydney’s Atrocity Forecasting Project also generates lists of states at
risk of genocide; GenocideWatch, Harff and Gurr’s website, and many other atrocity forecasting
undertakings assess risk at the state level as well.21 Put simply, when researchers and policymakers
think about the risk of genocide, they tend to consider whether genocide could occur within a
given state.
To be clear, these endeavors are not misguided, as the state is vital to understanding the onset
of genocide. Government officials and their armies have initiated most genocides that occurred
during the 20th and 21st centuries. Factors related to the state, such as the type of government or
state capacity, can certainly influence the likelihood of genocide; and interventions in genocide—
such as economic sanctions and military sanctions—typically target the state.22
Genocide research and related prediction efforts nonetheless run the risk of placing undue
emphasis on the state. Multiple genocide scholars have previously pointed out the state-centricity
that has continued to dominate genocide studies.23 This article extends their critiques by exploring
how state-centricity has affected forecasting efforts with a specific focus on suggesting how to
transcend this state-centricity in favor of better genocide prediction. As noted in the introduction,
limiting early warning models to violence committed by the state disregards the fact that non-state
actors can and do commit genocide. Predicting the onset of genocide at the state-level also eclipses
other meaningful ways to examine genocide, such as at the conflict-level since there can be multiple
conflicts with a state at any given time. Furthermore, although the state is a meaningful concept
in international relations, genocide often occurs in only part of a state or unfolds differently in
separate regions. For instance, the genocide in Sudan that began in 2003 was limited to the Darfur
region. Even in instances where genocide envelops an entire country, the violence often begins
earlier in certain parts of the country, though early warning efforts rarely focus on subnational
spaces.
Thus, as a complement to state-centric approaches to genocide prediction, this article suggests
three core ways in which genocide prediction efforts should expand beyond the state, both in
theory and in research on genocide onset, which is key for genocide forecasting. These three paths
include 1) addressing genocide committed by non-state actors, 2) taking conflicts as the unit of
analysis and analyzing how characteristics of a conflict influence the onset of genocide, and 3)
examining the onset and triggers of genocide at subnational levels, such as within communities. For
each, I incorporate interdisciplinary scholarship that has focused on genocide, defined as actions
taken with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a social group.24 I also integrate research on
of these factors, like assassinations or coups, have been included as structural factors in other models, indicating that
triggers may be built into some models that do not claim to engage in two-step analyses.
21
Notably, the United Nations does not restrict its forecasting to countries, but the vast majority of the factors
incorporated into its framework are state-level factors, such as situations that place the state under stress or
discriminatory state policies.
22
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mass killings and other atrocities given the similarities across these forms of violence and use the
respective authors’ terms (e.g., mass atrocity, mass killing, civilian targeting) when referencing their
findings. To be certain, genocide studies has sometimes been siloed such that relevant research on
related types of violence—such as civil wars or terrorism—is not considered alongside the study
of genocide. A critical engagement with genocide prevention involves breaking down disciplinary
barriers in favor of a more holistic view of the study of violence.
Each of the subsequent sections also includes specific suggestions for future research that
should in turn inform forecasting—research that should be informed by a multitude of methods.
Quantitative, large-N models are often necessary to establish more general patterns in social
processes. In fact, the early warning and risk assessment models reviewed by Verdeja in this special
issue rely almost exclusively on quantitative analyses. The numbers employed in such models
are powerful, but they are also reductive, erase lived experiences, and privilege violence that is
easily quantified.25 Analyses of general patterns should consequently be complemented with rich,
contextualized information. As such, I provide suggestions for how researchers can leverage the
benefits of diverse methods when analyzing non-state actors, conflicts, and subnational spaces.
Non-State Actors
The violence undertaken by insurgent groups, terror organizations, militias, and other non-state
actors can equal or even surpass that committed by states.26 Some of this violence straddles the line
between intentional and unintentional targeting and has consequently been framed as collateral
damage by researchers.27 Other non-state violence against civilians is undoubtedly intentional, and
as ISIL’s violence against the Yazidi makes clear, this violence can take the form of genocide.
ISIL is not the first non-state actor to commit genocide. Indeed, the Political Instability Task
Force database includes a genocide in 1964 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, noting in
its explanation that “rebels massacre(d) counter-revolutionaries, including educated Congolese,
missionaries, and other Europeans.”28 The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has likewise arguably
committed genocide by targeting the Acholi people in Northern Uganda.29
In each of these instances, a non-state actor instigated the genocide, commonly in spaces where
the state lacked capacity. In this sense, they differ from the non-state actors that work alongside
other actors (like states) that initiate genocide, though these non-state actors do often attempt to act
like states themselves. They levy taxes, take territory, and wield an army in pursuit of creating their
own state despite lack of international recognition.30 It stands to reason that such groups would
have the capacity to initiate and commit genocides—a capacity that is no longer limited to states.
Genocide researchers should consequently theorize why non-state actors initiate genocide and
examine the conditions under which they do (and do not). These theories, in turn, can inform
research on the onset of genocide at the group-level. Before addressing existing theories and data
that could inform these efforts, however, it is important to recognize that non-state actors are
heterogeneous—something that is often masked by framing all of these groups as non-state actors
simply in reference to states. Indeed, militias, rebel groups, terror organizations, and other nonstate actors vary widely in terms of their degree of organization, size, scope, membership, and
aims, among other factors. Given these distinctions and a lack of scholarly agreement about how
to classify non-state actors, I use the term “non-state actor” to refer generally to any or all of these
groups.
With this caveat in mind, efforts to theorize and analyze genocides committed by non-state
actors may be informed by scholarship that examines why non-state actors engage in widespread,
systematic targeting of civilians. Much like research on genocide, this work has addressed why
non-state actors target civilians by theorizing strategic reasons behind their actions as well as
assessing the situations in which non-state actors do and do not harm civilians.31 Although there
may be important differences to uncover between genocidal violence and other forms of systematic
violence against civilians, this scholarship suggests that genocide initiated by non-state actors may
31

Benjamin A. Valentino, “Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence Against Civilians,” Annual Review of
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be linked to characteristics of the non-state actor, the non-state actor’s relationships, or the broader
structural context.
Turning first to the group characteristics, non-state actors’ violence against civilians has been
linked to the internal structure of the group, including an amorphous organizational structure
and a leadership deficit.32 Group capacity may likewise matter, with comparatively weaker groups
found to be more likely to engage in violence against civilians.33 A group’s ideology may also
influence civilian targeting, and scholarship on terror organizations has found that religious and
ethno-nationalist ideologies can be particularly deadly.34 Indeed, the violence committed by ISIL
was motivated by a particular ideological worldview, not unlike the genocides committed by the
Khmer Rouge or Nazi Germany.35
The non-state actors’ relationships with other actors—most notably, civilians and
governments—may also affect whether they turn to genocide. With regard to relationships with
civilians, non-state actors may target civilians who appear supportive of their enemies.36 As
Schwartz and Straus suggest,37 such violence may be genocidal when the non-state actor views
civilians as unwinnable and consequently seeks to eradicate them.38 Non-state actors may also
engage in violence against civilians due to their relationships with governments. For instance, nonstate actors that benefit from state support may be more likely to commit genocide, since states
often use rebel groups to commit violence and since many non-state organizations, such as terror
organizations, depend on financial support from states.39 Of course, non-state actors frequently
commit genocidal violence alongside or on behalf of another actor, as scholarship on the Janjaweed
in Darfur or Arkan’s Tigers in Bosnia has illustrated.40 Here, I focus on non-state actor initiated
violence rather than these and other cases where the non-state actor carries out violence initially
begun by others, but I recognize the line between state and non-state is often blurred and that ties
between actors may change over time.41
Finally, studies of the onset of genocide committed by non-state actors may benefit from
the existing scholarship that focuses on state-level, structural factors that influence the onset of
genocide. Put simply, these groups do not operate in a vacuum, and other dynamics—such as the
type of government in the state (or states) in which they operate, the presence of a civil war, or
the number of other non-state actors operating within a defined space—may play a role. Wood42
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illustrates that civilians are more likely to be victimized when a weak insurgent group faces a
strong government, for instance, while Loyle43 finds that mass atrocities committed by non-state
actors occur in contexts where states also commit mass atrocities.
Researchers should consequently take non-state actors as the unit of analysis, and forecasting
efforts could consider the various factors that make certain non-state actors more likely to commit
genocide. These analyses could also take a two-step approach that couples structural factors with
the triggers of genocide committed by non-state actors. For instance, in an ongoing project, several
colleagues and I have been conducting in-depth case studies of the catalysts of mass killings
committed by non-state actors in Africa. Our process tracing addresses why Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) members killed hundreds of civilians in December 2008, and they find that this sharp
uptick in LRA violence against civilians came two weeks after the announcement of Operation
Lightning Thunder, a joint military operation targeting the LRA. Aligning with this, and based
on 26 other case studies, we argue that opposition military advances are the most prominent
triggers of mass killings committed by non-state actors. This, in turn, suggests that threat may be a
particularly important trigger of violence committed by non-state actors.
Numerous datasets exist to aid researchers in assessing the group characteristics, relational
factors, and structural factors that may influence the onset of genocide committed by non-state
actors. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s Armed Conflict Dataset contains valuable
information about violence committed by non-state actors, while the Non-State Actor Dataset
includes characteristics of groups that are in UCDP’s data.44 The Non-State Armed Groups Dataset
(NAGS) and the Dangerous Companions Project encompass important information about state
support given to non-state armed groups as well as group characteristics, such as ideology. Finally,
some non-state actors’ links to states can be found in the Pro-Government Militia (PGM) database.
These datasets are admittedly limited to established non-state actors. Militias and other groups
that are in their infancy or are more loosely organized are consequently not included, underscoring
the importance of employing case studies of non-state actors alongside endeavors that rely upon
quantitative datasets. Even with established actors, such as ISIL, quantitative modeling should be
paired with in-depth analyses of processes and contexts in efforts to test and build theory, as well
as in efforts to predict the onset of genocidal violence by non-state actors.
Conflicts
Societal upheaval is typically seen as a predictor of genocide.45 In fact, several studies have found
that conflict, especially civil war, is the strongest predictor of genocide.46 Yet, while state-centric
theories and models of genocide often include a measure of conflict, they often do not address
differences between multiple conflicts within the same state. For instance, most datasets cite two
different civil wars occurring in Ethiopia in 1976, though only one of these conflicts also involved
genocide. According to the PITF database,47 a year after the civil war began in 1975, “army, internal
security units, and civilian defense squads massacre(d) political and military elites, workers,
students, bureaucrats, and others thought to oppose the revolutionary regime.” However, when
this genocide began, the Eritrean-Ethiopian war of independence was also taking place. This civil
war was separatist in nature, though it did not involve genocide.
State-level factors cannot account for why one of these civil wars involved genocide while the
other did not, but in-depth comparative case studies of the two conflicts likely can. Additionally,
quantitative or comparative qualitative analyses of the onset of genocides in certain conflicts could
shed light on the types of conflicts that may lead to genocide, either as the conflicts are ongoing
or in their aftermath. Researchers should consequently devote additional attention to the conflict-
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related factors that influence the onset of genocide,48 and genocide prevention models should
address when conflicts lead to genocide, and, equally importantly, when they do not. In such
analyses, characteristics of the conflicts—rather than the countries—should be prioritized. These
characteristics include but are not limited to the type of conflict, who is involved, aspects of the
violence itself, and, for genocides that begin after a conflict ends, how the conflict came to a close.
Perhaps most notably, mass killing of civilians is more likely during certain types of conflicts.
Valentino, Puth, and Blach-Lindsay49 argue that mass killing is more prominent in conflicts where
guerrilla armies oppose governments. Yet, Krcmaric50 finds the exact opposite, arguing that mass
killing is more probable during conventional wars than during guerilla wars. Scholars could
test these competing hypotheses for the case of genocide, which in turn may shed light on such
divergent findings. Additionally, scholars could examine whether other types of conflicts, such as
ethno-nationalist conflicts, are more likely to include genocide.
Closely aligned with this, researchers could assess whether the changing nature of war
influences the onset of genocide. Walter51 suggests that there have been three recent waves of civil
wars: one that began around 1951 and ended with the Cold War, a second that began around
1992, and a third that began with the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. She argues that each of
these periods is distinguished by civil wars with distinct attributes, focusing largely on ideological
aims. As such, scholars could examine whether the characteristics of the third wave of wars are
particularly relevant to understanding the onset of genocide in the 21st century.
Beyond the type of conflict, the actors involved may also influence whether genocide is
likely to occur during or after a conflict. For instance, the group characteristics of non-state actors
involved in the conflict—such as their motivating ideology or their structure—may play a role.
Factors indicative of threat to the state may be particularly important; perhaps conflicts involving
larger non-state actors or non-state actors that garner widespread public support are more likely to
involve genocide. The historical legacies of who is involved in the conflict may likewise shape the
possibility of genocide, as these legacies may inform perceptions of threat as well as perceptions
of support for various actors. Furthermore, the internationalization of conflict, including financial
support from external parties, may also matter. Gleditsch52 illustrates, for example, that many
civil wars are transnational in terms of actors and resources; and scholars could examine how
foreign support during conflict—in terms of who provides such support and the level of support—
influences the likelihood that conflict leads to genocide.
Aspects of the violence itself should also be addressed. Researchers could assess whether the
intensity of violence influences the onset of genocide. The geographic distribution of violence may
similarly prove influential, as governments or non-state actors may be more likely to engage in
genocide when conflicts threaten spaces they value, such as locations rich with natural resources
or of other geo-political importance. Furthermore, researchers could examine the length of time
between the onset of conflict and genocide, addressing why some conflicts immediately involve
genocide while others lead to genocide years after the conflict began or, in some cases, after the
conflict ended.
Finally, distinct factors may affect the genocides that begin after a conflict ends. Uzonyi53
artfully shows that civil wars with a clear victor are more likely to see their winning party engage in
genocide than conflicts that end through other means, such as negotiations. Aspects of negotiations
may also impact the likelihood of genocide. For example, many scholars suggest the Arusha
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Accords influenced the onset of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,54 and the aspects of peace treaties
that lead to genocide could be informed by scholarship on peace treaties and conflict recurrence
more broadly.55
To be certain, distinguishing between civil wars and genocides can be analytically tricky,
and this difficulty is compounded by the fact that genocide is a political, contested concept. For
instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia deemed the 1995 massacre
at Srebrenica that occurred during the Bosnian civil war as genocide. Others label additional
aspects of the civil war that unfolded in different parts of the country, like the violence in the
Northwest region of Prijedor, as genocide as well.56 Such disagreements must be kept in mind, but
scholarly arguments regarding the nature of violence may also influence the creation of better tools
to measure forms of violence that are deeply intertwined and unfold simultaneously.
Thus, to analyze whether and why certain conflicts lead to genocide — including the type of
conflict, who is involved, aspects of the violence itself, and how the conflict ended —researchers
could draw upon the impressive databases that have documented global conflicts to date. Peace
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) has created numerous datasets that track various forms of armed
conflict, often in collaboration with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The Major
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) Dataset likewise documents large-scale violence, while
UCDP also introduced a conflict termination dataset that contains information about how conflicts
come to an end.
Once again, conflict-centered endeavors should likewise rely on case-based analyses that
privilege local knowledge and context. For example, my own preliminary qualitative comparative
analyses suggest that separatist conflicts are much more likely to lead to genocide than other
forms of conflicts. Much more could be done to trace the events that unfolded in conflicts that did
involve or lead to genocide alongside those that did not, however, in order to better understand the
processes that are associated with the onset of genocide.
Subnational Spaces
Lastly, although genocides are typically accorded a country-level onset date, violence can begin
at various times within each country or, conceivably, across countries (such as on both sides of a
border). In order to predict the onset of genocide with more precision, researchers must understand
why violence starts in specific locations. While state-level factors such as a state-led exclusionary
ideology or threat to a government may inform why genocide occurs within a state, they cannot
fully explain why violence begins at a particular location, as these factors provide no information
pertaining to spaces below the state-level. In fact, extending these factors to subnational units
would neglect the fact that those committing the violence are, like all social actors, subject to the
influence of their immediate social surroundings—surroundings that vary widely.
As Figure 1 illustrates, although the 1994 genocide in Rwanda began almost immediately
after the president’s plane was shot down on the night of April 6, violence started earlier in some
places of the country. McDoom57 suggests that elite competition for control and ethnic segregation
influenced this variation in onset, while Straus58 finds that violence began earlier in areas with
lower unemployment rates. Focusing on the spread of information, Nyseth Brehm59 suggests that
Radio RTLM (a hate-speech radio) coverage is also associated with earlier onset.
Though the studies cited in the prior paragraph employ quantitative analyses to assess the
factors associated with subnational onset of genocide, case studies of subnational spaces are also
informative. For instance, the large area in southwestern Rwanda with the latest onset was known
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as Butare. Butare was a former prefecture (a region somewhat akin to a state) and was the only one
of Rwanda’s prefectures led by a Tutsi prefect (a position somewhat akin to a governor). When the
genocide began, the prefect tried to resist the violence. Although genocide was unfolding in most
parts of the country, the prefect met with Butare’s local leaders and encouraged them to prevent
violence and help others. On April 17, however, Rwanda’s interim government removed the
prefect from his position.60 Violence in Butare began almost immediately afterward,61 illustrating
the importance of leaders in influencing subnational onset.

Figure 1. Commune Onset of Genocide in 1994 Rwanda
Being able to pinpoint where genocide will begin with more precision than the state-level could
have many benefits for genocide prevention efforts, and theories about where genocide starts
could be guided by scholarship on localized civil conflict and crime. Specifically, recent analyses
of civil and ethnic violence have documented how subnational dynamics influence where and
when violence occurs.62 For instance, Buhaug and colleagues63 found that the onset of civil conflict
was more likely in subnational spaces marked by low economic growth and capacity, while Fjelde
and Uexkull64 argue that climate variability heightens subnational conflict. Furthermore, Buhaug
and Rød 65 examined disaggregated data across Africa and found that separatist conflicts were
more likely to occur in sparely populated regions near borders and comparatively far from capital
cities.66
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Combining insights from numerous studies, Rustad and co-authors67 propose a subnational
conflict risk indicator based on population, socioeconomic status, conflict history, ethno-political
exclusion, geographic location within a country, and neighboring conflicts in other subnational
administrative units.68 Such factors may likewise inform the subnational risk of genocide.
Furthermore, the subnational levels or forms of civil conflict themselves may also influence where
genocide unfolds and the timing of this violence.
Studies of the subnational onset of genocide could likewise draw inspiration from theories of
criminology. The notion that crime unfolds differently in distinct places has long been a hallmark of
criminological inquiry. In fact, criminologists have found there are hot spots in crime, or subnational
areas that consistently experience comparatively more violent crime. In Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for example, three percent of neighborhoods were responsible for 50 percent of crimes in 1986.69
Hot spots likewise exist on a worldwide scale, and recent research has also found hot spots may
be linked to riots.70 Data on hot spots may be useful for predicting where genocide begins, and at
a minimum, scholars should address whether there are certain hot spots of genocidal violence as
well.
Ecological studies of crime have also pointed toward many other structural factors (such as
employment levels, community cohesion, and signs of social and physical disorder) that could
influence the onset of violence at various subnational levels. Such data may be particularly useful
in predicting the onset of violence that is largely undertaken by civilians, as was the case in
Rwanda. Indeed, Nyseth Brehm71 illustrates that characteristics of communities, like marriage rates,
informed levels of in violence in Rwanda. These factors may also be relevant for understanding the
onset of genocide.
Finally, triggers could also be analyzed at subnational levels. The triggers of genocide have thus
far been conceptualized at the state-level, but in much the same way, these events and processes
likely occur in localized spaces. Are there subnational triggers, and do they differ from those
typically accorded on a national level? For instance, the trigger of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda
was the president’s plane crash, but there may have been more proximate, localized triggers in the
communities depicted in Figure 1.
Data that could be used in studies of subnational onset and triggers are increasingly available.
Most datasets of civil war include disaggregated conflict data (for instance, see the Armed Conflict
Location Event Dataset Project, or ACLED), and many datasets are beginning to geo-reference
events, such as protests or riots (e.g., the Social Conflict in Africa Database). National censuses
worldwide often include indicators of population, employment, and ethnicity and are typically
available through IPUMS International. Furthermore, a 2017 issue of American Behavioral Scientist
considered how to measure state capacity in subnational spaces, while many environmental
indicators—such as rainfall and average temperatures—can easily be mapped onto subnational
spaces using GIS programs.
That said, researchers should not be restricted by the pre-set, subnational boundaries that dictate
the information available in quantitative datasets, such as census tracts and other administrative
areas. Though these data can be useful, subnational administrative units and their boundaries are
often created through political processes and may not hold meaning for their residents. Fieldwork
could shed light on how people living within these areas view their communities and whether
and how such communities map onto administrative boundaries, which in turn may dictate which
subnational level to consider.

government, cannot be considered. These should be considered as the first step. Nevertheless, aggregating data across
a country can obscure valuable information, especially when the violence is not initiated by the state.
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Implications for Genocide Prediction and Prevention
This article has argued that state-centricity has characterized genocide forecasting and that, in
order to pursue more accurate genocide prediction endeavors, researchers should look beyond the
state. I have proposed three major paths for doing so, including 1) theorizing and analyzing nonstate actors who commit genocide, 2) engaging in conflict-centered approaches, and 3) addressing
the onset and triggers of genocide within subnational spaces. Researchers examining these three
areas should employ a multitude of methods, and they should draw insights from interdisciplinary
scholarship on varying forms of violence, such as civilian targeting and mass killing.
Additionally, although I have addressed each of the three avenues in isolation, researchers
and practitioners involved in genocide prevention efforts should examine them concurrently when
possible. Moving from findings documented in research to forecasting future events is hardly an
easy task, and others have identified some of its pitfalls.72 Though some of these drawbacks are tied
to specific quantitative modeling decisions that are difficult to overcome (as all research methods
have some drawbacks), in-depth knowledge about cases can help transcend some of the other
pitfalls of forecasting genocide. For instance, large-N forecasting endeavors of non-state actors,
conflicts, and subnational spaces can identify actors, conflicts, and spaces that may be at risk of
genocide. These general analyses capture general patterns and trends, however, and are unable to
consider rich, case-specific information. Consequently, these analyses should be complemented
by situational and context-driven analyses of non-state actors, conflicts, and subnational spaces in
order to refine risk assessments based on localized knowledge.
In the case of ISIL’s genocide against the Yazidi that was briefly covered at the outset of
this article, a dataset of armed actors likely would have enabled analysis of how ISIL’s ideology,
relationships, and broader situation may have influenced the group’s likelihood of committing
genocide. Such analyses could have been combined with process tracing that would have identified
reasons behind ISIL’s declaration of a caliphate a month prior to the genocide, which coincides
with their escalation in violence and may have triggered the violence that occurred in August 2014.
Analyses of the civil war that began in Iraq earlier that year may have likewise yielded important
information linked to the type of violence that was unfolding. Furthermore, as the genocide
targeting Yazidi was geographically concentrated, researchers could have been assessing whether
certain parts of the country were more likely to experience violence. Of course, hindsight is clearly
at play with this example, but the important point is that more refined information that transcends
the state will aid prediction efforts.
To be certain, the three avenues proposed in this article are not exhaustive. There are many
other factors that researchers should consider when analyzing the onset of genocide and, relatedly,
assessing its risk. For instance, researchers could focus on groups that may be at risk of genocide. The
Minorities at Risk Project contains information on groups that have suffered from discrimination,
though grounded analyses would likewise be necessary given the socially constructed nature of
groups.73 Case studies tracking group characteristics as well as the actions that have harmed groups
may also wield important information. For instance, although the genocide against the Rohingya
arguably began recently, Myanmar’s government has discriminated against Rohingya people for
decades.
Furthermore, as researchers focus on a particular phenomenon within a bounded period of
time and space—such as a conflict, subnational region, or perhaps a group—they must remain
cognizant of other factors at play, such as the involvement of international actors. To be sure,
scholars of globalization have long suggested that the local and the global do not exist on their
own.74 For instance, Goodale75 argues that researchers often uncritically employ the notion of a
Michael D. Ward et al., “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4
(2010), 363-375.
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local, a national, and an international level without recognition that no location is fully detached
from national and international processes.76 Though the use of levels can be useful for thinking
about a complex world, researchers should nonetheless continue to recognize the multiplicity of
processes at play in any given context.
Taken together, genocide prediction and related prevention endeavors are still quite new.
Researchers can contribute to these paramount efforts by continually striving to better understand
why genocide occurs. This starts by examining the onset of genocide, and analyses looking beyond
the state to non-state actors, conflicts, and subnational spaces wield much promise.
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In the inaugural issue of the official journal of the International Association of Genocide Studies
(IAGS), Genocide Studies and Prevention (GSP), then-IAGS president Israel Charny and Chair of the
GSP Academic Advisory Board Roger Smith make a spirited argument for inclusion of the word
“prevention” in the journal’s title:
We recognize that the promise of genocide prevention explicit in our title is very ambitious.
How do we prevent genocide from happening? No single step will change the world, but
we believe that through careful research and reasoned argument, governments and policy
makers can be persuaded to expand their concept of national interest to include the prevention
of genocide. We further believe that for governments and policy makers to have the political
will to enforce the international laws and conventions on genocide through intervention and
prevention, they must be held accountable by their informed constituencies. It is through
education and awareness that people are made to understand their responsibility to hold
their governments accountable in this regard.
While awareness is a first step to the prevention of genocide, cognitive awareness is not
enough. In our ever-shrinking world, where there is ever-increasing competition for land
and the basic resources for life, the conditions for violent conflict are ever greater. We feel
that the key failure of human society has been the failure to adopt life itself as the central
value of all human decision making.1

In this statement, the authors understand the challenges of prevention to be profound and deeply
intersectional. Notwithstanding this complexity, however, they nevertheless decided to place the
cause of prevention at the heart of the academic mission of the journal, thereby contributing to
structuring our field around this aim.
Genocide Studies and Prevention was birthed in the afterglow of an Enlightenment conception of
rational, fully participatory and responsible governance, resting on the presumption that, if world
leaders could be convinced by reasoned argument or else feared disapproval from an informed
citizenry, the political will to prevent genocide (understood as a man-made and so malleable
phenomenon) might become more deeply rooted and blossom. Charny and Smith did not restrict
their understanding of prevention to its salience only for members of certain groups, or even solely
for those currently under threat of rapidly intensifying and deadly physical destruction. Indeed,
their reference elsewhere in their introductory essay to “less visible” but ongoing genocides against
Indigenous peoples is testament to the breadth of their conception.2 However, through the promise
they make, and the way that they make it, certain concessions may be detected that are indebted
to a specific logic of prevention, one that hasn’t always had welcome consequences for how we
understand this term today.
1
2
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In this paper, we seek to unsettle the reigning logic of prevention and foster the critical study
of genocide prevention by proposing an everyday ethos of genocide prevention, one targeting not
just rational thinking but also habituated practices. To foster such a quotidian prevention ethos,
we believe it necessary to multiply the points of prevention. We illustrate what we have in mind
briefly with reference to our project Embodying Empathy, a virtual Indian Residential School that
offers an immersive, empathy-inducing introduction to the cultural destruction wrought through
one of the more conspicuous and devastating processes forcing the assimilation of Canada’s
Indigenous population. Before discussing Embodying Empathy, the next two sections set the stage
by articulating the reigning logic of prevention, followed by an examination of how cultural
techniques of genocidal destruction have been excluded from this logic. This is followed by critical
interrogation of the dominant metaphors used to represent prevention to lay the groundwork
for proposing an everyday ethos of prevention that can be inculcated through projects such as
Embodying Empathy.
Risk, Culture, and Prevention
Risk is foundational to the field of genocide studies. Raphael Lemkin’s original understanding
of genocide as a concept is founded on his realization that historically the law was silent on the
risks confronted by human groups as cultural collectivities facing purposive destruction.3 More
generally, Lemkin argued that the future of humanity was secured and enhanced by our global
diversity and pluralism, which he also believed to be at risk from the phenomenon of group
destruction. Through the efforts of Lemkin and others, genocide prevention, understood broadly as
a determined effort to minimize the risk of genocide, was enshrined in one of our field’s founding
documents, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948. Hereafter UNGC).4
The notion that risks to collectivities can be identified, mitigated, and prevented emerged from
an evolving way of thinking that became increasingly prominent and prevalent in the 20th Century.5
The turn to risk and prevention thinking is therefore not novel to genocide studies. Genocide studies
emerged during the late stages of the “risk society,”6 the period sometimes also referred to as late
modernity7 in which the tools of science and technology, and the powers of human reason, were
seen as keys to a better-managed and less risky modern world.8 No longer were disasters merely
to be endured when they happened; instead, tools were designed to overcome the pervasive
uncertainties of disaster prediction, which in turn led to the creation of new prophylactic measures
that could guide intervention when potentially disastrous risks were detected. The practice of
genocide assessment and prevention thus was broadly compatible with modernity’s essential
rationalism. This practice promises to grasp group destruction in such a manner that it is made
specifiable (through the production of operational definitions) and actionable (in so far as, once
specified, it becomes amenable to epistemic and pragmatic organization in ways that allow for
strategic, rationally-grounded interventions).
The contemporary promise of genocide prevention, risk assessment and early warning is built
upon a specific way of thinking about genocide that tends to be less inclusive than the approach
envisioned by Charny and Smith. For the most part, the logic of genocide prevention builds off the
UNGC and therefore inherits its underlying prejudices. This is particularly evident when it comes
3
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4
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to the issue of cultural techniques of destruction. Risks to the group as a cultural entity are rarely
considered by those operating under the logic of prevention.9
Culture is fundamental to the continued existence of groups, since culture is part of what
helps them preserve group-sustaining relations.10 Culture is thus both the product and constitutive
component of group relations. Some definitions of cultural genocide treat culture as a static set of
practices and ways of being that need to be preserved as part of the store of the particular group’s
traditions rather than a collectively negotiated aspect of group life.11 In contrast, James Clifford
presents culture as a “deeply compromised” notion that has too often been used to place firm
boundaries around what is in truth a complex set of relationships.12 Culture, for Clifford, is a dynamic
grouping of values, practices, and behaviors that are never wholly legible but always in interaction
with historical processes of “appropriation, compromise, subversion, masking, invention, and
revival.”13 Culture, in brief, shifts and moves as our relationships unfold. Prevention of cultural
genocide therefore involves protecting a set of relations that allow groups to form and re-form as
they develop and adapt to changing circumstances.14 This raises a vexing question for genocide
scholars: How do you protect something that is dynamic and changing? Moreover, because culture
is a site of contest and debate, a further question arises: How do you protect something that is
itself beset by internal divisions? Yet, at the same time, cultural relations are those through which a
group establishes its identity, produces meaning for its members, and ensures its preservation into
the future. Violence against these relations can therefore compromise the continued existence of a
group in a manner similar to physical and biological violence, as captured in Claudia Card’s notion
of “social death,” which articulates the deep ontological distress caused through destruction of
relations that are fundamental to our social vitality.15 Such violence against culture is purposeful
and seeks to expunge society of the targeted culture and is therefore different from other processes
of inter-group cultural sharing and hybridity.
The tendency of the logic of prevention to ignore cultural destruction stems from the formative
process giving rise to the genocide concept in international law. Of particular, concern is the
excision of the concept of cultural genocide from the UNGC.16 When discussing the question of
cultural genocide, some delegates to the UN’s General Assembly found ridiculous the idea that
their nations might have been complicit in the destruction of cultural groups through acts they
felt to be part of normal procedures intended to yield civilization and moral uplift. Evolutionary
standards for assessing the value of groups were still present at this time, and Lemkin was hesitant
9
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to suggest that sovereign nations did not have some right to try to integrate subject peoples. In this
vein, Mr. Petran, the representative from Sweden, noted that
The acts which, according to article III [on cultural genocide], would constitute cultural
genocide might be far less serious than those specified in article II; for instance, in the case of
measures of educational policy, it might be difficult to estimate their scope in relation to the
cultural position of a minority. The question could arise whether, for example, the fact that
Sweden had converted the Lapps to Christianity might not lay her open to the accusation
that she had committed an act of cultural genocide.17

The thought that colonial powers could be impugned for their efforts to transform allegedly
“backward” Indigenous peoples struck the delegates as outrageous, so barely worth consideration
that they did not hesitate to bring up their “civilizational” efforts in condemning the article on
cultural genocide. Mr. Leif Egeland from South Africa likewise raised the specter of cannibalism,
noting there is “danger latent in the provisions of article III where primitive or backward groups
were concerned. No one could, for example, approve the inclusion in the convention of provisions
for the protection of such customs as cannibalism.”18
Other representatives argued that: a) physical and cultural genocide were too different to
combine under the same law; b) cultural genocide was covered by other legal protections (such
as those concerning minority rights to be included in the UN Declaration of Human Rights that
was being negotiated at the same time); and c) the article on cultural genocide was too vague to
be of any legal practicality. Danish representative Per Federspiel raised two of these objections
in his remarks: “it would show a lack of logic and of a sense of proportion to include in the same
convention both mass murders in gas chambers and the closing of libraries.”19 Some nations such as
Egypt and China opposed these arguments, pointing to the destructiveness of forced conversions
and other assaults on the cultural life of the group, but to no avail: in the Sixth Committee, 25
nations voted in favor of excluding cultural genocide from the UNGC versus 16 against and 4
abstentions.20
The memory of the Holocaust as an event of mass physical destruction, rather than primarily
cultural and physical destruction, contributed to the removal of techniques of cultural genocide
from the UNGC. In their efforts to reduce the law of genocide to whatever could be deemed
justiciable, the Holocaust was mobilized as a frame of reference and used to narrow the concept to
emphasize very nearly only its physical manifestation. As can be seen in Federspiel’s comments,
to compare mass murders with closed libraries was to dilute and distort the genocide concept
beyond reason. As Alexander Hinton notes, the argument of “dilution” has continued to perform
a gate-keeping function, limiting what reasonable accusations might be made concerning acts of
attempted group destruction.21 However, these arguments against dilution often served simply to
cover over the self-interest of the participating nations, who wanted to protect themselves from
genocide accusation as processes of decolonization were taking place around the globe.
In short, practices of cultural genocide were removed from the UNGC for a variety of reasons,
from the pragmatic to the nakedly prejudicial. On the latter score, one cannot deny that some
delegates to the General Assembly believed quite simply that some cultures were worthier of
protection than others. They raised concerns about the protection of “backward” languages and
17
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religions. Overconfidence in Western superiority and attendant Eurocentric biases thus worked
their way into the conceptual architecture of the UNGC.
Accordingly, the logic of prevention can also be seen to operate as a “logic of elimination.”
Just as the logic of elimination, as identified by Patrick Wolfe, works to erase Indigenous presence
upon the land while naturalizing non-Indigenous settlement, the logic of prevention turns our
gaze away from the many means of elimination (e.g., forced assimilation, removal, linguistic
and political destruction), thereby allowing us to imagine North America as a space not needing
prevention.22 Indigenous groups, and the centrality of culture to the ongoingness of these groups,
are defined out of the scope of genocide and so out of the scope of prevention, facilitating the
perpetuation of a settler colonial logic of elimination by legal and other means.
The Logic of Prevention
The colonial logic of prevention manifests in the way that culture is discussed and treated in the
mainstream literature on genocide prevention, risk assessment and early warning. Therein, for
the most part, culture receives little mention. Some reports discuss the creation of a “culture of
prevention” or a “culture of peace,” and warnings are sometimes given about regions where
there is a culture of obedience or authoritarianism, thus making certain kinds of culture serve as
potential warning signs or precursors to genocide, but little is said of the actual cultures threatened
by genocide.23 A review of some illustrative examples is thus in order.
The report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S.
Policy Makers, co-chaired by Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen (2008), is an example
of the blind spots inherited from the UNGC that are sustained in the logic of prevention. In this
report, culture is problematized in the form of the reigning institutional culture in the United
States, which is seen as being one that favours reactive rather than preventative practices.24 This is
a key focus of the report, since the task force was established with the purpose to “identify practical
steps to enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to prevent and respond to genocide and mass
atrocities.”25 Of course, in giving such advice, the report also needs to touch on how to identify
when prevention is warranted. Here, the report seeks to sidestep messy entanglements inherent
in the question “What is genocide?” by focusing instead on “genocide and mass atrocities” that
target victims “because of their membership as members of a group.”26 Despite this self-professed
open approach, it is clear that the report is only concerned with instances of physical destruction.
Cultural destruction may be something implicitly noted in references to the sort of “fine-grained”
analysis the authors feel is necessary to effective and efficient early warning and risk assessment,
though it does not receive specific attention per se.27
It is further clear in the report that culture may play a role in the lead-up to genocide. For
example, a culture of impunity that follows prior mass atrocities is noted as a possible precursor
to an occurrence of genocide.28 Likewise, the risk factor of “state-led discrimination” can be read
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as potentially including assaults on group culture, although again this is not explicitly stated.29
In large part, the report’s preventative lens does not focus on assaults against the cultural life
of targeted groups, and so fails to do enough to acknowledge cultural destruction as in itself a
technique of genocide.
Since reports such as that of the Genocide Prevention Task Force piggyback on the existing
early warning, risk assessment and prevention literature, it is necessary to look and see how it,
too, operates using a similar logic of prevention that overlooks the genocidal force of cultural
destruction. In this scholarly literature, one sees a narrowing lens that relegates assaults against
culture largely to the sidelines.30 The logic of prevention thereby remains ironically consistent with
the logic of elimination, despite the former’s commitment to forestalling genocide.
Though anthropologists such Hinton have brought to genocide studies an enhanced
understanding of the cultural conditions characteristic of particular regions (Cambodia) and
their relationship to genocidal processes, scholars approaching genocide prevention from a social
scientific perspective frequently exhibit little regard for the role of culture in both the perpetration
and resolution of genocide.31 Barbara Harff, whose pioneering work on genocide prevention has set
the stage for subsequent authors working on quantitative aspects of the field, re-works the UNGC
when she seeks to operationalize a concept of genocide and politicide for her research.32 In so
doing, she criticizes the UNGC for including “mental harm” as a form of genocide in Article II(b),
arguing that “it encompasses a vast array of instances of psychological and cultural harm done to
groups that have lost their cohesion and identity, but not their lives.”33 She offers no comment on
Article II(e) on the transfer of children from one group to another. Cultural destruction is simply
defined out of her equations.
If cultural destruction is not an outcome that such scholars consider to merit prevention, does
it at least appear in their work as a potential warning sign? Not so much. The analytical emphasis
in this kind of scholarship focuses on macro-level factors such as state policy, histories of previous
conflict, racial and ethnic cleavages, and underlying economic conditions. Harff does note factors
such as “exclusionary ideologies,”34 but these are registered more because of their capacity to
prime perpetrators toward physical genocidal action, rather than as assaults against the integrity
and continuity of targeted groups.
More examples could be provided, but the point is straightforward: constructed within a legal
regime that stacks the deck against general recognition of the genocidal significance of colonial
assaults on Indigenous cultures, the logic of prevention offers no solace and provides no potential
means of salvation to those facing cultural forms of group destruction. The same logic that resulted
in the removal of cultural genocide from the UNGC is operative in the decision-making featured in
both policy-oriented and scholarly interventions on questions of prevention. Within these domains,
cultural destruction is often seen as too messy, qualitatively different, or of too little importance
to require mention. These rationales draw upon liberal European ontological and epistemological
29
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assumptions that place individuals and their physical existence at the centre of group life. And
they downplay or otherwise ignore the cultural relations that constitute groups and contribute to
their ongoingness.35 Moreover, it is their fit with the law, and how they come to be known through
European legal practices that determines the relevance of the criteria whereby we are meant to
become able to determine when and where there is a potential genocide to be prevented. How
groups experience and understand their own potential destruction, especially where it resides
outside a European knowledge/experiential framework, simply matters less.36
Binaries, Clusters, Events, Circle, Line, Intensities
Beyond the neglect of culture in scholarly and policy literature on genocide prevention, we
contend there is a structural problem in the logic of prevention that locks it in patterns of modernist
and categorical thinking insensitive to the everyday intimacies of genocide. In brief, the logic of
prevention is represented through a variety of (often mathematical) metaphors that presuppose a
neat and rational world. Because our ultimate concern in this paper is with representation, we will
focus in what follows on how these metaphors of risk and prevention are typically visualized in
genocide studies.
Most prevalent among the early metaphors are those of the binary and the line. Genocidal
processes emerge either in one nation state or another—there is little regard for the indeterminate
zones that exist between the nations of the world. Instances of genocide might happen to cluster
in specific regions, but these spaces are distinctly segregated and carved so as to reflect a specific
geospatial conceptualization of the world, one that reinforces the idea of sovereign space. It is
therefore the nation that remains the primary unit for the logic of prevention, no matter how
contested that Westphalian framework might happen to be by those who live under its imposed
(and in some important sense arbitrary) order.
Within this national space, a particular trait or risk factor is usually understood to be either
present or absent. For example, it might be asked: Has the country experienced a previous instance
of genocide or mass violence? Yes or no. Is there evidence of an exclusionary ideology? Yes or no.
Responses may be coded into multi-modal rather than bi-modal responses, but the basic parameters
remain ones of a presence or an absence, the binarized logic of a finite machine state (either on or
off, present or absent).
The metaphor of the circle is also sometimes introduced with a view to capturing the notion that
previous violence increases the risk of future violence. This metaphor contributes to perceptions
of the cyclical nature of mass violence, in other words the idea that violent history repeats itself
unless intervention occurs. Such circles are often drawn between temporally and geographically
isolated events, in a back-handed way contributing to the idea of genocide as a distinct point in
time marked by definite boundaries. Accordingly, the circle of genocide may be seen to be nothing
more than another kind of line connecting events, with risks of heating up or cooling off viewed as
depending upon a number of identifiable (and shared) factors.
Such linearity is most obvious in stage models for predicting and preventing genocide.37
Under their logic, (pre)genocide begins slowly and increases in intensity until it blooms into fullfledged genocide. This development may be rendered metaphorically as either a straight line or
a tree branching off in different (binary) directions, the exact structure of which will depend on
a variety of yes/no or if/then-type decisions. If one can define/track/observe a potential direction
to a sequence of events, then the logic of prevention holds that we can try to staunch the flow of
genocidal actions.
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What these kinds of linear and teleological models gain in parsimony and practicality,
however, they often lose in explanatory and predictive subtlety. Some practitioners of genocide
risk assessment and prediction rightly acknowledge that their models only provide access to
certain types of genocide, and in particular are less successful in identifying and making sense of
the pulsating and mutating relations and processes responsible for slow genocides38 characteristic
of settler-colonial genocide.39 Consequently if we are serious about addressing the varieties of
genocidal processes and threats, it is necessary to open up the logic of prevention to new metaphors,
to the promise of prevention at a molecular rather than a molar level, and so multiply what we
propose referring to as the everyday ethos of prevention.40
The Open World, The Story World: Genocide’s Molecular Flows
It is not our contention that certain forms of genocidal destruction are undetectable and actionable
at a broader, molar level. Indeed we accept that some kinds of genocide can be recognized on a
broad surface with the aid of metaphors of lines, binaries, circles, events, and intensities. Molar
calculations of prevention, as calculations based on the analysis of generalized phenomena, are
sometimes successful in approximating and distilling genocidal probabilities. They assist us in
envisioning the surfaces of genocidal phenomena, especially when such surfaces are unmistakably
drenched in blood. In such circumstances, the linear, tree-model, might effectively allow us to
emplot the course of a genocide from root to branch, opening spaces for preventative actions
(although in assessments of efficacy it is sometimes worth remembering that one can never be sure
that an act that did not happen was in fact prevented). So, then we accept that models drawing on
a conventional stock of otherwise limited and limiting metaphors can sometimes create narrative
structures about genocidal progressions that open up possibilities for more and less preventatively
successful actions on the ground and political interventions in accordance with the reigning (formal
and informal) rules of the prevailing geopolitical order.
But even in cases of seemingly clear-cut, readily observable genocides it is also worth
remembering that operations take place at a molecular or microphysical level, and acknowledging
that complexities are often lost, distorted, or ignored through the distillation processes required
for emplotment. To provide one example, conventional prevention models do not deal with
genocidal intimacies, the everyday and molecular flows of and between relationships that make
attempted group destruction possible.41 Genocide occurs both to and through relationships.
These relationships are not ordinarily captured by macro-level data and the work that is done
to smooth the edges and constitute the conceptual boundaries of the violent phenomena under
study. However, it is precisely in our everyday relations with one another that group destruction is
made thinkable, habituated, innovated, and, in general, practiced.42 Identifying and intervening in
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destructive relations requires more than identifying the general circulation of a genocidal ideology
or exclusionary policies and practices – it requires thick description of the everyday forms of social
engagement and friction that make a genocide possible.
If one accepts the existence and power of genocide’s quotidian and affective dimensions, then
it is not a great leap to argue that it is within everyday structures, feelings, and interactions that
we also can locate a space of prevention. We feel this is particularly evident in cases of ongoing
settler colonial relations of destruction that persist in threatening Indigenous ways of being and
becoming. One such egregious case, that of Canadian Indian Residential Schools (IRS), serves
as a particularly vivid example of how genocidal intimacies were deployed for the purposes of
group destruction, predominantly through cultural means. Between the 1880s, until the last school
closed in 1996, Canada’s IRS served to remove upward of 150,000 Indigenous children from their
families and communities, in the process deliberately replacing the intimacy characteristic of the
Indigenous world with the twin terror-intimacies of physical and sexual abuse, supplemented by
the promised future intimacy (never to be fully realized) derived from assimilation.43 Through
the push of punishment and the pull of inclusion, Indigenous cultures were forcibly relegated to
a bygone and backward past, a displacement making it possible for the settler colonial Canadian
state to claim sovereignty over and within Indigenous nations.44
The complex topography – distributed across multiple times, spaces and cultures – of the IRS
example does not easily map onto the measures of risk and prevention identified in the mainstream
genocide prevention literature. However, it does have the potential to be signaled and unsettled
through forms of the educational work that Charny and Smith correctly identify in “Why GSP?”
as a component of prevention.45 Their mistake, however, involves limiting their conception of
“education” to a notion of cognitive awareness of the sort that is always susceptible to the distancing
and indifference-making patterns of the modern world, alongside a moral education that prioritizes
the value of life. In their (liberal-educational) model, cognitive and moral awareness holds the
promise of straightforwardly resulting in transformative action through the creation of reasonable
and ethical citizens who demand that their political representatives intervene to halt or otherwise
address genocidal circumstances. The process is, they assume, largely rational, and it operates
through appropriately molar political channels to bring about the cessation of violence and an end
to human suffering. Unfortunately, Charny and Smith do not critique these channels and their
normative outcomes and tactics (e.g., sanctions and military intervention). Most problematically
from our perspective, this model remains at the molar level and does not efficiently either take into
account or recommend strategies suitable for preventing molecular genocidal violence.
We argue that one important way to educate and work both to prevent and redress genocide
molecularly is through artistic renderings of genocidal experiences. Through artworks it becomes
possible not only to deploy cognitive-educational tools conducive to an ethos of prevention in
the individual, but also to cultivate empathetic and unsettling responses in secondary witnesses.
This is not of course to suggest that artworks are the only or even the main expressive vehicle
through which empathy can be cultivated; indeed works of history and biography, both creative
and expressive enterprises in their way, can also yield similar results. But the latter genres tend to
engage empathy when they are the most “expressive,” by which we mean they work to illuminate
or interpellate states of mind and feelings that reveal the more intimate and contingent aspects
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of lived experiences – e.g. the highly subjective and potentially “relatable” ways that people
make sense of what is happening to them, particularly in so far as we are concerned at times of
constraint and distress. Following scholar and therapist Mitchell Kossak,46 we believe that creative
artworks facilitate “attunement” with the world, both by modelling what attunement looks like
and by demonstrating the consequences and costs of “misattunement.” In becoming attuned to
the world – by learning to understand and accept the world’s inhabitants, folkways, and risks –
empathy plays a central role by creating opportunities for learning from the world as others see
and understand it. Creative or expressive representations, by drawing our attention (in, say, works
of fiction) to variations in the way we negotiate our lived realities, and by revealing how these
variations have come to mean something to the artists producing the representations of them,
invite us to think differently and, often, to care. When we do, when we respond positively to
the invitation to enter others’ lives that artworks extend to us, we facilitate, without in any way
overdetermining, the emergence of empathetic connections and the expectation that we need to
care. Notwithstanding the work of scholars like Paul Bloom and others who are overtly suspicious
of any claim that empathy might possibly contribute to the refinement of our moral sensibility
and ethical comportment,47 we remain convinced that empathy has a role to play in allowing us to
enter into the lives of others in ways that, under certain circumstances, contribute to narrowing the
distance between “Us” and “Them,” and through this narrowing aid in fostering a way of being
in the world more finely attuned to the harms inherent in genocidal intimacies and hospitable to
the demands of genocide prevention and repair. The argument over the moral and practical utility
of empathy is a large one that generally exceeds the scope of this writing. It is acknowledged
here only by way of admitting that there remains some controversy over about what tools are
best suited to the work of genocide prevention at the molecular level (empathy, Bloom’s “rational
compassion,” etc.).
For our part, we are exploring possible answers to this question through the production and
implementation of a uniquely twenty-first-century prototype of genocide education and prevention
practice that we are calling a “virtual storyworld.” In this wholly digital domain, interactions are
less scripted and open to multi-focal and multi-dimensional experiences. Though the story at the
heart of the digital world has been designed to elicit affective and empathetic responses through
the production of evocative sounds, moods, colors, and perspectives, it also makes possible unique
interactions and experiences that can be incorporated into the individual’s personal storehouse of
moral and other dispositions.48 The storyworld thus holds the promise of being able to familiarize
an individual, through seemingly everyday (and so molecular) interactions, with both the ethic
and practice of caring. In this way the storyworld promises to give those experiencing it access to
an everyday experience of genocide prevention through the recalibration of human relations.
Embodying Empathy
The Embodying Empathy project is led by a group of residential school Survivors with whom we
researchers have been working for several years now to design, build and test a virtual Indian
Residential School (vIRS). Using an Oculus Rift headset and other leading-edge technologies, our
project has constructed a dynamically interactive and immersive IRS storyworld, a virtual realitybased environment that provides carefully-rendered IRS interior and exterior spaces, photographs
and Survivor narratives for users to experience, interact with, and transform in various ordinary
(and sometimes troublingly intimate) settings. Survivor-led representations of their experiences are
thereby made available to a great variety of end users, including other Survivors, intergenerational
Survivors, non-Indigenous Canadians, recent immigrants and others. Through the spaces, images
and testimony contained within the storyworld, as well as through its introductory and closing
46
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monologues, users are connected not only to the attempted destruction of Indigenous groups
via forced assimilation but also to a multi-vocal experience of the continuing (and profoundly
damaging) reverberations of Canadian settler colonialism today.
The vIRS has been built carefully by adhering to unsettling and decolonizing research
principles, such as those found in the OCAP protocol (ownership, control, access, and possession)
formulated by Canada’s Assembly of First Nations originally to guide “non-extractive” scientific
research on Indigenous people and communities. We have also made use of administrative and
engagement procedures defined by relational accountability, whereby the role of the researcher
is understood to be not simply to extract knowledge from research subjects but rather to form
responsible and ongoing relations with those who possess a grounded expertise in the matters
being inquired into.49 Accordingly, the Embodying Empathy project is owned, controlled, and led
by a Survivor Governing Council, who have overseen all levels of the project from methodology
design, to ethics, to the build and design of the vIRS itself.50
We understand the impact of the vIRS to constitute a form of everyday prevention in light of
Domenic LaCapra’s (1999) distinction, borrowed from Freud, between “acting-out” and “workingthrough.” According to La Capra, “Acting-out is related to repetition, and even the repetitioncompulsion – the tendency to repeat something compulsively.” Those acting out consequently
“have a tendency to relive the past, to relive the present as if they were still fully in the past, with no
distance from it.”51 For them, the past intrudes into the present in ways that crucially overdetermine
the latter’s meanings and significance. Acting-out in this context would involve little more than a
simple performance of the past – a reliving and return of a trauma that has formerly been repressed,
but in a somewhat attenuated form. To simply act-out a residential school experience in a context
such as the vIRS would be to make it available to those immersed in the virtual storyworld in a
way that simply reaffirms or leaves intact their preexisting beliefs about residential schools. Such
an experience would be neither morally nor politically transformative, and would be of extremely
limited educational value. In contrast, a virtual world such Embodying Empathy that is designed
to encourage empathic unsettlement – a term LaCapra uses to designate that which “poses a
barrier to closure in discourse and places in jeopardy harmonizing or spiritually uplifting accounts
of extreme events from which we attempt to derive reassurance or a benefit”52 – would open up a
space of mourning within which it becomes possible to call the present into question by workingthrough differences and disjunctions made available via one’s virtual encounter with the past.
LaCapra notes that
Mourning involves a different inflection of performativity: a relation to the past that involves
recognizing its difference from the present – simultaneously remembering and taking leave
of or actively forgetting it, thereby allowing for a critical judgment and a reinvestment in
life, notably social and civic life with its demands, responsibilities, and norms requiring
respectful recognition and consideration for others.53

By participating in mourning conceived as an act of empathic unsettlement, secondary
witnesses embedded in the vIRS are not facilely engaging in “the dubious appropriation of the
49

For discussion of Indigenous and decolonizing methods, see Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies:
Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2nd ed. (London: Zed Books, 2012); Shawn Wilson, “What is an Indigenous
Research Methodology?” Canadian Journal of Native Education 25, no. 2 (2001), 175-179; Margaret Kovach, Indigenous
Methodologies: Characteristics, Conversations, and Contexts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Brian Schnarch,
“Ownership Control, Access, and Possession (OCAP) or Self-Determination Applied to Research: A Critical Analysis
of Contemporary First Nations Research and Some Options for First Nations Communities,” Journal of Aboriginal
Health 1, no. 1 (2004), 80-95.

50

We address these methodological concerns in other publications: see, for example, Adam Muller, Struan Sinclair and
Andrew Woolford, “Digitizing Trauma: Embodying Empathy in a Reconstructed Canadian Indian Residential
School,” in Wor(l)ds of Trauma: Canadian and German Perspectives, ed. Wolfgang Kloos (Münster and New York:
Waxman, 2018).

51

Dominic LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 142.

52

Ibid., 41-42.

53

Ibid., 70.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.3.1674

Woolford, Muller and Sinclair

90

status of the victim,” or otherwise reliving the past to make it cohere with the present.54 Instead,
they oscillate between past and present so as both to come closer to the experience of others and to
upset or unsettle themselves in/and the here and now. For LaCapra, “It is dubious to identify with
the victim to the point of making oneself a surrogate victim who has a right to the victim’s voice or
subject position. The role of empathy and empathic unsettlement in the attentive secondary witness
does not entail this identity; it involves a kind of virtual experience through which one puts oneself
in the other’s position while recognizing the difference of that position and hence not taking the
other’s place.”55 Through Embodying Empathy we have worked to create an experience for users
that neither completely disconnects their present from the past nor merely replicates the past in their
present. Instead, we have worked to have the vIRS produce emotions and affiliations conducive to
empathetic unsettlement, and through the experience of this unsettling an empathetically enriched
and cognitively enhanced appreciation of the traumatic experiences of social and moral solidarity
and betrayal marking the lives of Indigenous residential schoolchildren.
Empathic unsettlement nudges us toward ethical behavior, since it puts a confrontation with
the past in the service of reworking relationships today. It is a sufficiently experientially rich
and morally worthwhile goal to pursue, but building it into a virtual storyworld presented all
of us working on Embodying Empathy with a host of challenges. Our strategic use of inherently
unbounded, multivocal and narratively rich virtual space-time has allowed for the production
of serial counter-memories that now co-exist within the vIRS. Because of their (sometimes
contradictory) co-presence, these countermemories forestall possible harmonizing narratives
marshaled not just by the state but by members of a wide range of advocacy groups in order to
promote generically untroubled (and therefore static and unresponsive) forms of reconciliation and
redress. The immersive environment we have co-created demands complex forms of engagement
with Survivor experiences, as they are expressed in their own words, within a haunted yet
immediate and viscerally lifelike space composed from Survivor memories.
The Embodying Empathy storyworld is not an open world in the fashion of some contemporary
(especially multi-player) video games. Instead it is an environment in which users are directed
along a specific narrative path that leaves directional and other choices up to the user, but that
in strategic (though subtle) ways overdetermines their exposure to the storyworld’s traumatic
content. The everyday terrors of forced assimilation, including aspects of colonial intimacy, are
present in every glance. As part of an experiment in virtual embodiment, users are immersed in
and in contact with the virtual world through the agency of the 360-degree visual and auditory
perspectives provided by an Oculus Rift headset. This level of embodiment is intended to increase
users’ exposure to colonial intimacies as they confront objects and experiences in the storyworld:
the Lacombe’s ladder that contrasts the assimilative path to heaven with the Indigenous road to
hell; the clerical shadows that haunt the chapel and dormitories; on the ride to the residential school
in a van in which the seat is too large and distance from the driver is expressionistically magnified;
in the intimate, searching text fragments that appear on a bathroom mirror in the girl’s dormitory,
covered over with cardboard to guard against vanity, and the pages of a missal on display in the
dark, isolated furnace room. These experiences recruit users into a kind of muted trauma that is
intended to upset and unsettle – not by subjecting them to immediate pain or distress, but rather
by requiring them to rethink their relations with Indigenous others who underwent such violence,
as well as with the state that thought it acceptable to use these institutional techniques to forcibly
transform (and thereby destroy) entire peoples. The Embodying Empathy vIRS had been created
to inspire a change in its users’ everyday relationality, and through this alteration contribute to the
quotidian practice of genocide prevention.
Initial Findings
Our purpose in this paper is primarily conceptual; however, it is worth reporting on some of
the early but suggestive findings from our lab-based study and public exhibition of the vIRS. In
an initial qualitative study, carried out alongside a more ambitious psychological investigation
54
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that in the near future will provide quantitative data on the empathy-generating capacity of the
vIRS,56 twenty University students were introduced to the vIRS through a 15-minute tour of its
space followed by a one-hour, semi-structured lifeworld interview. The lifeworld interview is not
intended to measure a specific phenomenon, or individual reactions to it. Instead, this interview
strategy seeks to develop rapport with the research participant in order to examine how this
individual makes sense of their experiences.57 Research participants ranged in age from 19 to 40,
with the majority being in the 19-22 age range. Most (65%) identified as male, which is unusual for
a sample drawn from the pool of first-year Psychology students at the University of Manitoba, who
predominantly identify as female. Many suggested they were drawn to participate in the study
because they enjoy video games or had a curiosity about virtual reality, and saw their participation
as providing an opportunity to try it out. Most of our group were Canadian citizens, though we
also interviewed a handful (five) who were either landed immigrants or international students. No
one in our sample identified as an Indigenous person.
All participants had learned about Canadian residential schools in either their high school or
university classes. All were familiar with Survivor retellings of their experiences, and had either
read this testimony in textual form (e.g., memoir) or heard it recounted in documentary films. Even
so, every one of our participants felt this testimony was enhanced in some fashion when situated
within the virtually reconstructed residential school. While many felt they gained new knowledge
of residential schools through their experience of virtual immersion, this was not what they cited as
the primary takeaway from their engagement with the vIRS. Instead, they remained most alive to
how their feelings of sadness,58 unease,59 anger,60 loneliness,61 and other emotions were intensified
by the experience of being in the location where the harm occurred. One participant reported: “I
definitely felt like I was there” and how the vIRS allowed her to “… take more, give more meaning
to it. …It helps you understand more, in a sense.”62 Another noted that “it definitely made me feel
more like I was a part of what they were actually saying when I was in the actual place they were
describing.”63 Moreover, their sense of intimate connection to the Survivors was heightened since
they felt closer to their experiences of isolation, injustice, and abandonment.
When asked what empathy meant to them, most students were able to articulate a sense of the
concept, though never in a textbook or clinical manner. They described empathy, in general, as the
experience of “being in the shoes of another,”64 “connecting with them,”65 “helping someone,”66 or
“to feel what another person is going through.”67 All but one felt their empathy toward Survivors,
however they understood the term, was increased through their experience of the vIRS. They
explained that this was the case because of the “eeriness”68 or the palpable “loneliness”69 of the
vIRS. Their recall of the Survivor testimony they heard was also very good, demonstrating that the
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Survivor experiences had in some sense sunk in and “stuck,” at least for the moment. Interestingly,
the one participant who did not feel he had experienced empathy also self-identified as an avid
video game player. For this person, the experience of the vIRS was less emotionally powerful
because he adopted strategies he used when playing tense action or horror video games so as to
avoid feeling distress or unwanted surprise.70
Aside from this one individual, other participants expressed their sense of connection to
Survivors and a desire to communicate their concern to these individuals. Some wanted to know
whether or not the Survivors are “okay now.”71 Others wanted to “congratulate them” or express
respect for their “bravery” or “strength”72 for surviving such a horrifying milieu. Connecting this
to their day-to-day lives, these participants felt less able to address the broader national project of
“reconciliation” and suggested instead how they hoped to live in a way that respected the cultures
and ways of being of Canadian Indigenous peoples: “I will go and do, like, a little research and find
out more about them;”73 “I just want to listen to them talking for more about their experience.”74
We have also exhibited the vIRS at four local high schools. For ethics reasons, we have not
collected data in these settings and can only speak anecdotally to the students’ reactions. For
the high school pop-up exhibitions, students first listen to members of the Embodying Empathy
Survivor Governing Council recount their residential school experiences before visiting the vIRS
in groups of two. Some students have noted how seeing the space helps make the Survivors’
testimony more vivid, and we have at times heard audible gasps from the young people as they
navigate the various spaces comprising the virtual storyworld. However, this is also the one setting
where Indigenous students have visited the vIRS, and their reactions have ranged from feeling
too close to the experiences depicted and needing to exit the storyworld immediately because of
resurfacing trauma, to feeling the vIRS “sugar coats” Survivors’ experiences because we are unable
to include graphic representations of sexual and physical violence when presenting the storyworld
to younger students.
These findings are preliminary but suggest that the affective space of the vIRS is a context in
which study participants heightened their emotional connection to residential school Survivors.
Participants did not pretend that they had experienced what Survivors had experienced, or that
they could somehow act out life in a residential school and in so doing achieve a full understanding
of that life. Rather, the data suggests that participants were thoughtfully encouraged by the vIRS
to work through many of the harms of residential schooling. Several asked that in future iterations
of the storyworld we include more representations of hardship, particularly of the sexual and
physical abuse that was a common feature of residential schools.75 Altogether study participants
gave us reason to continue believing that empathic unsettlement can serve as a means of molecular
prevention, the latter deriving from participants’ reflection on how they could embody greater
respect for and recognition of distinct Indigenous cultures. Through empathic acts of role-taking,
emotional connection, and expression of ongoing concern for Survivors, the participants in this
study are displaying an initial experience of behavioral change through their engagement with the
Embodying Empathy storyworld.76 The question remains as to how long this behavioral change
lasts after they depart from the storyworld; nonetheless, it suggests the vIRS holds some promise
for instilling an everyday ethic of prevention.
Conclusion: Multiplying Prevention
In recent years, greater emphasis has been placed on the scientific aspects of genocide risk
assessment and prevention. The persistence and immediacy of genocide, not to mention the
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devastating experience of witnessing the suffering it entails, has the obvious consequence of driving
us toward similarly immediate responses. In the face of such suffering, critique as an explanatory
and moral-political project can seem untimely, irrelevant, or inappropriate. It is not for lack of
solidarity with suffering others that we engage here in the critique of prevention. We follow Wendy
Brown and view critique as resisting the closing-in of the present upon us, rejecting its inevability,
and providing us with the means to imagine it differently.77 More precisely, critiquing how the
prevention concept is used in a specific time and place is not an act of indifference; it is a sincere
effort to broaden our horizons of understanding, and with them the possibilities of justice and
redress. As a complex problem, or maybe better as a complex of problems, prevention should not
be rushed into, pragmatically, conceptually, or otherwise.
In our view, the rush to prevention speaks for a deeper (and in many ways understandable)
desire for immediate action as well as a realpolitik that wages the battle against genocide at a molar
level. Prior to critique of the sort we aim to offer here, prevention makes itself available to recognize
and address only certain types of genocide identifiable through surface acts of recognition. A
truly critical approach to genocide prevention needs to look to multiplying prevention through
the proliferation of everyday resistance to genocidal practices and logics. Embodying Empathy,
which may be more familiarly conceived of as a project revolving around concerns with genocide
representation, can, we believe, also operate to initiate and sustain everyday forms of genocide
prevention, designed to counter habits and practices conducive to the destruction of group life. In
particular, it potentially awakens users to the cultural destruction wrought through the genocidal
intimacies of the residential school, providing an embodied experience directed toward shifting
users’ future beliefs and practices away from the ongoing destructiveness of Canadian settler
colonialism.
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In its evolving delineation from the senior field of Holocaust studies, the interdisciplinary
field of genocide studies has seen a remarkable growth in the past 25 years. We have seen the
professionalization of the field through the emergence of two organizations, the International
Association of Genocide Scholars in 1994 and the International Network of Genocide Scholars in
2005. Each organization gave birth to new scholarly journals for the field and the corresponding
growth of scholarship has led to an impressive robustness of interdisciplinary work reflected in the
compilation of comprehensive textbooks and handbooks, myriad edited volumes, and a seemingly
endless array of workshops, seminars, and conferences. On-line encyclopedias, discussion groups,
blog sites, and curricular initiatives in secondary and higher education reveal the extent to which
both scholars and educated laypeople continue to wrestle with the concept, and, more importantly,
the reality of genocidal violence.
Genocide studies remains, however, a young and, at times, fractious discipline, in search of
theoretical and conceptual maturity – often acutely reflected in the self-imposed tension between
scholarship and activism. For too long, there remained an “ivory tower” lens in our field that upheld
the former and, too often, looked down with suspicion, or even derision, upon the latter. This
has been challenged, however, with the emergence of new generations of teacher-scholars in the
field – coming from more diverse disciplinary, age, gender, cultural, linguistic, and socioeconomic
backgrounds – who have pushed us to redefine “engagement.” Increasingly, activism has come to
be seen as a necessary complement to scholarship. To divorce the two, cheapens both. There can be
a synergy between scholarship and activism in which each is nurtured and informed by the other.
This is just one transition that has pushed us to reframe the field in which we work. It also,
however, pushes us to bring a critical lens to other long-held disciplinary assumptions. As Alex
Hinton first argued in 2012, “the time is right to engage in critical reflections about the state of the
field.”1 Referring to this exercise as “critical genocide studies,” Hinton called for a “critical thinking
about the field of genocide studies itself, exploring our presuppositions, decentering our biases,
and throwing light on blind spots in the hope of further enriching this dynamic field.”2
In that spirit, this article expands those critical reflections to the work of genocide and atrocity
prevention. Of particular focus in this piece is the communication of the logic of atrocity prevention
to State actors. As genocide studies has developed as a field, we also have become more insular;
professionalizing how we operate in such a way that it has pulled us away from those very venues
in which we should be applying our work. From the sure footing of the outside, we often criticize
State actors, particularly policymakers, for their impotent actions in the face of escalating risks or,
even, genocidal violence. But we seldom speak with them or push ourselves to find ways to bridge
what we know with how they work. Scholars and State actors occupy separate intellectual and
institutional universes, to the impoverishment of both communities. Recognizing that reality, this
paper will examine how genocide studies scholars might be more productive and influential voices
in deliberations on atrocity prevention, particularly in engagement with State actors.
Since its inaugural seminar in 2008, I have had the privilege to be involved with the work of the
Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), an international NGO devoted to atrocity
prevention through education, training, and technical assistance to State actors.3 The motivation
for that work was not that State actors are the only actors in atrocity prevention; rather, it was that
atrocity prevention education, training, and technical assistance was virtually nonexistent for State
actors. In the life of the organization, for which I now serve as Director of Academic Programs, we
have trained more than 5,000 State actors (government officials, diplomats, parliamentarians, and
1
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security sector personnel) from over 85 countries around the world. My unique bank of experiences
drawn from this frontline engagement with atrocity prevention training for State actors has shaped
much of my thinking in this paper.
In early July 2018, Hikmet Karcic, an author and genocide researcher from Sarajevo,
received unsettling news from the European Parliament (EP). His exhibit commemorating the
23rd anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, agreed for over a year to be hosted by the EP, was
turned away for displaying “too many skulls and bones.”4 Publicly, the EP worried that the exhibit,
focusing on the stages leading to genocide, would potentially jeopardize Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
path to Euro Atlantic integration. In truth, it was personal political calculations on the part of some
EP members – including requests to remove photos of war criminals such as Slobodan Milosevic,
Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko Mladic – that led to the cancellation of the exhibit.
The denial of genocide, at Srebrenica and elsewhere during the Yugoslav Wars of 1992-1995,
is widespread in Republika Srpska and Serbia. In those regions, war criminals are embraced by
their communities as national heroes. For the EP to cancel this exhibit, however, shows the degree
to which the broader political establishment and society in Europe is not ready to come to terms
with the reality of the worst atrocities committed on its soil since the Holocaust. In the words of
Bosnian journalist Mirnes Kovac: “With today’s triumphalism along with the European Parliament
members’ mitigation of the genocide when they rejected the exhibit’s content, the world is, in
fact, encountering the most brutal lesson from Srebrenica, from Bosnia and it’s short and clear:
‘Genocide is worth it’.”5
“Genocide is worth it.” Kovac’s statement is not a test of a scholar’s right to free speech.
Neither is it an inexcusable defense of an indefensible position, as Bruce Gilley tried to do in 2017
by arguing for “the case for colonialism” on the spectacularly misguided basis that colonialism was
“beneficial” for the colonized and that the recolonization of former colonies by Western powers
was worthy of consideration.6 Rather, this statement – “genocide is worth it” – is a disquieting, but
resonant, reality on two levels.
First, genocide is worth it because, in the minds of its perpetrators, it is sound political and
social strategy. We see its ubiquity throughout human history because, in short, it works more
often than not. It works to marginalize or remove political opposition, to reshape the social strata of
society, to privilege certain identities while disenfranchising others, to transfigure the geography
of lived spaces, to separate families as the ultimate expression of state power. Indigenous
communities around the world, for instance, have been marginalized by genocidal violence, most
often a consequence of settler colonialism, to the point that majority groups see them as “were”
rather than “are;” extinct rather than existing. Violence in the former Yugoslavia has transfigured
the geography of lived space to such a degree that perpetrators have resolved what they perceived
as the problem of identity plurality by being able to draw territorial and social boundaries that
exclude the “other.” So, when genocide works, either as political oppression or social engineering,
it transforms political and social relationships for generations. Genocide is worth it, again from the
“rational actor” perspectives of those who perpetrate it, because it, more often than not, works to
achieve their exterminatory or exclusionary aims.
Second, genocide is worth it because not only does it often work, but the chances of punishment
for those who orchestrate and carry it out are, if existent, relatively inconsequential. Impunity is the
rule rather than the exemption. A recent documentary, for instance, states that more than 800,000
SS soldiers survived the war. While several thousand were prosecuted for war crimes, only 124
were convicted.7 The apprehension and conviction rates for international tribunals are as equally
4
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disconcerting, even as they are empowering for would-be perpetrators. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicated 161 individuals, of whom 90 were convicted,
at an estimated cost of $2.3 billion USD. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
indicted 93 individuals, of whom 62 were convicted, at an estimated cost of more than $2 billion
USD. For the beleaguered International Criminal Court (ICC), its 16 years of operation have seen
the indictment of only 41 individuals, of whom 8 have been convicted, at an estimated cost of more
than $1 billion USD.8 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, after 12 years in
operation and an estimated cost of $300 million USD, just recently convicted the second and third
of only nine Khmer Rouge leaders who have been indicted.9 Clearly, genocide overwhelms justice
and the lesson learned by would-be perpetrators, as I have found in my interviews with alleged
and convicted perpetrators over the years, is that genocide is a benefit worth pursuing because the
risk of punishment is inconsequentially small – particularly for the rank-and-file killers who are at
the frontlines of the destruction.10
“Genocide is worth it.” The fact that this truth is unsettling does not make it any less true.
Educated folk had truth in esteem. We value truth and aspire to it. That does not mean, however,
that every truth we face will make us feel good about our world or ourselves. I argue that this is
one of those truths. And yet, still, we find its truth so outlandish, and so unsettling, that it is seldom
addressed seriously. In October 2017, for instance, Reuben Rose-Redwood sent a hoax proposal to
13 academic journal editors with the following pitch: “There is a longstanding orthodoxy that only
emphasizes the negative dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing, ignoring the fact that there
may also be benefits — however controversial — associated with these political practices, and that,
in some cases, the benefits may even outweigh the costs.”11 His use of an “outrageous” proposal to
test the ethical standards in the editorial decision-making process is telling in that, to his mind, he
selected a proposition with which any right-thinking person would be immediately appalled and
would find no defensible reason to engage with intellectually.
Whatever degree of offensiveness, or perceived cold-hearted calculation, we find in this costbenefit analysis, however, is irrelevant to its truthfulness and how well it reflects reality. The truth
is that perpetrators, in a very practical and utilitarian sense, do weigh the costs and benefits of
committing atrocities and that, in not a few cases, they proceed with the commission of atrocities
precisely because the benefits outweigh the costs. This recognition pushes us to think more broadly
about how we communicate the logic of atrocity prevention. We cannot comfortably restrict the
logic of atrocity prevention to the persistent, but misguided, belief that its moral urgency – the
preservation of human rights and life – is what must be communicated and that, if communicated
effectively, would-be bad actors will refrain from the commission of atrocities. Until we recognize
that genocide is perceived as worth it to the people who perpetrate it, however morally repugnant
we may find it, our “best practices” of atrocity prevention will continue to fall short.
The restricted logic of atrocity prevention as grounded in moral urgency is particularly
misguided, even reckless, when thrown into the bureaucratic structures of State actors. Moral
urgency does not fall within the purview of how most State actors self-define “national interests.”
As such, appealing to it will be particularly ineffectual, as we have seen time after time. State actors
are embedded in bureaucratic structures where rigidity overrides creativity and decision-making
occurs with a glacial pace. Bureaucratic structures seldom leave room for moral agency, let alone
moral urgency. So, for atrocity prevention to be communicated most effectively to State actors,
Data for the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC are taken from Carolyn Kenney and John Norris, “International Justice on Trial:
Taking Stock of International Justice Over the Past Quarter Century,” Center for American Progress, March 28, 2018,
accessed November 30, 2018, www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/03/28/448415/internationaljustice-trial/.
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we must move beyond simple moral urgency and find other ways in which their agency can be
mobilized.
This paper argues that, in building the capacity and agency of State actors, we must broaden
the logic of atrocity prevention to most effectively promote the prevention of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide. That broadening of logic is built on three interrelated tasks that
represent best practices of engagement with State actors: (a) recognizing the reality of atrocity
prevention as a multilayered approach running throughout the pre-, mid-, and post-conflict cycle,
(b) understanding atrocity prevention as a cost-benefit exercise, different from, but overlapping
with, conflict prevention and (c) identifying the specific features of bureaucratic information
processing that too often lead political will away from atrocity prevention.
Atrocity prevention is a multilayered approach running throughout the pre-, mid-, and postconflict cycle.
When atrocity prevention is narrowly understood as crisis management or humanitarian
intervention, it is reduced to self-interested actions that often accelerate the rate of mass violence
as well as reinforce global hierarchies built on colonial and post-colonial structures.12 Effective
atrocity prevention requires a re-imagining of that logic to recognize a continuum of strategies that
include preventing atrocities from ever taking place (upstream prevention), preventing further
atrocities once they have begun (midstream prevention), and preventing future atrocities once a
society embarks on rebuilding after mass violence (downstream prevention). Central is the notion
that prevention does not end when the violence begins. As Gareth Evans argues: “’Prevention’
language can reasonably be applied at all stages of the conflict cycle.”13
Let’s contextualize this continuum of prevention strategies in an analogy. Imagine you are
standing beside a river and see someone caught in the current and struggling for their life. You
jump in and manage to pull the victim ashore. Just as you catch your breath, however, another
person in distress comes downstream…followed by another and another and another. Rather than
remaining downstream and exhausting yourself on the rescue of individuals already in distress,
you travel upstream to find the source of the problem. You may discover a hole in a bridge or
perhaps of a lack of a protective fence on a cliff. You have changed, though, the calculus of what
prevention means – rather than expending your resources and energy on rescuing people in crisis,
you can now try to stop the crisis at its source. Saving victims in crisis and fixing the source of the
crisis are both forms of prevention – as is helping victims the moment they fall into the river rather
than waiting until they have been swept downstream – each simply occur at different stages of
the process of prevention. Clearly, focusing prevention efforts at the source of the crisis, before it
happens, is more efficient and less costly than managing the consequences of the crisis once it has
occurred. You may not stop all of the people from falling into the river, at least not right away,
but – by addressing the root cause – you have decreased risk and there will be far fewer people to
rescue downstream.
Following a population-based health model where the aim is the prevention of the disease
of genocide and other mass atrocities, we can think of three stages in a continuum of prevention
strategies – primary, secondary, and tertiary.14 Primary prevention is upstream prevention; fixing the
hole in the bridge or constructing a protective barrier to prevent people from falling into the river.
Upstream prevention is the “before” analysis of the longer-term governance, historical, economic,
and societal factors that leave a country at risk for genocide and other mass atrocities and the
inoculation avenues open to mitigating those risk factors. Like genocide itself, upstream prevention
is a process, not an event. It is a long-term strategy of building underlying structures of societal and
state durability related to governance, the interpretation of conflict history, economic conditions,
and social cohesion. Upstream genocide prevention is built on sustained efforts to increase the
See Daniel Feierstein’s related paper in this special issue.
Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington, DC: Brookings
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capacity and resilience of societies to inoculate themselves against the risk of mass atrocity. These
are long-sighted measures – often underappreciated or even unrecognized because they have led
to a non-event – intended to minimize the necessity for midstream crisis management or reactive
measures.
Upstream prevention strategies are universal; that is, they can – and should – be applied
broadly for a population regardless of their current state of risk. While many developed states
think of atrocity prevention as a foreign policy issue, it also should be recognized as a domestic
concern as no state is immune to the risk of genocide. Upstream strategies for atrocity prevention
also can be selectively applied to populations who have been identified in some ways as being at
heightened risk for genocide. For their most durable and sustainable effectiveness, however, it is
important that upstream strategies for atrocity prevention come from within a society rather than
being imposed from without. Localized community-based initiatives that are highly responsive to
the unique internal dynamics of the society are crucial in building a state’s resilience, reducing its
susceptibility to genocide and, ultimately, reinforcing a state’s sovereignty. In addition, increased
“emphasis should be placed on building the capacity of non-state actors, including traditional and
religious institutions, to identify and monitor risk factors preceding mass atrocity crimes.”15
The work of my colleagues at AIPR, for instance, has intersected with the birth of national
mechanisms for the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes in Mexico, the US, Uganda,
Kenya, Tanzania, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Argentina, and
Paraguay.16 As just one example from this list, Tanzania’s National Committee for the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms
of Discrimination (TNC), established in February 2012, was the first of its kind in the Great Lakes
Region, site of some of Africa`s most intractable and violent conflicts. Housed within Tanzania’s
Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs, this committee includes a broad-based national
membership drawn from government, civil society, and faith-based organizations. In addition to
several AIPR-led training seminars to build the capacity of the committee, the group has developed
collaborative ties with a range of other international partners, including the UN’s Office of the Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
Since its inception, the TNC has had a remarkable impact throughout Tanzania, leading Peace
Forum workshops, bringing diverse religious leaders together to brainstorm strategies for the
promotion of social cohesion, establishing Joint Peace Committees in regions throughout the
country, and conducting periodic risk assessments of conflict-prone areas in Tanzania and its
neighboring countries.
Secondary prevention is midstream prevention; the rescue of victims just as they hit the water
but before they are swept further downstream. Midstream prevention “during” the crisis captures
the immediate, real-time response efforts – political, economic, legal, and military – that are direct
crisis management tactics to slow, limit, or halt the mass violence. The mistaken belief that, short
of full-scale coercive military intervention, little or nothing can be done to respond to an ongoing
genocide is a failure of preventive creativity.17 We have a diverse and wide-ranging set of preventive
response tools that can be applied in myriad creative ways to a broad spectrum of actors and
interests. To believe otherwise is willful neglect.
Even when we are aware of the tools in the preventive toolbox, however, we still need to
articulate better principles for how they are used. “Future work should emphasize the interactions
between the various tools that slow or stop the killing, so as to better understand how best to
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deploy ‘all the means at our disposal.’”18 As Alan Kuperman warns, a poorly-conceived and poorlyimplemented response to genocide can create a “moral hazard” that increases the very human
suffering that it intends to alleviate.19 Certainly, used in isolation, any one of the preventive response
tools is unlikely to slow, limit, or stop genocide violence. Employed, though, in conjunction with
other tools, and as part of larger overall framework conditioned on the principle of “do no harm,”
the strategic application of several of these preventive response tools can go a long way toward
mitigating genocidal conflict and protecting civilians.
Finally, tertiary prevention is downstream prevention; the hopeful resuscitation of victims who
were swept away because upstream or midstream prevention failed. Downstream prevention refers
to the “after” efforts to foster resilience by dealing with the acute long-term consequences of mass
violence through pursuits of justice, truth, and memory to help stabilize, heal, and rehabilitate a
post-genocide society. Verbitsky, a prominent Argentine journalist best known for reporting the
confessions of Francisco Scilingo, a retired naval officer who admitted to throwing live prisoners
out of airplanes and into the sea on the so-called “flights of death,” said: “People always ask,
‘Why reopen wounds that have closed?’ Because they were badly closed. First you have to cure
the infection, or they will reopen themselves.”20 Societal wounds that reopen after genocide leave
a society at considerable risk. This is why, from a downstream prevention standpoint, it is vital to
focus on social repair – “closing the wounds” – after genocide.
Complementary pursuits of justice, truth, and memory can be important mechanisms of social
repair in a post-atrocity society. They are paths that cleave a trail to societal reconstruction. While
States carry the primary responsibility for such repair, the international community (including
international and regional organizations, neighbors, states, private companies and businesses, and
civil society) has a responsibility to assist States in building the capacity to carry out that repair.
It also is important to note that no one transitional justice mechanism can address the myriad
problems facing a post-genocide society. “The large number of victims, inadequate legal systems,
and traumatized societies require countries to adopt multiple transitional justice mechanisms.”21
No single mechanism of transitional justice – be it rooted in justice, truth, or memory – is as
impactful on its own as when combined with the others.
We should not create an artificial distinction between these stages of prevention strategies,
boundary them in mutually exclusive boxes, nor suggest an overly simplistic sequential approach
to the protection of populations. Mass atrocities are often more cyclical than linear.22 So upstream,
midstream, and downstream prevention efforts work in an interconnected and synergistic, rather
than isolated, fashion. I also do not mean to imply a strict temporal process; most conflicts are an
intricate tangle of pre, mid- and post-conflict at any one time. As a result, the defining element of
an upstream preventive approach, for example, is not “when” it takes place but rather that it seeks
to address the underlying causes of conflict. “In theory, interventions to prevent conflict upstream
can be undertaken at any point during the conflict cycle, even at the same time as measures to
address the symptoms of conflict are also being carried out.”23 In short, these stages of prevention,
and the measures involved in each, are complexly linked and state responsibility, buttressed
by international assistance for capacity building, is threaded throughout all three stages of the
continuum.
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By broadening the logic of atrocity prevention to a continuum of prevention strategies, rather
than artificially isolating prevention as simply a reaction to crisis, we also broaden the range of
actors who play roles in prevention. These actors include domestic non-state actors (civil society,
traditional and religious institutions, education, localized community-based initiatives, etc.),
state actors, multilateral regional organizations that oblige member states to surrender a measure
of state sovereignty for the sake of collective goals, and international actors working through
internationally-recognized organizations.
Atrocity prevention as a cost-benefit exercise, different from, but overlapping with, conflict
prevention.
In atrocity prevention, the measures used and those targeted by a particular strategy, as well as
the objectives and type of engagement, may be narrower than the measures deemed suitable for
more general conflict prevention. Where a conflict prevention strategy might consider the use
of amnesty for perpetrators, for instance, such a strategy for mass atrocity prevention would
compromise criminal accountability in an unacceptable way.24 In yet other ways, atrocity prevention
strategies may be broader, including, for example, physical protection for vulnerable groups, a tool
rarely associated with conflict prevention.25 In some cases, the exact same prevention tools might
have decidedly different targets or objectives when tailored to the context of atrocity or conflict
prevention. In atrocity prevention, for example, sanctions may be used coercively to target specific
actors we are seeking to dissuade from committing atrocities. In the case of conflict prevention, the
same tool could be directed cooperatively at several actors we are seeking to bring together in a
consensual peace agreement.26
In many ways, though, the preventive implications for conflict and atrocity are markedly
interconnected; many of the actions taken to prevent the former will necessarily reduce the
occurrence of the latter. Just as the number of drowning incidents is likely to increase as more people
head to the water on a hot day, the number of atrocities will increase as more conflicts emerge
globally. So, understanding the general sources of conflict, and how they may be mitigated, will
go a long way towards helping us at least indirectly prevent, or reduce the number of, atrocities.
As Alex Bellamy argues, “there can be no meaningful and effective agenda for the prevention of
genocide and mass atrocities that does not incorporate the prevention of armed conflict and the
measures commonly associated with it.”27 In short, the prevention of conflict should be a core
element of any atrocity prevention strategy.
Atrocity prevention reduces four types of costs – human, instability, economic, and diplomatic.28
Atrocity prevention is primarily focused on reducing human costs through the protection and
preservation of human life and security. Even the most restrictive of definitions estimates that at
least 60 million men, women, and children were victims of genocide and mass killing in the past
century alone.29 On the upper end, political scientist Rudolph Rummel argues that close to 170
million civilians were done to death in the twentieth century.30 Unfortunately, the first two decades
of the twenty-first century have brought little light to the darkness as a variety of international
watch lists suggest that close to 20 countries are currently “at risk” for genocide. Even for those
who survive, genocide is a collective trauma, a redefining destruction that shatters their assumptive
world and transforms societies for generations.
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In addition, atrocity prevention reduces instability costs by contributing to national peace and
stability in fragile countries, as well as promoting regional and international peace and stability. As
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report argued, “these
days, good international citizenship is a matter of national self-interest. With the world as close
and interdependent as it now is, and with crises in ‘faraway countries of which we know little’ as
capable as they now are of generating major problems elsewhere (with refugee outflows, health
pandemics, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, organized crime and the like), it is strongly arguable
that it is in every country’s interest to contribute cooperatively to the resolution of such problems,
quite apart from the humanitarian imperative to do so.”31
Atrocity prevention also reduces economic costs as prevention is much less costly than
intervening to stop genocide or rebuilding in the aftermath of a mass destruction that has destroyed
the development trajectory of a state or region. That is, the strategies available to us for upstream
prevention are much less costly, in an economic sense, than the available strategies for midstream
prevention once atrocity has broken out or, even more so, for downstream prevention for rebuilding
after the atrocities are over. In a world where the global economic impact of violence was $14.76
trillion in 2017 alone, the economic costs potentially addressed by effective atrocity prevention are
no small issue.32
Finally, atrocity prevention reduces diplomatic costs as it reinforces state sovereignty by limiting
the more intrusive and invasive forms of response, from other States or international actors, that
may be required to halt atrocity crimes. The violation of state sovereignty by the use of military
force for nonconsensual coercive intervention carries with it significant costs. To the civilians it
is meant to protect, military intervention can inflame hostilities and put them at greater risk by
further destabilizing the state in which they reside. To a perpetrator regime it is meant to defeat,
military intervention can rouse sympathy among bystander nations and lead perpetrators to
blame the victims for the costs they are now suffering. To an international order predicated on
state sovereignty, military intervention can undermine that “last defense against the rules of an
unequal world” and raise the abusive threat of powerful states meddling in the affairs of those less
powerful.33
Atrocity prevention is impeded by bureaucratic information processing that too often leads
political will in a non-preventive direction.
As mentioned earlier, State actors are embedded in bureaucratic structures where rigidity overrides
creativity and decision-making occurs with a glacial pace. While there are certainly cultural
variations in how bureaucracies function, a common thread is that many become self-sustaining
institutions in which substantive gaps between information received and action taken become
a natural consequence of risk-adverse hierarchical structures often build on cautious prudence.
These realities become particularly problematic when State actors, often with too little support and
too few resources, are being asked to use their agency to respond to escalating situations of violent
conflict.
In 1997, Alexander George and Jane Holl first identified the “warning-response” gap in a
Carnegie Commission report on preventing deadly conflict. “If events such as in Bosnia, Kuwait,
and Rwanda,” they asked, “are known (and increasingly knowable, given the rapidly contracting
nature of global interactions), why are they not prevented?”34 Rather than a lack of timely or
accurate early warning, George and Holl posited a systematic warning-response gap as the key
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factor in understanding policy delay or paralysis in the face of deadly conflict. They cited six
reasons, related to decision makers’ information processing, for this warning-response gap:
• the relatively low stakes perceived to be at risk for a given state’s vital national interests;
• the uncertainty and interpretive ambiguity of knowing which trouble spots are likely to
explode and when;
• the lack of theories and models to assess and predict the significance of early warning
indicators;
• the dread of “false triggers,” or a “cry wolf” phenomenon, that may register preventive
actions as premature or unnecessary;
• the impracticality of responding with preventive actions given the large number of lowlevel crises and the ever-growing limitation of resources; and
• the fear of a “slippery slope” engagement in a potentially intractable problem.35
Similarly, the Albright and Cohen report admits: “Warnings always entail a degree of
uncertainty, and human beings naturally resist paying certain costs today, even if small, to protect
against uncertain future costs; this is true of bureaucracies all the more so. Add to this the incentives
for political leaders to focus on short-term costs and benefits, and the tendency for bureaucracies to
resist risky action, and it should not surprise us that it is difficult to generate support for preventive
action.”36 Indeed, with such a list of compelling barriers to preventive action, the surprise is not
that we have a warning-response gap; rather, the surprise is that the gap between warning and
response is ever bridged.
Since George and Holl’s 1997 piece, the field of genocide studies has made great strides in
developing theories and models of early warning as well as unpacking the accelerators and triggers
that cause trouble spots to explode. Still, however, four of their other reasons (low stakes, “false
triggers,” impracticality, and “slippery slope”) for the warning-response gap remain relevant.
For many, this warning-response gap can best be bridged by making sure that “early warning
is not simply the sharing of information about an impending crisis, let alone the wail of a siren
announcing the imminence of such a crisis. Early warning goes beyond the collection and sharing
of information to include both analysis of that information and the formulation of appropriate
strategic choices given the analysis.”37 That is, the impact of early warning can be heightened by
also offering appropriate response strategies to the at-risk situation, rather than simply warning
that an at-risk situation is getting worse. As Annika Bjorkdahl suggests, political will and capability
can be strengthened by presenting “decision makers with a clear policy alternative which identifies
the tools and strategies relevant to the main objective of the preventive effort.”38 So, in essence,
bridging the warning-response gap, rather than being thought of as “where there is a will, there is
a way,” might be best framed as “where there is a way, there is a will.”39
As Christoph Meyer et al. emphasize, however, just adding policy or action recommendations
to early warning does not close the warning-response gap, even when early warning is regionalized
or localized “by directly involving those who will have to carry the brunt of the consequences
should a conflict escalate.”40 It can be more helpful, they argue, to approach early warning as a
nuanced and graduated persuasive process – rather than an informational, educational, or alerting
activity with a simple binary outcome of action or no action. Drawing on an extensive body of
social scientific literature, they distinguish between five distinct stages of persuasion – reception,
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attention, acceptance, prioritization, and the decision to mobilize. When applied to early warning,
warning can fail to elicit response – for various reasons – at each stage. For instance, even if a
decision maker has received an early warning, attended to it, and accepted its veracity, they still
may be unconvinced that the pending crisis is a greater priority than other current or future crises
pressing for their attention. So, in this case, low prioritization of the early warning becomes a barrier
to preventive response. Recasting the warning-response problem as a special case of persuasive
discourse can go a long way toward understanding how early warning is best communicated at
each stage of the communication process. In so doing, we increase our gap-bridging chances “to
raise a given recipient’s awareness about a potential threat to a valued good or interest to enhance
her ability to take preventive or mitigating action.”41
Thinking of early warning as a persuasive process also opens us up to the different vectors
of preventive persuasion that can impact reception, attention, acceptance, prioritization, and the
decision to mobilize. For instance, much attention has been drawn to the use of Facebook as a tool
of perpetration in Burma. For the past several years, Myanmar military personnel used Facebook
to wage a systematic campaign targeting the country’s Muslim-majority Rohingya minority
group. Human rights groups blamed this propaganda for inciting violence against the Rohingya,
acts which a recent UN fact-finding mission labeled as “genocide.”42 Far less attention, however,
has been given to the use of social media as a tool of atrocity prevention. While, in theory, most
agree there is a preventive power in social media to inform and shape decision-making processes,
relatively little empirical work has been devoted to analyzing exactly how such tools can be used
in a preventive capacity.43
Crucial to this persuasive process, by whatever medium through which it is communicated, is
the collective mobilization of political will. The oft-stated notion that “nations don’t have friends,
nations have interests” reminds us of the importance of prioritizing how responding to genocide
is in our best interests. Unfortunately, baser political and strategic interests too often override
humanitarian concerns. As Meyer et al. argue, the calculus underlying political will “is not ‘do we
care about x,’ but ‘how much do we care about x in comparison to y and z.’”44 Often, what State
actors care most about is the well-being of their own citizens rather than the protection of civilians
from atrocity in other countries. Juan Mendez states: “I have no doubt that the greatest contributing
factor to humankind’s inability to protect vulnerable populations from slaughter is the absence of
political will to act on the part of leaders that do have the solution at their disposal.”45 In reality,
though, the issue is not an absence of political will; rather, the issue is political will displaced
elsewhere and the subsequent need for a reshaping of how we interpret “national interests” and
international obligations.
Finally, particularly in the context of working with State actors, we must acknowledge the
seismic changes in contemporary political landscapes that exacerbate the challenges we face in
broadening the logic of atrocity prevention. The notion that countries should privilege democracy
over all else is no longer unquestioned and support for autocratic alternatives continues to rise.
In the words of Michael Abramowitz, president of Freedom House: “Democracy is in crisis. The
values it embodies—particularly the right to choose leaders in free and fair elections, freedom
of the press, and the rule of law—are under assault and in retreat globally.”46 These comments
regarding a global democratic recession coincide with a 2018 report indicating that democracy was
41
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on the retreat and authoritarianism on the rise in more than 96 of the UN’s 193 member states.47 A
diverse set of research suggests that states with a lower degree of democratization are at greater
risk for the onset of conflict or mass atrocity.
Concomitant with the above is a rise in violation of basic freedoms worldwide. For instance,
the CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report found that, in 2017, the space for civil society – including
the core civic freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression – had become closed,
repressed, or obstructed in 109 countries.48 Similarly, Freedom in the World 2018, the latest in a series
of annual reports by Freedom House, found that – for the twelfth year in a row – freedom around
the world is declining. Over the period since the 12-year global slide began in 2006, 113 countries
have seen a net decline, and only 62 have experienced a net improvement.49
We also are seeing an increasingly divided world in terms of peace and security. The wellrespected Global Peace Index, issued annually by London’s Institute for Economics and Peace, found
that global peacefulness has deteriorated by 2.14 percent in the decade since 2008, with 52 percent
of countries recording a deterioration, while 48 per cent improved.50 The thirteenth annual Fragile
States Index (FSI), published by The Fund for Peace, is an assessment of 178 countries based on
twelve social, economic, and political indicators that quantifies pressures experienced by countries,
and thus their susceptibility to instability. FSI 2017 found that factionalization and group grievance
were fueling a rise in instability across the globe, including in a number of developed countries.51 In
the words of executive director J.J. Messner: “When you see the most fragile countries continuing
to worsen and the most stable countries continuing to improve over time, it suggests fragility
begets fragility and stability begets stability.”52
To these warning signs can be added a number of potent international and local drivers of
conflict that raise additional concern for our future. These intersecting drivers of conflict include
economic fragility, mismanagement of natural resources and tensions over equality of access to
them, population growth, transnational organized crime, climate change, and the proliferation of
violent non-state actors.53 These intersecting drivers of conflict do not respect state borders.
Taken collectively, all of these factors suggest a tenuously uncertain future, foreshadowed
in the echoes of an increasingly violent present. Indeed, it seems that our words of “never again”
most often translate into actions leading to “again and again,” “ever again,” and “here we go
again.” On our worst of days, our commitment to atrocity can be compromised by a diminishing
will, a problem fatigue, or a selfish isolationism. On our best of days, however, we realize that, as
Gareth Evans said in a 2012 lecture at Central European University, “genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity were not no one else’s business, but everyone’s business.”54
In the field of atrocity prevention, State actors are but one actor with one set of tools. There
are many actors with many tools and part of the challenge in working with State actors is to help
them understand how to most effectively work with other diverse non-state actors – including
academics, civil society, traditional and religious leaders, educational leaders, and localized
community-based initiatives. While they do not always share common interests or utilize the tools
for common purposes, the many actors can be mobilized to create the political will necessary to
prevent genocide and mass atrocity. As Evans writes:
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Political will is capable of creation and subject to change: its presence or absence is not a
given… It has to be painfully and laboriously constructed, case by case, context by context.
And all of us have a role in this respect… It is also a matter of bottom-up mobilization:
making the voices of ordinary concerned citizens heard in the corridors of power, using
all the resources and physical and moral energy of civil society organizations all round the
world to force the attention of policymakers on what needs to be done, by whom, and when.55

Juan Mendez concurs with the importance of bottom-up mobilization in which political
will “is constructed over time by the force of public opinion that can shame leaders out of their
complacency and into effective action.”56
In sum, atrocity prevention is an achievable goal, but it requires each of us to take seriously
our global civic responsibilities in whatever role and in whatever place we find ourselves. While
perpetrators will still, too often, make a utilitarian calculation that “genocide is worth it,” the world
that we have made is not the one for which we must settle. The field of atrocity prevention must
remain steadfastly committed to building bridges with State actors and broadening the logic of
prevention in such a way as to recognize the multilayered approaches to prevention, understand
prevention as a cost-benefit exercise, and identify the bureaucratic features of information
processing that too often result in leading political will away from atrocity prevention.
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Critical genocide studies has emerged as an important strand of scholarship devoted to interrogating
the core assumptions of the field of genocide studies. Drawing on the intellectual traditions of
Frankfurt School critical theory as well as deconstruction, among other approaches, this scholarship
has provocatively explored various methodological limitations in current research, including biases
in case selection, problems with the comparative case method, definitional debates, and reductive
formulations of perpetrator motivations, among other issues. Informed by critical genocide studies,
this article sketches a critical approach to modern atrocity prevention.1 Although contemporary
atrocity prevention has made significant advances, I lay out several areas where a critical approach
can be applied fruitfully. The paper puts forth a critical approach to prevention that is self-reflective,
dialectical, multivalent, and anti-teleological.
Part I provides a brief overview of contemporary prevention theory, which I identify as rooted
within a broadly liberal normative orientation. Part II elaborates the four elements of the proposed
critical approach toward prevention. Part III uses the critical lens to examine several important
assumptions in current atrocity prevention.
Two preliminary points of clarification follow. First, a caveat. We should not be seeking to
prevent genocide per se, which is insufficiently wide to capture the scope of significant human
rights violations that any prevention theory should encompass. Genocide prevention implies
that the object of prevention is one specific kind of collective harm, the intentional destruction
of groups as such, when in fact the field of critical genocide studies is concerned with a range of
widespread collective violence. The focus, I contend, should be on the prevention of large-scale and
severe harms against civilians. A somewhat more inclusive formulation is “atrocity crimes,” “mass
atrocities,” or just “atrocities,” which include the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, as well as ethnic cleansing.
In reality, the prevention community often uses the terms genocide and atrocities
interchangeably but normally means the latter.2 Here, I use the term atrocities, though it makes
sense to maintain the term critical genocide studies as our starting point, if only to highlight
the intellectual origins of critical approaches within genocide research that seek to expand and
problematize scholarly inquiry.3
Second, a point about the article’s focus: I examine atrocity prevention, which has been shaped
and enriched by genocide studies scholarship but also other scholarly fields and practitioner
communities. Examining only prevention in the narrower orbit of genocide studies4 literature
misses many of these developments, and in any case atrocity prevention is now sufficiently well
developed and sophisticated to warrant critical investigation on its own. In this article, prevention
means those strategies, policies, and practices directed toward anticipating and arresting the onset
of atrocities prior to their occurrence or reoccurrence.5 The appropriate range of strategies, policies
1

In addition to various scholarly sources and government, intergovernmental organizations and NGO reports and studies
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for an ongoing project, “The Scholar-Practitioner Nexus in Atrocity Prevention,” which examines current challenges
in prevention work and areas where scholarly research can assist the prevention community. Quotations from
respondents are cited as “Nexus Project” below. I also draw on occasional work consulting with the United States
government, foreign governments, and various human rights organizations.
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and practices requires a broader historical and geographical horizon than is typically found in
current atrocity prevention.
Part I
Modern atrocities prevention largely espouses a liberal normative orientation. This includes a
commitment to liberal values such as human equality, freedom and democratic accountability;
support for the human rights regime found in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and institutionalized through a rule of law system enacted by various international
treaties, conventions, laws, and norms; acceptance of an international community composed
of sovereign states and formalized in the UN and various regional organizations; and, a global
governance architecture that curtails use of violent force through procedures for adjudicating and
solving conflicts between countries. This set of claims is liberal in its emphasis on core civil and
political rights and the rule of law, and insofar as it is meant to be binding on all nations. It remains
the dominant orientation of prominent global human rights organizations and actors.
Contemporary atrocity prevention has evolved within this liberal orientation, becoming
increasingly professionalized and sophisticated over the past two and a half decades. Although
its origins can be traced at least to the end of World War II and the moral shock of the Holocaust,
contemporary prevention theorizing and practice emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War and
the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides. The establishment in 1994 of the Carnegie Commission
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, tasked with addressing “the looming threats to world peace of
intergroup violence” and developing “new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly
conflict,” helped center attention on the protection of civilians in a new way.6 In 2001 the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released its report, The Responsibility to Protect,
as an answer to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call to renew UN efforts to stop mass atrocities. That
report reformulated the relationship between national sovereignty and human rights through the
responsibility to protect (R2P) norm, and provided a rearticulation of the legal, political and moral
justifications for more robust prevention and intervention strategies. The UN General Assembly’s
subsequent endorsement of a revised version of R2P has entrenched the norm, if imperfectly, in
international politics.7 Additionally, the establishment in 2004 and subsequent expansion of the
UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect has helped secure the place of
atrocity prevention in the highest reaches of the human rights firmament.
Contemporary international atrocity prevention now benefits from a confluence of factors:
the marked expansion of the UN’s peacebuilding portfolio; the spread of human rights in global
political discourse; the development of advanced graduate programs in peacebuilding, conflict
resolution, humanitarianism and related fields; a professionalized international human rights
community; private and foundation funding sources for prevention; and, a rise in the number
of foreign ministries in the global north that advocate human rights in their work. Current
prevention work consists of extensive cross-fertilization between scholarship and practice, and a
substantial amount of research is driven by concrete policy questions or challenges.8 Much of this
is characterized by policy work that emphasizes not only conflict termination and resolution but
also the promotion of individual human rights, the rule of law, liberal democracy, and a market
economy.
The Atrocity Prevention Lens
As the Budapest Centre for Mass Atrocities Prevention has noted, there at least four reasons
for adopting an atrocity prevention lens as distinct from conflict prevention, the latter of which

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict Final Report (New York: Carnegie
Corporation of New York, 1997), 9.
7
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001);
United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (October 24, 2005), para. 138-140.
8
Craig Zelizer, ed., Integrated Peacebuilding: Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict (Boulder: Westview, 2013).
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largely addresses violent conflict between armed actors.9 First, mass atrocities may occur outside
of regular armed conflict or continue once a ceasefire has been concluded.10 Although atrocities
outside of armed violence comprise a minority of situations, they are still sufficiently common
to warrant the development of atrocity prevention strategies distinct from traditional conflict
resolution. Second, mass atrocities are by definition crimes, and thus always illegal. The same
normative condemnation does not hold for all conflicts, where the legality of the use of violent force
is sanctioned and controlled (in principle, if not in practice) by international law. Third, prevention
does not stop when the killings start, even if the scope of action is severely limited; there may be
opportunities to reduce civilian suffering and provide assistance, even if armed conflict is ongoing.
Fourth, preventing atrocities entails developing forecasting tools and violence escalation models
that do not necessarily track directly with forecasting armed conflict. Governments may repress
civilian populations without facing any armed resistance, and thus mainstream conflict prevention
theories are not easily applicable.11
Given these justifications for a focus on atrocities as distinct from armed conflict, what are
the primary elements of modern liberal atrocity prevention? Although specific terminology and
conceptualization may differ, contemporary atrocity prevention has settled on a relatively stable
set of practices.12 Current prevention is typically divided into two general areas, structural and
operational.13 The former focuses on the long-term prevention of harms, such as by conducting
risk assessments, promoting liberal democracy, addressing profound economic and political
inequalities, fostering the rule of law, encouraging integration into the global capitalist economy,
and supporting human welfare and development, among other strategies. Operational prevention
concerns situations where atrocities are occurring or likely to do so. Strategies may include early
warning monitoring, diplomatic pressure on leaders, peace negotiations, economic sanctions,
humanitarian assistance for vulnerable populations, and at its extreme, military intervention.14
A third area concerns preventing the recurrence of atrocities, and it is largely the purview of
transitional justice, political reconciliation, and long-term societal peacebuilding. Within each area,

9

Conflict prevention includes a broad range of incentives and threats, such as trade and economic enticements, political
recognition, economic sanctions, military coercion, and threats of legal prosecution, to get parties to the negotiating
table and agree to stop fighting. A common formulation of armed conflict in this work posits a bell-shaped cycle
with distinct stages. Although the details differ across cases, the basic stages are well established: absence of conflict;
latency; emergence; escalation; stalemate; de-escalation; resolution; and, peacebuilding. The conflict cycle model has
the benefit of parsimony and clarity, and because of this it has proven remarkably durable. It has been employed
extensively to make sense of myriad post-World War II conflicts through the present with the aim of identifying the
various points where de-escalation and even conflict resolution may be possible. I. William Zartman and Alvaro de
Soto, Timing Mediation Initiatives (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010); Louis Kriesberg and Bruce
Dayton, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).
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Policymakers (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008); Sabrina Stein, Atrocity Prevention in
A Nutshell: Origins, Concepts and Approaches (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2016); United States Agency
for International Development, Field Guide: Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities (Washington, DC: United States Agency for
International Development, 2015); United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,
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Conflict; Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust
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Capability of the Council of the European Union, (Initiative for Peacebuilding, March 2010), accessed October 13, 2018,
http://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/0611prelisbon.pdf; Helen Fein, Human Rights and Wrongs (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers,
2007).
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the set of available strategies may be more or less coercive to incentivize changes in behavior,
and not all strategies will be employed. Over twenty years of research and practice have helped
hone and fine-tune them, and the available mix illustrates the development and maturation of
prevention thinking.15
We now have better understandings of the short and midterm drivers of violence, greater
knowledge of the primary indicators of onset, and awareness of the importance of supporting
“upstream” prevention efforts.16 Nevertheless, the dominant atrocity prevention lens contains a
number of limitations which have practical consequences. These limitations require critical scrutiny,
and include: the displacement of global and regional contextualization in favor of the nation-state
as the object of analysis and treatment; the overlap between prevention and securitization; limited
conceptualizations of violence; the emphasis on expert knowledge above concrete, embedded,
localized and historical knowledge; and, highly selective engagement with civil society and local
actors. I explore each of these clusters of limitations in more detail below. First, however, I sketch a
critical approach to prevention, which helps provide the conceptual framework for the subsequent
discussion.
Part II
The critical approach presented in this section is meant as a perspective by which to assess current
atrocity prevention thinking and strategies. Although there are many valuable points in current
atrocity prevention work, adopting a critical perspective highlights certain lacuna as well as ways
forward.
The points I make below are critical in two ways: first, in the narrow sense that they are informed
by the work of the intellectual tradition of Critical Theory and the scholars of the Frankfurt School.
Although these thinkers did not write extensively on international politics, their commitment
to emancipatory, historically grounded social theory that is firmly rooted in empirical research
provides an important analytical orientation for prevention. They distinguished themselves from
approaches based on abstract moral philosophy (which tends to posit ahistorical, universal values,
such as “natural rights”), as well as reductive social scientific methods that treat empirical facts
as “given” while ignoring interpretive questions or the particular perspectival limitations and
biases of the observer. A foundational text remains Max Horkheimer’s 1937 essay, “Traditional
and Critical Theory,” which lays out three important markers of this approach.17 For Horkheimer,
a critical theory is normatively committed to human emancipation, and thus rejects as untenable
the fact-value distinctions dominant in the social sciences; it adopts a wide range of social scientific
methods combined with philosophical critique (in other words, it is rooted in social theory, not
idealist philosophy); and, it is tasked with showing how transformational change can occur. It is
therefore not merely aspirational, as is common in some leftist utopian political thought. Indeed,
genocide scholars have already adopted such a critical perspective in their work.18
The points below are critical in a second, wider sense: they amount to a perspective that is
explicitly normative, dialectical, and attuned to how power relations shape social analysis and
practice while also hiding their contradictions and tensions.19
In line with these general claims, I propose a critical genocide studies approach to prevention
that is self-reflective, dialectical, multivalent, and anti-teleological. Below I present what this means.
15
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Self-reflective: Self-reflectivity involves adopting a theoretical stance where the researcher
remains aware, and interrogates, her own positionality. This means several things. First, and
rather obviously, this entails recognizing that there is no value-neutral analytical position, say
for assessing the causes of violence or the means of prevention. In other words, it rejects an
unexamined neutrality still dominant in many areas of the social sciences. As a first step it means
examining how the methods one employs – whether qualitative, quantitative, interpretive or
various mixed approaches – and their various assumptions shape the perception of a research
question, design and execution. Of course, neutrality of that kind is hardly the problem for liberal
prevention scholars or practitioners – they do not hesitate in condemning genocidaires and war
criminals, and are instead quite explicit about their normative commitments. But self-reflectivity
is important in a second sense: it consists of questioning the prima facie authority of the human
rights expert (scholar, diplomat, activist, etc.) who may make a claim to grasp the problem of
violence and the appropriate response (e.g., by providing the “theory” of genocide, the “theory”
of prevention), and who is thus authorized to determine what a society in crisis needs. To be selfreflective is to confront how any analysis of violence, and the prevention plan that follows, always
includes a set of normative claims and assumptions that cannot be theorized away or held at bay.
Given these constitutive biases in interpretation, the researcher should be committed to critiquing
both the presuppositions of theories as well as the status of the expert speaker – and this holds
for critiquing one’s own positionality as expert in addressing these issues. This does not mean a
rejection tout court of expertise or accumulated knowledge based on sound research – far from it.
Rather, a critical, self-reflective perspective invites cultivating epistemic humility: if we remain wary
of comprehensive, ‘scientific’ understandings of violence, and thus the seduction of speaking for
all, we are enjoined to take much more seriously the claims, knowledge and authority – the practical
agency – of local prevention actors. Self-reflection demands an openness to those claims, and thus
authority, of multiple agents, as well as engagement with the disruptions and uncomfortable truths
that this may entail.20
Dialectical: This involves several components. First, the prioritization of relational analyses of
concepts and phenomena, rather than treating them in isolation of one another. A dialectical approach
posits that concepts are defined and shaped in relation to one another, and thus it is these relations,
and subsequent changes to relations, that require special attention. A dialectical approach, in
other words, historicizes concept formation and theoretical claims. Thus, it is skeptical toward
the reductive reification of concepts as 1) comprehensive explanatory factors (e.g., ethnic war,
ideology, etc.), 2) identity categories (e.g., Hutu v. Tutsi, moderate Hutu, spoilers, bystanders,
etc.), and 3) outcomes (e.g., successful prevention, stability, reintegration, peace, reconciliation,
etc.). Naturally, any social theory of change, including one about violence and peace, must employ
concepts to understand otherwise highly complex and oftentimes confusing social and political
processes. Concepts allow us to make sense of complicated dynamics and shifting contexts and
they structure our analyses. However, a tendency toward conceptual reification in prevention
work risks producing analyses that posit as true what in fact are parsimonious proxies for reality.
A dialectical approach also helps highlight hidden tensions and exclusions in analysis and practice.
It can challenge, for example, otherwise sharp, categorical distinctions between “political” violence
and common crime, and help us understand how violence can be displaced from one social domain
to another, such as how previously political violence may become routinized quotidian violence
after a peace accord is signed and security personnel join criminal enterprises.21 We miss these
displacements if we only employ discrete analytical categories of violence and fail to assess their
dialectical relationships to each other.
Multivalent: A critical prevention approach is multivalent. It resists efforts to maintain
prevention to one level of analysis, be it the so-called “international community,” national elites,
or domestic governance institutions, and instead it takes as its starting point the interconnection
20
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of multiple analytical levels: global, regional, national and subnational. Framed this way, we can
examine a host of questions important to prevention: How are violence dynamics at different levels
linked theoretically and empirically? Under what conditions are national or subnational conflict
dynamics exacerbated by broader global and regional structural factors, reinforce one another, or
follow some other interactive pattern? To what extent, and how, do shifts in global structures of
power and “different world-historical contexts produce different patterns or extents of genocide”?22
By identifying such linkages and causal processes, we may be able to locate new prevention actors,
tools and strategies.
Anti-teleological: Lastly, a critical approach does not assume a certain patterned unfolding or
endpoint of social processes. Critical genocide studies scholars have rightly critiqued the dominant
modernization theories that equate societal advancement with the spread of liberal democracy, free
markets and Enlightenment values, for downplaying histories of genocide and slavery on which
Western progress was built - what Hegel called the slaughter bench of history.23 The conceit of
developing sophisticated and teleological theories of historical change is occasionally reproduced
in prevention work at smaller scales, where paradigmatic “conflict cycle” models lay out the natural
ebbs and flows of collective violence. This does not hold, for example, for the genocidal violence
against indigenous peoples in colonial settler democracies, nor does it obtain in many other cases
around the world, such as in parts of sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East. A critical approach
remains skeptical of generalized teleological claims that rest on selective empirical observation,
such as claims that violent conflicts have built-in cycles of escalation and de-escalation24 or that
political reconciliation is achievable through the application of certain sequential strategies. It is
equally skeptical of the existence and application of universal ‘lessons learned’ that can be taken
from one context and applied, with minimal alteration, to substantially different contexts, or even
in the same location but over different historical periods.
A common thread throughout this discussion is the foregrounding of how values, power,
and knowledge are intimately linked. Values such as peace, justice and human rights are always
constituted by power relations, and are at least partly given legitimacy through the knowledge
claims of actors holding a certain status in an epistemic community, such as scholars, government
leaders, and expert practitioners from the global north. Ultimately, a critical approach is oriented
toward interrogating and deconstructing these complex connections between values, power and
knowledge.
Part III
Given the four elements presented above, several critical tasks for prevention follow. This section
identifies a few issue areas that are central to a critical genocide studies approach to prevention.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. In some cases, a critical approach encourages a shift in our
analytical perspective to focus on the ways in which several dominant assumptions hide important
global power relations and trends that can exacerbate violence. In other cases, the points below
concern deepening or extending claims that are already found in dominant prevention work –
such as privileging the importance of civil society actors – but doing so in ways that may have
transformative effects. If we continue to use the language of a prevention lens, we are asking, what
is in focus, and what remains blurred?
22
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Global and Regional Contextualization
Prevention must extend its use of global and regional analyses. Shaw underscores the importance
of “complex structural analysis of the local and regional contexts of genocidal violence together
with their insertion into global power relations”25 as a key starting point of prevention thinking.
He has convincingly argued that the sites of genocidal violence have moved across regions of
the world according to historical shifts in global power arrangements caused by colonialism, the
collapse of empires, and the Cold War.26 Prevention today requires greater focus on, and mitigation
of, these large processes of violence displacement by developing and enhancing tools that limit
the military, political and economic overreach of powerful countries. The tendency in prevention
practice of treating countries as discrete, isolated cases risks reproducing a focus on the (very real
and violent) symptoms of regional stresses, fragility and collapse at the expense of examining their
larger structural causes and enablers. This does not mean focusing exclusively on global factors.
Instead, it requires examining systematically the ways in which these factors overwhelm regional,
national and local sources of resilience. Two points follow for prevention purposes:
First, explore how contemporary global political dynamics structure and drive regional and
local violence, including the roles of “wars against terrorism,” struggles among powerful states
and alliances over spheres of influence across Asia, Europe, Latin America, north Africa and the
Middle East, and global economic and environmental/climactic pressures that weaken already
fragile states in the global south.
Ameliorative prevention programs typical of the liberal approach seek to contain national
outbreaks of genocide or mass killings, but often only superficially acknowledge and then ‘bracket
out’ how regional and global power politics can cause or exacerbate localized violence. Instead, the
critique of global power politics should be at the center of atrocity prevention. Atrocity prevention
should directly challenge, for instance, US, Russian, and Chinese foreign policies that serve as
drivers of political violence in different regions, as well as interrogate how the United Nations and
regional governance organizations may legitimize the interests of powerful states in a gambit to
secure their short-term support. Prevention also requires more attention to problems of uneven
global economic integration that can weaken domestic institutions, and how environmental
destabilization can exacerbate local sources of violent conflict where governance institutions
remain weak. At its core, this involves critiquing, and reimagining, what is meant by that empty
signifier, “international community,” that occasionally functions to legitimize violence and the
unequal distribution of global power. As one Nigerian civil society activist pointed out,
The Europeans, and especially the Americans, talk about the terrible violence of African
[jihadi] groups, but don’t ask, ‘how did our own actions in Libya worsen these problems?
How are our own counterterrorism programs across the region encouraging state repression
and harming civil society?’ You can’t really bring this up. They acknowledge it, say yes, yes,
and then move on and talk about problems in your own country and what you should do
about it.27

Second, more attention is needed on how, and under what conditions, violence crosses national
borders. Atrocities are not kept within neat political boundaries. Violence often follows a contagion
effect, spreading to neighboring areas and destabilizing them. The practitioner community is well
aware of this, of course, but cross-national analyses often still privilege one country and involve
assessments of international and transnational dynamics to the extent that those dynamics affect
the primary country. Further research is required for understanding how these violence dynamics
influence one another, and thus what additional prevention strategies are necessary but may be
ignored. Greater attention to regions of violence, and not only country cases, can aid this. Some of
this is already happening: The United States Institute of Peace’s project examining Africa’s Lake
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Chad region - rather than Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon individually or dyadically – is providing
greater insights into how different vectors of violence require different strategies for prevention
and peacebuilding,28 while new research projects analyzing violence in the African Great Lakes
region have helped develop cross-border monitoring and prevention.29 Nevertheless, these types
of studies remain in the minority, thus reinforcing the tendency to see country cases as the default
level of analysis.
Securitization
Atrocity response is shaped by state interests. Political leaders frequently adopt a national security
litmus test to assess the feasibility, and thus value, of prevention in terms of whether it advances
certain core national interests – wealth, power, credibility, and ultimately security – rather than
in terms of some moral compunction to reduce human suffering elsewhere. This approach,
of course, is still with us today: the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) periodic “Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” is one of the most succinct formulations
of prevention available from a national security perspective. A public summary of the findings
of seventeen intelligence agencies, the 2018 report for instance states that its charge is to provide
intelligence needed to “protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world.”30
It is in this context that “violent – even regime threatening – instability and mass atrocities” are
presented as a danger to core US interests, and thus any prevention work should be carried out
with the aim of advancing, or at least protecting, those interests.31
The national security approach has always been explicit in tying the reduction of human
suffering abroad to promoting core national interests.32 What requires greater parsing is how
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the liberal approach to atrocity prevention has
become somewhat bifurcated, with one strand becoming heavily influenced by security discourse,
motivations and objectives. A substantial number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) still engage in practical and policy-focused atrocity prevention rooted
in liberal norms, but prevention has also been at least partly redefined and instrumentalized
elsewhere as an aspect of national security. Securitization is especially evident in peacebuilding
discussions about the Middle East and North Africa, where the “resurgence of the state-centric
security agenda” has “appropriated peacebuilding,”33 including prevention, though it is not limited
only to this region. The result is a narrowing of what qualifies as peacebuilding, and its conflation
with political stabilization and conflict management.34 The tensions between these two strands of
liberal prevention efforts show no signs of abating.35
An example of this narrowing between security and liberal arguments is found in an influential
genocide prevention report from the Obama era. After noting how genocide is “horrific” and a
“direct assault on universal human values,” Madeline Albright and William Cohen’s Preventing
28

See USIP, “Resolve Network,” accessed July 20, 2018, https://resolvenet.org/projects/lake-chad-basin.

29

See, for instance, the work of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, “Home Page,” accessed July 20,
2018,http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/

30

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”
(Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018), 2.

31

Ibid., 16.

32

Fabian Klose, ed., The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Business (Cambridge: Polity, 2013);
Rajan Menon, The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

33

Necla Tschirgi, “Securitization and Peacebuilding,” in Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, ed., Roger MacGinty (New
York: Routledge, 2013), 208.

34

Edward Newman, “Peacebuilding as Security in Failing and Conflict Prone States,” Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding 4, no. 3 (2010), 305-322.

35

This is particularly evident in debates over the responsibility to protect norm. The Coalition for the Responsibility
to Protect, which includes over eighty member NGOs, is often involved in debates over the securitization of peace
and human rights while defending a robust understanding of R2P. See responsibilitytoprotect.org and also, passim,
reports on R2P from the International Peace Institute, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, International Center for Transitional Justice, Human Rights First, and other major
NGOs in the Washington D.C. – New York orbit. Also see Lupel and Verdeja, Responding to Genocide.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.3.1676

Critical Genocide Studies and Mass Atrocity Prevention

119

Genocide states categorically that, “[g]enocide and mass atrocities also threaten core US national
interests.” They go on:
[Genocide and mass atrocities] feed on and fuel other threats in weak and corrupt states,
with dangerous spillover effects that know no boundaries. If the United States does not
engage in preventing these crimes, we inevitably bear greater costs – in feeding millions of
refugees and trying to manage long lasting crises. In addition, US credibility and leadership
are compromised when we fail to work with international partners to prevent genocide and
mass atrocities.36

Preventing Genocide justifies prevention (and intervention) on both humanitarian and national
security grounds. The more recent disturbing trend in some democracies, including in the United
States, toward authoritarian populism and xenophobic, racist politics has shifted prevention
justifications further away from humanitarianism toward national security and counter-terrorism.37
A task of critical prevention work is to interrogate this discursive displacement, which equates
securitization and peacebuilding (including prevention), and examine in detail its practical
consequences. For instance, what are the specific security imperatives that frame powerful states’
selection of atrocity cases and prevention interests? What are the functional consequences of these
choices – that is to say, which cases are left out, and why? How are liberal norms and discourse
appropriated to advance security interests and neutralize radical critiques of state power?
There are also a set of subnational institutional questions around securitization. Governments
are not monolithic, and various government agencies may be at odds with one another in
approaching prevention and human rights advocacy.38 One conflict analyst in the US government
remarked,
The people in State [Department], CIA and Defense [Department], to take just a few examples,
have somewhat different understandings of threats, and thus different priorities. The CIA
and Defense have comparatively narrow understandings of US foreign policy objectives.
State works much more closely with foreign civil society organizations and the UN, but this
puts them in occasional tension with others in our own government. And, the instructions
mid-level State folks receive from the top often conflict with their own best judgment,
especially these days… So, there can be a lot of turf wars, but that also means that there’s a
lot of different opinions on what national security means and the relative weight that should
be given to human rights abroad. There isn’t just one perspective that everyone has.39

Given these internal differences, a number of questions follow: how do various government
agencies understand their prevention portfolios? Who resolves disagreements between competing
prevention priorities, and using what criteria? What are the formal and informal bureaucratic
mechanisms for resolving disputes, and what is kept and what is lost? How can human rights
protection norms be insulated from problematic securitization pressures in policy formulation and
execution?
Broaden the Scope of Violence
Mass killings and fleeing civilians still drive high-level political attention and thus international
prevention priorities. This short-term, reactive approach is certainly a result of media framing,
popular pressure, and the limited attention of decision-makers, but it is not only this; there is
36
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also a deeper theoretical myopia that contributes directly to this problem. Adopting a dialectical
sensitivity to our fundamental concepts encourages us to interrogate dominant formulations of
atrocities and expand the types of harms requiring attention from the prevention community.40
One consequence of a dialectical approach is greater scrutiny of dominant theoretical
formulations of core concepts and their problematic practical consequences. Benjamin Meiches,
for example, has persuasively critiqued the “hegemonic” understanding of genocide – which
emphasizes mass killings above other forms of violence, relatively static collective identity
categories, and an excessively narrow understanding of intentionality – for foreclosing discussions
about what types of violence demand condemnation and what groups of people deserve protection.
For him, the hegemonic understanding “is thus the effort to normalize and depoliticize destructive
processes that do not fit with dominant perceptions about identity, violence, and history.”41 In
essence, the danger is that prominent formulations of our basic concepts (such as genocide) may in
turn minimize the importance of other forms of violence.
For instance, current atrocity prevention work pays little attention to structural violence, those
deeply entrenched and systemic harms against vulnerable populations that are reproduced over
time. This kind of violence is structural because it is woven into a society’s economic, political
and social relations, reaffirmed through formal policies and informal practices, and legitimized
by the norms and values of the broader culture. Structural violence normally appears as a form of
social anomie, where groups live precarious lives marked by high rates of poverty, unemployment,
malnutrition, poor mental health, displacement, emotional and physical insecurity, high mortality
rates, and weakened social bonds.42 It is routinized and thus naturalized – treated as a part of the
given, if lamentable, state of affairs – making it difficult to pinpoint a specific set of responsible
agents, even if its consequences are dire and even genocidal.43 One human rights analyst in the
European Union noted,
Look, we [prevention practitioners] all know that there are a number of long-term, structural
causes to mass atrocities, but in fact we largely focus on actual outbreaks of violence – the
killings, ethnic cleansing, torture, and the like. It is hard to tie in questions of poverty and
long-term discrimination into prevention, except in the most general ways… We don’t have
the resources to do so, but we also frankly don’t always prioritize it. Think of how at the
[UN] Security Council they really started talking about the Rohingya once the killings and
forced displacements got worse.44

And yet it is also precisely its routinization that makes it invisible, except for occasional,
episodic moments when the state employs more explicit violence – killings, torture, disappearances
– to reinforce structures of exclusion and marginalization. Structural violence often occurs over a
much longer time period. This is most apparent in the treatment of indigenous populations in
settler societies, where the process of genocidal attrition occurs over a period spanning decades or
centuries and in some instances continues to this day.45 Crucially, structural violence can also result
in more recent instances of genocide, insofar as the basic conditions of social life are destroyed over
time and the collective identity of the group disappears.
A critical approach, then, requires examining how our dominant concepts of violence
systematically erase certain kinds of harms and experiences, and it also necessitates foregrounding
40
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severe structural violence. It means prioritizing the structural prevention dimension of current
practice by devoting greater attention to how systemic and long-term processes of exploitation,
marginalization, powerlessness and cultural imperialism, to use Iris Marion Young’s terms,46
are linked to the various forms of direct violence that dominate the attention of the prevention
community. It also means moving beyond thinking of these harms merely as precursors to atrocities
and instead seeing them as significant on their own, requiring immediate attention.
Expert opinions, epistemic orthodoxies
Contemporary prevention places a high premium on expert knowledge and technical mastery.
The depth of expertise is indeed substantial, and as discussed earlier, now consists of sophisticated
bodies of knowledge. But the accumulation of this knowledge has come with certain challenges.
The prevention community’s professionalization and, at its most influential levels in the global
north, separation from or selective engagement with local and regional practitioners around the
world, has reinforced an epistemological orthodoxy that occasionally privileges “lessons learned”
approaches, understood as generalized tools from a kit of classifications, procedures and strategies
that can be applied to widely disparate contexts. These lessons learned in turn generate a fair
amount of uniformity in recommended policy solutions and delivery systems.47
Professionalism has also led to the creation of a class of prevention practitioners who have a
great deal of practical mastery of generic prevention tools. This reinforces the general discounting
of local knowledge and actors in conflict zones in favor of applying general lessons learned from
other contexts. The result is the production of expert epistemic communities that remain rarefied
and isolated from local peacebuilders and prevention practitioners. In its more extreme variants,
it produces a disturbing cycle: problems are identified in the global south, they are analyzed,
diagnosed and codified as new doxa in the global north, and finally, experts from the north
recommend treatments to be applied on the south.
The lessons learned problem is not only about types of knowledge, but also tensions generated
in the field. In writing about peacebuilding more generally, Severine Autesserre refers to a
“bubble,” or isolated world of practitioners in conflict zones, as “peaceland,” a place with its “own
time, space and economics,” where “expatriates’ social habits, standard security procedures, and
habitual approaches to collecting information in violence… strongly impact the effectiveness of
intervention efforts.”48 As one Sierra Leonean peace activist told me,
The experts who come from New York and Europe often have little understanding of the
local conflicts here. They don’t go into the villages, don’t travel around the country, don’t
speak any of the local languages. But they know what the problem is and how to fix it,
because maybe they spent time in East Timor, or Guatemala, or maybe Rwanda. They talk to
one another and then they leave, and don’t return until there is another crisis.49

Too strong a focus on technical mastery, unreflective application of lessons from other contexts,
and little time in the field minimize reliance on contextual knowledge and local peace builders,
with detrimental results.
It is important to be clear here: the problem is not expert knowledge or the generation and
use of guidelines and lessons, as such. Nor is this a criticism of particular research methods. Our
understandings of how to improve prevention efforts should be based on rigorous research using a
46
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broad range of social scientific methods, including qualitative, quantitative and interpretive. These
types of research must be informed – and in turn shaped – by practical findings in the field. The
problem, rather, develops when certain bodies of knowledge becomes a new orthodoxy, reinforced
by the creation of largely closed communities of experts, and remain insulated from critique,
contestation, refinement and even transformation from local expertise and practice.
Civil Society
A critical approach underscores the importance of civil society as a crucial space for advancing
prevention. The term has a long and complex history, but for our purposes civil society refers to
a space of social relations “autonomous from the state where groups and movements create new
alliances, further their interests and views, and engage with one another to shape public and elite
opinion with the aim of influencing state policy and public discourse.”50 It is the social space,
in other words, where the articulation of inclusive, nonviolent values can be advanced, and it
is composed of a wide range of groups.51 Obviously, not all civil society groups or movements
support inclusivity or human rights. The term “civil society” is analytical, not explicitly normative,
as groups may spearhead persecution and otherwise legitimize violence. Myanmar’s Ma Ba
Tha Buddhist extremist organization has encouraged terrorizing Rohingya civilians, a sobering
example of the dangerous side of civil society.52 This phenomenon of violent civil society groups is
well known, and has rightly received plenty of attention from prevention practitioners.
A more systemic problem, however, is the split in the prevention community between, on the
one hand, influential international actors who have limited and selective engagement with local civil
society groups, and on the other, smaller prevention groups that may have stronger connections
to local peacebuilders but lack the ability to influence high-level prevention policy. Too often,
international actors give domestic civil society groups only pro-forma support, with insufficient
engagement with groups as partners and leaders in prevention. Only a small fraction of local civil
society organizations may succeed in establishing linkages with powerful foreign prevention actors,
whether donors, intergovernmental organizations, the UN, other states, or prominent NGOs. The
most successful civil society groups in the global south have comparatively more social capital:
they have members who speak English or French, can navigate the cultural norms of Westerners,
and are capable of formulating their own goals and needs in terms of the criteria and expectations
provided by Western donors, governments and aid agencies. A multivalent approach, however,
encourages greater effort to bring in more activist and local civil society and social movement
organizations into prevention, both in terms of assisting them with resources and training, and also
in enabling them to lead efforts according to their own set of priorities and understandings of local
conflict dynamics.53 Without this, the doxa of the expert risks being reproduced uncritically. A civil
society activist from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo said,
Groups like ours, which are small and organic [from the community], do a great deal of
peace work on the ground, including around public health, support for women and girls,
and conflict resolution. We also have informal connections to other organizations around
the [provinces of the] Kivus and even in neighboring countries. There are many alliances
like this, but we remain invisible to the UN and big donors because we are seen as too small
and we have difficulty getting their attention. Also, sometimes we are most critical of the
Ernesto Verdeja, Unchopping A Tree: Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Political Violence (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2009), 138.
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government security forces, and this can cause problems for outsiders who see Kinshasa as
a partner.54

Civil society groups can be important sources of prevention and restraint in a variety of
ways, and the prevention community needs to cultivate and encourage this more extensively.
Their contributions are varied, and may include protecting vulnerable populations, monitoring
and reporting abuses, advocating human rights, nondiscrimination and peaceful coexistence in
ways that are culturally rooted and resonant beyond formal legal norms or government policies,
creating solidarity movements by building and extending networks of like-minded organizations,
and, pressuring political leaders to change policies.55 More contentiously, some groups may
advance peacebuilding by openly critiquing and resisting narratives that emphasize difference and
dehumanization of vulnerable populations, identifying and condemning discriminatory practices
by the government or others, shaming perpetrators and supporters of violence, and pressuring
bystanders to be actively engaged in defending rights.
This list of contributions is well supported by empirical research.56 However, it still falls
largely within a liberal paradigm typical of mainstream prevention work, anchored in standard
political and civil rights and secured by advancing values such as tolerance and respect for the
rule of law. All of this, of course, is important. But a critical perspective significantly expands
the role for civil society. Civil society groups are well positioned, for instance, to engage in much
more uncomfortable, but often necessary, public debate examining how a country’s founding
principles of self-rule and governance, as well as its origin myths and ‘settled’ histories, may be
implicated in the sustained exclusion and oppression of minority groups from the past through
the present. This can entail contesting dominant understandings of collective identity in deeply
divided societies, challenging conceptions of political reconciliation that reproduce the values and
self-understandings of majority groups, and opening a space for reimagining what a just shared
future may look like. For instance, in indigenous communities in settler colonial democracies like
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, contesting the very terms of national
membership – who are ‘we, the people’ – raises profound issue about the limitations of modern
configurations of sovereignty. To mark collective identity and the terms of reconciliation as
politically off limits because of its possible disruptions risks perpetuating the symbolic violence
and erasure that is a constitutive part of collective harms.57
A critical approach to civil society underscores the need to include radical peaceful social
movements that often remain marginalized, resisted or otherwise ignored by mainstream
prevention actors because of what they have to say and how they say it.58 Such an engagement
goes well beyond short- and mid-term causes of atrocities and draws attention to the narratives
and values that legitimize continued domination of vulnerable peoples.
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Conclusion
Practitioners and scholars have made enormous advances in understanding the warning signs of
impending atrocities, the primary causes of mass violence, and the appropriate combination of
responses. The maturation of the prevention field over the past two decades is indeed impressive.
However, as this article has discussed, there are several areas where a critical approach can
contribute to ongoing prevention work. These include problematizing the “bracketing” of
global and regional contextualization that results in treating the nation-state as an analytical
monad, examining the problem of securitization and connections to state power, pushing for an
expansion of the kinds of violence under the purview of prevention, identifying the consequences
of privileging expert knowledge, and noting the limitations of global north engagements with
local actors.
In essence, the critical approach presses several questions: prevention for whom (who is
designated a worthy victim, who is not), prevention of what (what harms are worthy of response,
what forms of life qualify for protection), and why prevention (whose interests and voices determine
which cases meet the threshold of response)? In answering these questions, we get a better sense of
the selective nature of the when, where and how of actual prevention efforts.
In some situations, a critical approach involves deepening efforts that are already in place,
or at least acknowledged as important, even if they are pursued only in the breach. In others, the
approach laid out here encourages a more radical change in prevention work, calling on rethinking
– and contesting – the boundaries of what is the appropriate scope of prevention by asking what is
left out. Given ongoing violence across many regions of the world, this work is all the more urgent.
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The First Lesson in Prevention
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Rutgers University
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Critique
Warning
“There’s a Medusa in the room!”
Pig in a Poke
In prevention, we tell many tales. Most are tragic, stories of victims and their suffering and woe.
But we seek out heroes, some tragic, some fortunate and a bit more bland. Lemkin is one. And then
there are the resisters, rescuers, saviors, and saints.
Caveat emptor, it’s said. “Let the buyer beware.” So, too, the genocide scholar and preventer.
Pig in a Poke! Are we tricking ourselves with our preventer stories, our hero and victim narratives?
And how do we know?
Critical Prevention Studies provides one tool, the offering of this essay. But critique makes
many people uneasy, especially those inclined to normative quest. “Too critical” some complain.
“Negative!” Others pin the ultimate slight with a roll of the eyes: “Ivory Tower” musings. For some
critique is Medusa-like, petrifying moral action. And perhaps it can be. But it’s also possible the
prevention quester is already on a petrified path, only partly seeing.
For the purposes of this essay, I refer to critique – and critical prevention studies by extension – as
a methodology involving discernment, ambiguation, decentering, genealogy, openness, recursivity,
and a look at the unsaid. Analysis if you will – but in the etymological sense of an unloosening.
Denaturalization. Contextualization, Multivocality. And dare I say it? A bit of deconstruction.
Reread what I’ve written. Pig in a poke. The critical difference is already there.1 It was present
in the first sentence. It’s manifest in the writing style. You just need to read between the lines.
I’m going to tell you some critical prevention stories though they lack clear heroes, focus
on blind spots and flaws. Some even involve me. We’ll travel to ancient Greece, Norway, and
Cambodia.
Go ahead. Read some more. Medusa is waiting. Turn the page. I dare you.
Medusa’s Head
I promised Medusa. She was already lurking, but here’s her tale. There are different versions, old
(Hesiod and Ovid) and new (Bulfinch and Hamilton). And today her story is recounted on YouTube
shorts and in comic book form.
Of course, she serves as a second act, the foil to Perseus’s blade, as illustrated by the frequent
framing of the retellings that have titles like “PERSEUS: The Hunt for Medusa’s Head.”2 “Could
a monster whose gaze turns men to stone be the death of the son of Zeus?” one graphic narrative
headlines. Another highlights: “Perseus . . . the hero is ordered to slay a hideous monster named
Medusa, whose gaze turns men into solid stone. How can Perseus fight an enemy he can’t even
look at? He will need the wisdom and weapons of the gods to prevail.”3
There, in a nutshell, is the gist of the story in its popular form: the hero Perseus succeeds in
his perilous quest to slay the monster Medusa. While varying in some of the details, the popular
narrative follows a similar form. Here’s a summary taken from two graphic narratives aimed at
1
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teenagers. The treacherous King Polydectes sends heroic Perseus to do the impossible: to bring
him the head of Medusa, whose hair of snakes and hideous gaze petrifies anyone who looks at her.
Perseus is helped by Athena, who bestows upon him gifts of the gods to aid in his quest: a
magic sword, winged sandals, a helmet of invisibility, and a magic bag in which to place Medusa’s
head. Athena also gives him her shield. “Look only at her reflection in this shield,” Athena advises
Perseus, “and you will be safe.”4 She tells him that he can learn the whereabouts of Medusa’s lair
from the three Grey Witch sisters, who share an eye to see and tooth to eat.
After Perseus forces the Grey Witches to reveal Medusa’s location by stealing their eye, Perseus
travels to her lair, a place of ancient ruins where Medusa lives with her two Gorgon sisters. The
dark compound is filled with petrified soldiers who had sought to kill Medusa. Looking into his
reflective shield, Perseus succeeds in locating Medusa and cutting off her head, which he quickly
puts into his magic bag and flees, barely escaping Medusa’s irate sisters.
While passing through Ethiopia on his way home, Perseus sees Princess Andromeda, who is
being sacrificed to appease Poseidon and prevent one of his sea monsters from wreaking havoc
upon the kingdom of Andromeda’s family. Perseus slays the sea monster and asks to marry
Andromeda as his reward, a request that is granted. At the wedding, Andromeda’s former suitor
appears with an armed guard, which Perseus defeats by pulling Medusa’s head out of the bag and
petrifying them.
Upon returning home, Perseus does the same to King Polydectes and his guard when
Polydectes tries to force Perseus’s mother, Danaë, to become his wife. Perseus pays homage to
Athena and gives her Medusa’s head, which Athena mounts on her shield to terrify her enemies.
The myth ends with Perseus fulfilling a prophecy that his mother’s father, King Acrisius, would
be killed by his grandson. In response, Acrisius had cast Danaë and the infant Perseus into the sea,
where they were protected by Perseus’s father, Zeus, who facilitated their rescue by Polydectes’
brother. In the end, Perseus inadvertently kills his grandfather with an errant throw at an Olympic
event.
Frame
“Medusa!” you may be asking. “What does this have to do with prevention?” But remember my
first warning and the first lesson in prevention: “There’s a Medusa in the Room!” Then I cautioned,
“Pig in a Poke!”
Before I turn to my next story – and yes, it connects to Medusa as well – let me switch to a
more expository frame. And indeed, “the frame” is a good place to start. Graphic narratives, in part
due to the success of Maus, have increasingly been acknowledged for their literary qualities – as
opposed to being “mere” commercial art, comics, cartoons, or “the funnies” – including the genre’s
similarity to poetry through its use of juxtaposition, visual image, materiality, and underlying
grammatical structure (panel, text, and image).5
As I have suggested elsewhere,6 graphic narratives provide an entrée into critical genocide
studies and, by extension, critical prevention studies. One way graphic narratives do so is through
their compositional structure of sequential panels separated by borders called “gutters.”
If this compositional style offers many ways to undertake critique, ranging from considerations
of space and time (through the layout and visual structures that enable analysis of linear, emplotted
moments and places), the gutter-frame structure highlights the process of foregrounding (whatever
is highlighted in the panel) and backgrounding (through the ever-present gap between the frames
suggesting erasure).
In other words, even as they assert given articulations, such as the popularized Perseus and
Medusa myth summarized above, graphic narratives structurally and visually suggest the erasure
Storrie and Yeates, Perseus, 8.
Hilary Chute, “Secret Labor,” Poetry Magazine. July 1, 2013, accessed November 10, 2019, https://www.poetryfoundation.
org/poetrymagazine/articles/70022/secret-labor. See also Art Spiegelman, MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic
Maus (New York: Pantheon, 2011).
6
Alexander Laban Hinton, “Wonder Woman, the Gutter, and Critical Genocide Studies,” in Memory and Genocide: On
What Remains and the Possibility of Representation, ed. Fazil Moradi et al. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 165-174.
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that inevitably accompanies them. Graphic narrative form, in other words, demands that we
always ask what has been edited out, existing now only as a trace in the visually present gutters
bordering the frames.
In Man or Monster? The Trial of a Khmer Rouge Torturer,7 I have argued that this dynamic of
(framing) articulation and the redaction that ensues – and “the redactic” potential for what has
been edited out to dehisce – is part of the banality of everyday thought (a reworking of Arendt’s
idea of “the banality of evil”8) even as it may be mobilized by “thick frames of power” in contexts
ranging from the torture chamber to international law.
What does this discussion tell us about the myth of Perseus? It suggests the first lesson of
critical prevention: always look for the “Medusa in the room,” a haunting and uncanny presence,
often only glimpsed from traces, which needs to be critically discerned. And indeed, the myth’s
emphasis on the gaze is suggestive in this regard: the eye of the Grey witches, prophecy, the helmet
of invisibility, and, of course, Medusa’s petrifying gaze.
In both of the graphic narratives about Perseus and Medusa that I drew upon, eyes are also
highlighted in the panels and the petrifying power of Medusa’s head is signified by glowing
light emanating from her eyes. This motif of the seen and the unseen – a worthy trope of critical
prevention studies – is a key current in the myth of Medusa and one the graphic form is able to
underscore in visual ways prose usually cannot.9
To conclude this first story, I want to turn to erasure and the gutter. What is the Medusa in
the room in the myth of Perseus? Medusa provides a guiding clue. We have a hero and a monster
whose monstrosity (her past petrifying violence) legitimates violence against her (her decapitation):
Violence at Time (V1) (her past monstrous and petrifying acts) legitimates Violence at Time 2 (V2)
(Perseus cutting off her head).
A host of questions are backgrounded, including Medusa’s past. Where is she from? Why is she
mortal while her Gorgon sisters are not? Why does she have the power of petrification? One of the
graphic narratives completely ignores such questions, which otherwise disrupt the hero narrative.
Perseus and Medusa: A Graphic Novel provides a passing reference to Medusa’s more complicated
past, when a young Perseus asks Dictys, Polydectes brother, to recount the story of Medusa.
“A long time ago, there was a beautiful woman named Medusa,” Dictys begins.10 Poseidon fell
in love with her and they “met secretly” in Athena’s temple. Because Medusa bragged that she was
more beautiful than even Athena, Athena “punished Medusa for her vanity,” turning Medusa’s
“silken hair into slithering serpents . . . soft hands into crooked claws . . . [and] perfect white teeth
[into] sharp, jagged fangs.” Each transformation is depicted in a panel colored in stone grey. “Now,”
Dictys concludes, “Medusa is so hideous that any man who looks upon her is instantly turned to
stone.” “Do you think anyone will ever slay Medusa?” young Perseus then asks, suggesting both a
glimpse of his future and the implicit moral righteousness of her being slain.
Once again, to maintain the hero narrative, Medusa’s past is depicted in a manner that
suggests her future evil by highlighting her immorality (sexual transgression and vanity). But a
trace of something more dehisces for a moment: Medusa was originally human and beautiful and
had a past intertwined with Athena. In other mythic renderings, which don’t fit the Perseus hero /
Medusa monster binary, Medusa is said to have been raped by Poseidon in the temple of Athena,
who punished Medusa for the defilement by making her hideous.
And indeed, the interrelationship of gender, sex, and violence is a key theme backgrounded in
the myth – not just Medusa’s past, but Danaë’s past (sexual relations with Zeus) and present (King
Polydectes attempt to force Danaë to marry him) as well as Andromeda being married to Perseus
as a reward for his heroics. More broadly, the sexual potency of women, both coveted and feared,
7

On articulation, redaction, the redactic, dehiscence, and thick frames of power, see Alexander Laban Hinton, Man or
Monster? The Trial of a Khmer Rouge Torturer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); see also Alexander Laban Hinton,
“Postscript – Man or Monster?,” Journal of Genocide Research 20, no. 1 (2018), 181-192.
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York: Routledge, 2003).
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is depicted in scenes such as Danaë’s being locked away from men to prevent her from having
the son destined to kill Acrisius, Andromeda’s sacrifice to Poseidon, Danaë’s inability to ward
off Polydectes’s advances without Perseus as her protector, and the danger of the Grey Witches,
Gorgons, and, of course, Medusa herself.
Once discerned through critique (an unpacking of frames and exploration of the gutters and
the unsaid), Medusa becomes a much more complicated character. And indeed, she has figured
in a myriad of critical discussions.11 For the purposes of this essay, I want to highlight how a
methodology of critique may be applied not just to narratives like the story of Perseus and Medusa,
but to other domains including the narratives that undergird work in critical genocide and
prevention studies. I will reapproach this point from a different direction – though one still related
to Medusa and the first lesson in prevention – in my next story and second section of this essay.
Before doing so, however, I want to note how critique complicates the perpetrator-victim
binary and legitimation of violence. If the popularized myth portrays a simplified sequence of
violence (V1 [legitimating]  V2],12 the more complicated mythic strands suggest a much longer
and morally fraught cycle of violence: V1 (Medusa’s rape)  V2 (Athena’s curse)  V3 (Medusa’s
petrifying violence)  V4 (Perseus cutting off her head)  V5 & V6 (Perseus using Medusa’s head
to petrify Andromeda’s suitor and King Polydectes and their guards)  V7 (Medusa’s head being
mounted on Athena’s shield and used for violence even as Medusa’s violent power is symbolically
domesticated).
Medusa, then, raises questions about how we represent and analyze violence, how our
accounts dehistoricize, decontextualize, and even dehumanize others, the gaps in our analyses, the
haunting and uncanny conceptual spaces we fear, our tacit assumptions about gendered violence
and the legitimation of violence including mass murder (Perseus’s killing of not just Andromeda’s
suitor and Polydectes but their entire guards), and questions about the intersection of violence,
law, responsibility, and legitimacy.
To analyze something involves an unloosening, an endeavor that may be undertaken through
the method of critique that always bears in mind questions of gaze and the first lesson in (critical)
prevention: “There’s a Medusa in the room!” I end with another warning: Medusa appears in my
next story, set in Norway, even if she remains unnamed. I’ll give you a hint: pig in a poke, Medusa’s
head in the bag.
Interlude
Evaluation
Time to change the tone. I’m worried about what reviewers will say (but also that I’ll continue
to stray from the well-trodden path to prevention). “Post-modern junk.” “Boring.” “I read Why
Did The Kill? What happened?!” “Frivolous and foolhardy.” “A waste of pen and ink (and my
time).” “Too many clichés!” “Nothing to do with prevention.” “Can’t write.” “And I thought Man
or Monster? was odd! At least it had an explanatory ending.” “Passé.” “Number One . . . on the
top ten list of why I no longer read anthropology.” “Retitle The Hinton Facade.” “Fell asleep while
reading.” “What’s the point?”
Archeology (aka “The Critical Preventer’s Methodological Guide to Finding the Medusa in the Room”)
In early September 2018, I attend “The UN Genocide Convention at 70 Conference,” conference
hosted by HL-SENTERET, a Norwegian research center and museum that plays a role in Norway
somewhat similar to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and Yad Vashem. Established
in part as a response to economic losses suffered by Norwegian Jews during Nazi occupation, HLSENTERET is located in Villa Grande, where an infamous Nazi collaborator resided.
At the end of two packed days of papers and discussions focused on the politics of mass
atrocity prevention on the 70th anniversary of the UN Genocide Convention, our hosts take us to
11
12

Garber and Vickers, The Medusa Reader.
V1  V2 stands for Violence (V) at Time 1 standing in relation to (in this case by legitimating and leading to) Violence at
Time 2.
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the nearby museum featuring “the world’s best-preserved Viking Ships” excavated from Viking
tombs in the Oslo Fjord.13
Besides the ships, there are wooden carts, animal head sculptures, and ornate sleighs from
burial mounds. A film, “The Vikings Alive” depicts how the artifacts may have gotten here. A
ship sets sail, a battle ensues. There is a return home, shovels hitting the ground, burial of the
dead. As I sit on a bench watching the show, projected onto the walls of the museum, I nod to a
colleague and ask, “What do you think? Genocide?” A shrug. Uncertainty. Vikings are not part of
the genocide studies canon, which is temporally inflected by the destruction of the European Jews
even if the purview of the field has broadened over the past decade, as illustrated by publication
trends, including content in the Journal of Genocide Research and Genocide Studies and Prevention (see
also Woolford, Muller, and Sinclair, this issue).
Each of the three large Viking ships displayed has a turn-of-the-twentieth-century story of
discovery. And excavation. The most ornate ship on display, the Oseberg, was discovered in 1903
by a farmer, who notified a prominent archaeologist, Gabriel Gustafson.14 Gustafson cordoned off
and secured the site before undertaking a three-month dig with a team that likely used tools such
as trowels, shovels, sifting screens, and measuring devices. Like the Vikings, burrowers of the
ground.
A photo of Gustafson shows him standing at the base of the hollow his team had created. If the
excavation took just months, the longer-term process of restoring and preserving the artifacts took
many years, eventually becoming a primary exhibition at The Viking Ship Museum.
The Dig
Here we arrive at a first signpost – part of “The Critical Preventer’s Methodological Guide for
Finding the Medusa in the Room” – for critical prevention studies. Perhaps it is the biggest signpost.
Maybe even the only one that needs discussion. “The dig.” And this signpost has a flashing light,
a warning to which we can return again and again.
For prevention, like all of our pursuits, involves excavation, fingers sifting earth and sand,
an exploration of ruins in the hope of avoiding genocidal ruin. Ruin, from the Latin ruere, “to
fall,” suggesting collapse, decline, and catastrophe.15 What came before now. Ruins like the secret
location of Medusa’s lair. Ruins offering traces of the past that provide clues to the present and
what might come next – if only we further hone our excavatory skills. One paradox of atrocity
prevention is that, like Klee’s angel of history, it looks at a past, both distant and proximate, to
envision a future that can’t be fully seen.
Excavation
Like other fields, genocide studies and prevention research is predicated on “the dig.” Excavation.16
To excavate is to “make (a hole or channel) by digging” such as by “carefully removing earth from
(an area) in order to find buried remains.” The Latin root of the term, excavare, means to “hollow
out.”17
This notion of “hollowing” resonates with ideas of articulation and redaction as well as the
graphic narrative “grammar” of gutters and frames.18 Our excavatory assemblage – mediated by
structures of power and associated ways of ordering and classifying reality – are predicated on
hollowing, a set of erasures, gaps, redactions, and backgroundings. These excavatory hollows are
What follows on The Viking Museum is based on its website. Museum of Cultural History, “The Viking Ship Museum,”
accessed November 10, 2019, https://www.khm.uio.no/english/visit-us/viking-ship-museum/index.html.
14
What follows on Gustafson draws both on Museum of Cultural History, “The Viking Ship Museum - Oseburg,”
accessed November 10, 2019, https://www.khm.uio.no/english/visit-us/viking-ship-museum/exhibitions/oseberg/
oseberg-found.html and World Archaeology, “Gustafson at Oseberg,” Current World Archaeology 52 (March 30, 2012),
accessed November 10, 2019, https://www.world-archaeology.com/great-discoveries/gustafson-at-oseberg/.
15
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, “Ruin” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
16
This paragraph and broader discussion on excavation draws on and extends Hinton, Wonder Woman. See also Hinton,
Man or Monster?; Alexander Laban Hinton, The Justice Facade: Trials of Transition in Cambodia (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
17
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, “Excavate” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
18
See Hinton, Man or Monster?; Hinton, The Justice Facade; Hinton, Postscript.
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visually manifest in “the gutter” – the aforementioned frame construction of graphic narratives,
which have an ostensible narrative flow undercut and ruptured by a grid of crosscutting frames
that simultaneously question assumptions about meaning, time, and space.19
The Hollows of Prevention. Here we find a second warning in critical prevention studies:
beware the excavator who believes s/he can use the past to prognosticate the future. Pig in a Poke.
Medusa’s Head in the Bag. Along these lines, perhaps we need a rethinking of the often-cited
George Santayana saying – “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” – in
which it is put in conversation with Adorno’s warning, “There can be no poetry after Auschwitz.”
Atrocity prevention treads the gap between these two oft-cited sayings about genocide even as it
flails at a related imperative, “Never Again.” The Hollows are the spectre of our excavations, the
source of hauntings from the ruins, the grounds of this guide for finding the Medusa in the room,
a Sisyphean task.
Authorization
Excavation is an enterprise, a “hollowing” endeavor undertaken with an end.20 And, like all projects,
this enterprise requires authorization for the “hollowing out” to unfold. There is, on the one hand,
the “permit” that legitimates the endeavor, an approval or sanction linked to structures of power
(including “academic authorization”). But there is also “authorization” in the sense of that which
gives “authority,” such as the set of conceptual principles that legitimate the study, including the
way the excavation is undertaken.
Gustafson could not embark without permission to conduct a dig at a particular time and
place or status within structures of power, such as his institutional position as an archeologist. This
authority was signified by his ability to cordon off and guard his site as well as by accoutrements
(outfit and equipment) and practices, including performative expertise.
Tools
A dig also requires techniques, tools, and practices. If they symbolize authorization, these tools,
techniques, and practices – let’s refer to them together as “tools” – condition the endeavor, both
enabling and constraining how the excavation unfolds and what is found. These tools are deployed
as part of a larger methodology. Gustafson was, of course, trained as an archaeologist and used
archeological tools to excavate the ruins of the Oseberg, reclaim the ship and other objects as
artifacts, and reconstruct a Viking past imagined in “The Vikings Alive” film that plays three times
an hour at The Viking Ship Museum.
Fire
Excavations also require illumination, the “fire” of light that enables artifacts to be discovered.
Gustafson, for example, likely used lanterns in the Oseberg dig. If light reveals, it also occludes, a
partial illumination that foregrounds particular places while creating shadows and leaving other
areas in darkness.
Excavations are lit by many fires. Here are a few. There is the fire of our concepts and theories,
which direct our analytical gaze. A second is the fire of our passions, the motivations that drive
us, push us to excavate. Yes, those motives are bound up with structure. Professional ambition.
Honor. Shame. But there are also those that are personal. Including our fetishes. About that I will
have more to say. Then there’s the fire of the archive, a fever, the validating stamp of authorization.
Impression.21
Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Spiegelman, MetaMaus. On
critical genocide studies excavation, see also Hinton, Wonder Woman.
20
On “enterprise,” see Alexander Laban Hinton, et al. eds., “Introduction: Rethinking Peace Studies,” in Rethinking Peace:
Discourse, Memory, Translation, and Dialogue, edited by Alexander Laban Hinton, et al. (New York: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2019), xiii-xxxii.
21
The “drive” of the “author” may be passionate (propelled not just by “the fire” of libidinal or fetishistic desire, but more
broadly by intensely felt emotions and even the passion to understand) or structural, such as the “fever” that emerges
from the instability of authorization since it requires replication and a doubling that is never identical to the original
(Jacques Derrida, “Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression.” Diacritics 25, no. 2 (1995), 9- 63; see also Johnson, The
19
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We don’t know a great deal about the fires that drove Gustafson, though he left diaries, his
own ruins, a Gustafson archive, traces for excavation. The fire of this essay turns in a different
direction, toward prevention, so I’ll leave his diaries aside. But we know his excavation earned him
a degree of fame. A moment. Spotlight.
Assemblage
“The dig” is a moment of glory – Indiana Jones, Laura Croft, people like Gustafson, too. Another
black and white photo shows him looking dapper on the Oseberg dig: jacket and bow tie combined
with knee-high mud boots and a hat, brim curled. He has an air of confidence and erudition, poise
and aplomb.
Dig and display. It seems easy. And indeed, Gustafson’s team sifted the soil for not even four
months. But that was just the beginning of the story.22 He labored for twenty years to piece together
the ship and the artifacts he had found. He was able to use 90 percent of the ship’s original timber.
This phase took place out of site, a process painstaking and tedious at times. His assemblage of
artifacts now stands at the Viking Ship Museum: ruins excavated (by Oseberg), reassembled into
a new set of ruins (The Viking Ship Museum), now excavated one more by the ink of my pen, the
glance of your eye.
The archaeologist excavates the earth and objects it preserves with authorization, methods,
tools, fire, and assemblage to produce such artifacts. This essay is the artifact of my excavation of
prevention. My atrocity crimes “Viking Ship,” part of the ruins of this special edited collection.
You are the reader of these textual ruins, undertaking your own excavation. A text read and
reread. Roland Barthes called it “the writerly,” the polyphony of texts distinguished from the
singular authoritative voice of “the readerly,” a “definitive” monologue.23 Excavation is writerly,
though many assume it is readerly, the discovered truth presented at “the museum.” It’s a point
to which I will return.
I have not forgotten my promise of more signposts to guide an archaeology of prevention. No
pig in the poke. Medusa’s head is out of the bag. Do you see my method, my tools, my lantern? My
permit is printed at the top of the first page. This is my assemblage. Go back and make your own.
Let Medusa be your guide.
Pharmakon
Word
Pill. A capsule. Compressed medicine. The magic bullet. But also bitter, difficult to swallow. That’s
why some people are referred to as “a pill.” Pills often need to be sweetened and coated. “Sugar
the pill,” it’s said. Regardless, the pill is meant to be swallowed whole.
Pill. The Oxford English Dictionary offers many inflections. A small ball of any substance. A
pellet. Cannonball then later bullet, bomb, or shell. A tidal pool. A ball in billiards. Pellet of opium.
Cigarette. Testicle. A ball of fluff on the surface. Pill as in to pillage and plunder. Sometimes a
medical officer. An outer covering. And of course there’s “the pill.” Contraception. Intervention. I
could go on. Pill bag. Pillbox. Pill head. Pill popper. Pill peddler. Pill Pusher. There’s an old saying.
Pill and poll. To ruin by depredation. To strip bare. Pill as noun, pill as adjective. You get the idea.
Let’s look at the source. Dispensation. Pharmacy, “a place where medicinal drugs are prepared
or sold.”24 It’s also a science, as in the ancient Greek pharmakeia, “the practice of a druggist,” from
pharmakon, “drug.” Though things are a bit more complicated. For the Greeks, pharmakon meant
both “remedy” and “poison.” The idea of a “poison pill” gets at the idea.
Pharmakon. Poison and cure. Like Medusa’s blood. Like this essay. Like prevention.
Here, then, is another signpost in our guide to critical prevention. Genocide as Pharmakon.
Prevention as cure, prevention as poison. The Prevention Pill.
Critical Difference). Even if it comes from the same “authority,” each dig is distinct, yields a different truth or, to use
Derrida’s term, “impression.”
22
What follows is based on details from Museum of Cultural History, “The Viking Ship Museum,” accessed November 10,
2019, https://www.khm.uio.no/english/visit-us/viking-ship-museum/index.html.
23
Roland Barthes, S/Z (London: J. Cape, 1975).
24
The Oxford English Dictionary, “Pharmacy” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.3.1677

The First Lesson in Prevention

135

This idea, I know, is itself a bitter pill to swallow, particularly given that we just celebrated the
70th anniversary of the UN Genocide Convention, an occasion that marked a University of Manitoba
workshop that gave rise to this special issue.
To sugar the pill, so to speak, let me tell some more stories even if, like the Perseus-Medusa
myth and the recounting of the conference in Norway, they are critical prevention narratives. The
first, like the Perseus myth, has ancient origins. The second is another of my own.
So let’s turn to our next story, Plato’s Phaedrus, to learn more.
Thoth and Thamus
Thoth thought he had it made. He had good stuff! Or at least he thought he did.
In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates recounts how this God traveled to Thebes to appear before the
King of Gods, Thamus. Thoth had invented remarkable things, not just numbers and calculation,
but writing (and dice and draughts, too). “Writing,” Thoth enticed his king, will “make the
Egyptians wiser and improve their memories.”25
Poor Thoth. The king shot him down. The fact is, he told Thoth, “this invention will produce
forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it because they will not need to exercise their
memories, being able to rely on what is written.” Moreover, the King added, Thoth would be
“equipping your pupils with only a semblance of [wisdom], not with truth.”26 Thoth’s invention of
writing was not “a remedy” (pharmakon) for memory, but a poison instead.
Pharmakon. Poison and cure. In ancient Greek, the term had an umbrella of meanings (e.g.,
medicine, recipe, drugs, philter), but perhaps most centrally this idea of something both remedial
and harmful. Like a pill.
Now on to our second narrative, set in a completely different time and place: November 16,
2018, on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
I was there for this one.27
Genocide Justice
Gravel spits on the underbelly of our van as we turn the corner into the dirt parking lot of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the ECCC, or Khmer Rouge Tribunal as
everyone calls it.
The browned landscape is lit by saffron, rows of robed monks and elderly nuns dressed in
white. The monks will sit in the front row of the court’s public gallery as the decision in Case 002.2,
which includes the charge of genocide against the two most senior surviving leaders of the Khmer
Rouge, is read later in the morning.
The 500-seat courtroom is filled with a wide range of “stakeholders”: VIPs, including diplomats
and government officials, blue-shirted students, civil parties, villagers, journalists, and a handful
of academics like me.
Just before the curtain rises, a Cambodian Public Affairs officer provides a brief sketch of the
case in which the two most senior living Khmer Rouge, “Brother Number Two” Nuon Chea and
Head of State Khieu Samphan, are being tried for atrocity crimes committed during Democratic
Kampuchea (April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979).
“Oh, and it will take about an hour and forty minutes to read the verdict,” the court officer
finishes. I hear a few moans.
Then the curtain opens. The parties are in place.
Better late than never.
These words, well-worn like the elderly defendants, came to mind as I gaze at Nuon Chea (92)
and Khieu Samphan (87). Many feared they would die unjudged.
Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Literary Theory: An Anthology, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Malden:
Blackwell, 1998), 431.
26
Derrida, Plato’s Pharmacy, 436.
25

27

The narrative below partly draws on Alex Hinton, “Justice at Last,” Mekong Teahouse, November 19, 2018, accessed
November 9, 2019, http://mekongteahouse.com/observations/justice-at-last/.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.3.1677

Hinton

136

Two years before, I sat in the witness stand and watched as Nuon Chea sought to deflect blame
and deny responsibility for a campaign of terror and mass murder that resulted in the death of
almost a quarter of Cambodia’s 8 million inhabitants from 1975-1979.
What about the American bombings? He chided me after I had testified for three and a half days
on the charge of genocide. And didn’t Vietnam want to swallow Cambodia?
The verdict would put an end to those arguments. Yes, the U.S. carpet-bombing of Cambodia
constitutes a war crime. Yes, Vietnam meddled in Cambodian affairs and sought to topple the
Khmer Rouge regime. And of course Cambodia was caught in geopolitical crosshairs. But one and
only one group deserves the primary blame in the end: the Khmer Rouge leaders who made the
decisions.
The judgment makes this clear in legal monotone. For almost two hours, the court’s President,
Non Nil, reads a summary of the verdict. He barely looks up as he methodically details the
crimes: mass relocations, brutal work camps, an extensive security system and prison network,
forced marriage, and the targeting of Buddhist monks as well as Cambodia’s ethnic Chams and
Vietnamese.
By the time President Non Nil finishes, Nuon Chea has been excused to listen to the proceedings
in a holding cell. Both defendants are in poor health and may die any day.
When the final disposition is delivered at the end, Khieu Samphan is asked to stand in the dock.
He has to be supported by two guards, one of whom hoists him up by the back of his trousers, as
Non Nil declares the pair’s life sentence for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crimes
of crimes, genocide.
Genocide. Justice. But also pharmakon. Like Medusa.
Convention
These two stories, distant in time and place, are easily set into conversation. Indeed, they connect
genocide, justice, and prevention with the idea of pharmakon in interesting ways. Given that this
special issue began with a 70th Anniversary workshop, let’s start with convention. (Genocide)
convention as poison, (genocide) convention as cure.
Convention is etymologically related to the word “convene” and its Latin cognate, convenire,
means to “assemble, agree, fit,” or more simply “to come” (venire) “together” (con). To convene.
Assemblage. Parts brought together in a meeting or activity.28
Along these lines, convention may refer to “a large meeting” such as a political convention
or “an agreement between states” that codifies “a way in which something is usually done” or
“socially acceptable behavior.”
And there we have it: convention as in it’s criminal to commit genocide. The December 9, 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Lemkin’s Convention.
Our convention. Genocide studies convention, genocide assemblage, convention codified in
written word.
Written word. This takes us back to Phaedrus and pharmakon. It also speaks to convention. For
King Thamus worried precisely about such written codification, an intended auxiliary that was a
diminishment, a crutch both salve and source of sickness.
Despite the legends of renown and glory, the exhortations of “it’s the best we have,” we remain
afflicted by genocide fetish. Excessive fixation on a part (ignoring the whole), attribution of magical
powers, object of excessive desire, overcommitment. A charm, to revisit the French source (fetiche),
the product of sorcery.
The story of Lemkin provides a related example of genocide. The hero of the genocide
convention myth. The First Preventer. Lemkin fetish. Convention fetish. The elixir of prevention
cure. And now, most recently, R2P fetish.
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I grant you Convention as cure. I sip from that elixir, too. But I warn you it is also poison. Some
of the poison is easy to see, acknowledged begrudgingly or, more often, in passing, with a wave of
the hand. Political groups provide an obvious example.
And there it was at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. “Genocide” flashed the headlines after the
verdict. “Khmer Rouge leaders found guilty of genocide” splashed The Guardian.” “Khmer Rouge’s
Slaughter in Cambodia is Ruled a Genocide,” proclaimed The New York Times.
While literally accurate, the headlines, the written word, offered a truncated truth, diminishing
a more complex reality – Thamus’s point. For starters, what was legally a partial and somewhat
roundabout conviction for genocide – against two ethnic minorities (Muslim Chams and ethnic
Vietnamese) – had become something quite different, the all-encompassing headliner of “genocide.”
We all know the story of how political and “other groups” were excised during UN
deliberations as the Convention was being promulgated. Usually it’s referenced, if at all, with a
quick “too bad, but the Convention is what we have.” A point well-taken. Better than nothing, like
the ECCC genocide verdict.
But it’s still a poisoned point, not solely cure. First and foremost, there is the prioritization of
certain protected groups and not others – not just political but economic, social, and so forth. And
it’s not just the glaring gap left by exclusion of political groups. Left-handed people beware; so,
too, should those who are transgender (or any gender for that matter) – and many other identity
groups. And then there’s the erasure of cultural genocide.
There still more poison. We have the arbitration of Convention, a normative order applied.
It’s sticky with politics through and through. The examples are legion, gatekeeping debates about
what’s “authentic” genocide. I’ll give a quick example: race and slavery in the U.S. (which Lemkin
deemed not genocide) or apartheid in South Africa (Leo Kuper’s “not quite” case).
By what criteria? Who decides? What are the positive and negative effects of such convention?
And what does it mean to crown “the crimes of crimes,” making other sorts of horrible violence
seem tepid in comparison.
The drips and drabs of much settler colonialism violence (see Arnold and Woolford, Muller,
and Sinclair, this issue), including that in the United States where I reside, provides an example
and in many ways remains on-going. It turns us away from structural violence and the ways in
which power reveals, obscures, and erases (see also Feierstein, this issue). Genocide Convention
signals a temporality – a discrete beginning and end – and particular modalities of violence that
obscure these other sorts of violence. Thoth’s vice; Thamus’s warning.
The notion of atrocity crimes provides some mitigation, though genocide still reigns supreme.
And atrocity crimes wear a crown of their own, imposing another triumvirate hierarchy with a
lesser fourth part, ethnic cleansing.
I could go on. But you get the point. The UN Genocide Convention – and convention more
broadly – as poison and cure.
Before we leave the topic of convention, I leave you with one last inflection. Thoth, the god of
numbers and writing, is also a “god of articulation” to again reference a notion I discuss in Man
or Monster? He advocates a rendering of experience and understanding in remembered written
form: spelling something out, if you will. But the act of articulation always involves redaction as
Thamus’s comments suggest. The poison, I would add, remains in what Man or Monster? refers to
as the redactic, the suppressed excess that haunts the articulation, sometime suddenly dehiscing in
moments of the uncanny.
Remember my initial warning and our first lesson: “There’s a Medusa in the room!” On that
I’ll have a little more to say. But meanwhile, let’s look for her elsewhere. Indeed, Medusa haunts
the ECCC courtroom. So, too, do the spirits of the dead.
Justice
Justice. Another modality of genocide prevention. Another elixir of promise. It’s said to combat
impunity, contribute to democratization, advance the rule of law, and deliver peace, security,
reconciliation, and healing. Justice as fetish, a sorcerous conjuring.
But also justice as poison, something that can never be fully delivered and that inevitably falls
short in proportion to the fetishistic intensity of its projected cure. Justice as transitional justice
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throws this even more into relief, with the boatload of promised goals that are part of what The
Justice Facade refers to as the “transitional justice imaginary,”29 replete with utopian, teleological,
globalizing, democratizing, and progressivist aspirations and assumptions.
The ECCC provides an illustration with its motto, “moving forward through justice,” and official
proclamations that the court will contribute to Cambodia’s “justice and national reconciliation,
stability, peace and security.”30 Such aspirations mask a profoundly political process that involved
Cold War strategy and domestic and international concerns.
The court was a compromise formation from the start, structured with a hybridity and mass
of contradictions that would have made that fan of the pharmakon, Derrida, nod knowingly.
Indeed, Derrida’s peer, ECCC defense lawyer Jacques Verges – who pioneered the legal strategy
of “disruption,” or undercutting the legitimacy of a trial in the court of public opinion – did smile
mischievously as he deployed this strategy at the ECCC, launching early salvos in what would be
a litany of defense complaints.
The defense lawyers have had cause to complain, as Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan’s lawyers
did (yet again) immediately after the Case 002.2 verdict. The process has been a slog, the court’s
name partly stained by the allegations. Political interference. Corruption. Unfair rulings. Truncated
jurisdiction. And a legal process sometimes unsound. Nuon Chea’s defense lawyer called the court
a farce, mere victor’s justice. And the KRT’s justice is indeed a partial one. Many people hoped for
more.
After a dozen years and over $300 million spent, the court convicted just three people. The
international community wanted a dozen arrests or more. The Cambodian government insisted on
just five. Two of the accused died, unjudged.
The hybrid court is based in Cambodia. The government holds most of the cards and can pull
the plug at any time. It’s widely expected that they have already done so and that the November
2018 genocide conviction was the court’s last hurrah, the final act in what many people refer to as
“the show.”
There’s more. The laundry list of court problems is long. One of the biggest elephants in the
room is superpower culpability.
As Nuon Chea noted, the U.S. carpet-bombed the Cambodian countryside during the Vietnam
War, dropping more tonnage than it dropped during World War II.
China, in turn, provided the Khmer Rouge with support, aid, and arms. Western powers did
the same with resistance factions to help fuel a civil war that continued long after the Khmer Rouge
were deposed in early January 1979.
Superpowers don’t want this dirty laundry aired. So when, after years of geopolitical dithering,
they finally allowed the ECCC to be set up, they limited its jurisdiction to only include the time
Khmer Rouge were in power.
Defense lawyers have repeatedly highlighted the hypocrisy. Their contention that the ECCC
should have dealt with superpower crimes has merit.
So too do defense arguments that is impossible for the ECCC to reveal a fuller truth and
discern the causes of violence when only a snapshot of history is brought into view. The extensive
problems have led some to ask if the trials have been worth the effort and question whether justice
can ultimately be served.
Genocide Justice as remedy, justice as poison.
Prevention in Translation
Pharmakon is a tricky word. Remedy, recipe, and cure. But also drug, philter, and, of course
poison.31
So, too, is Thoth: God of wisdom, records, the moon, and much more. Thoth and his pharmakon
are pesky, an irritant, hard to pin down. Like convention, the problem of “prevention in translation”
is usually swept under the rug.
Let’s go back to the ECCC, the verdict read in Khmer, translated into English, then from
English to French. Thamus would not be pleased with these secondary and tertiary renderings.
Nor, indeed, should we.
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Take the very notion of “justice.” What, exactly, does it mean? We have our dictionary
definitions: “The administration of law or of legal processes; juridical proceedings” or, more
generally, “maintenance of legal, social, or moral principles by the exercise of authority or power,”
an idea linked to its etymological connections to “just,” or “what is morally right.”32 Justice, like
pharmakon, encompasses a loose conglomeration of terms, including legal process, “just desserts”
given, righteousness, and a hint of the Sublime.
When artist, S-21 survivor, and Cambodian civil party Vann Nath was asked in court what he
wanted from the trial of Duch, the commandant of the torture and extermination center where he
was imprisoned, Vann Nath replied, “What I want . . . it’s . . .” He paused. Then motioning in the
air, he continued, “[it’s] something that can’t be seen. It’s justice for those who died. For this justice,
I am relying on this Chamber. But in my heart, I’m not certain what this justice is.” He glanced
up at the judges. “It is only when this court is over that we may know the answer to the question:
justice, what is it? I’m not certain. What is justice? In my heart I hope that it’s something that will
be an outcome resulting from the actions of Your Honors, of this court.”33
Vann Nath’s comments raise a question that should be at the heart of considerations of
international justice prevention: what, exactly, is justice? And how is a Judeo-Christian legal
concept understood in a predominantly Buddhist context like Cambodia? Indeed, this is something
I thought about when I saw the saffron-robbed monks observing the Case 002.2 verdict from the
front row of the public gallery.
If, in The Justice Facade I discuss the transitional justice imaginary, I argue that these projections
mask what is really taking place on the ground. Katherine Sikkink’s notion of “the justice cascade,”
a foil upon which my title partly plays, highlights this point, suggesting a relatively seamless
process of “remedy” and “cure” – a global “cascade” of accountability and transitional justice.
The waters, however, are muddy and what lies beneath the veneer of the water’s surface are rich
ecosystems of cultural complexity and lived experience.
In Cambodia, Buddhism is central to understandings of “justice.” Indeed, the Khmer gloss,
yutethoa, is formed in part from the key Buddhist principle of dhamma, a term that, like justice and
pharamkon, has a wide range of referents.
For many Cambodian villagers who survived DK, then, the tribunal is linked to Buddhism in
different ways. Some view the tribunal as ultimately unnecessary since those who sin get their “just
desserts” through reincarnation, as their past (bad) actions condition their future. Others view the
tribunal itself as an instantiation of this karmic process.
For many Cambodian survivors, especially rural villagers who are largely unfamiliar with
formal legal justice, the tribunal’s key purpose relates to transactions with the spirits of the
(DK) dead, the haunting presence of those not yet reborn. They often perform a Buddhist ritual
(bangsokol) in which “justice” is transferred, though monks, to the dead in order to calm the spirits
and facilitate their rebirth, thereby rebalancing the social world, an ideal reflect both in terms of
everyday health (to feel “easy”) and Buddhist being (with its emphasis on equanimity).
Here we return to Thamus’s warning. The act of translating concepts like “justice” involves
reduction and change. In the context of transitional justice, then, the proclaimed “cure” (delivering
justice) is also poison, a “remedy” that redacts, erases, decontextualizes, and misrepresents
everyday experience, practice, and understandings (see also Zulver, this issue).
But the translations of prevention go far beyond justice, encompassing domains such as
peacebuilding (UNTAC), human rights (via Buddhist idioms), democratization, and so forth.
Sadly, the issue of translation -- and related questions about lived experience and practice – is often
ignored in the corresponding literatures, especially prevention studies. Medusa lurks, haunting
our words.
Genocide as Pharmakon: Endings that are Beginnings
Genocide prevention, in all its modalities, is often depicted as a straight-forward good, a shared

32

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, “Justice” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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Day 35, 55-56; Khmer 45.
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cause in need of little critical reflection since it is an obvious life-and-death imperative.
As this essay this has shown, the situation is less straight-forward, since prevention – and I
have discussed what are sometimes referred to as “upstream” (legal promulgation of Convention)
and “downstream” (international justice) mechanisms – is pharamakon, a remedy that is also part
poison, sometimes dangerously so.
I have provided a few examples. There are many more. Thoth, for example, is also the god
of numbers. Like the written word, numbers are articulations that foreground and background,
redacting aspects of reality even as they are fetishized – numbers fetish! – as “hard” data. Thamus’s
warning is relevant here as well.34
Earlier I spoke of not just prevention, but genocide as pharmakon. And indeed, this notion
could be applied to genocide more broadly. Here are a few last brief inflections, considered through
the second story, the ECCC verdict.
Nuon Chea, genocidaire, claims to be a hero. Or at least he contends that, like his comrades,
he acted for noble purposes: the alleviation of oppression and poverty, the creation of a society free
from imperialist and class-based domination, the collapse of the distinction between the rich and
the poor. His defense was to deflect blame, casting it on others, particularly the U.S. and Vietnam
and their lackeys. In his rendering, he was a tragic hero, largely misunderstood and scapegoated
– a pharmakon defense.
Here is a perhaps controversial inflection of genocide as pharmakon: the notion that genocide
can be committed in the name of the good.35 This idea grates on the ear, tears at our sense of
morality. But, sadly, as much research has shown, there is a moral logic to genocide, as mass
murder is legitimated as “remedy” (as is the genocide preventer’s destruction of the genocidaire),
a targeting cure to sociopolitical woes. It is, of course, a poisonous “cure” since the groups were
demonized as impure and targeted for elimination.
More broadly, drawing on scholars like Stiegler,36 we might consider technology -- like the
written word -- as pharmakon: an exteriorization that has the potential to transform humanity.
Pharmakon as technology converges with pharmakon as recipe in the notion of social engineering:
a “plan” or design to transform (a poisoned) society into a new (cured) state. Of course, the cure
(social engineering) for the poison (the flawed society) is itself not just a cure but poison – genocide.
Genocide as pharmakon.
Genocide, technology, and pharmakon intersect in others ways, perhaps most famously in
Zyklon B and industrialized mass murder but also in new modalities like social media that provide
both remedy (a source of grassroots atrocity crime alerts of the sort that became famous in Aleppo)
and poison (Facebook used for incitement in Myanmar).
What else does Nuon Chea’s pharmakon defense suggest about genocide? He raises the issue
of the scapegoat, pharmakos, part of the semiotic family of pharmakon. Ironically, Nuon Chea
claims to be a scapegoat. And perhaps in a limited sense he is: someone targeted by law as a
symbolic offering of justice for a broad range of crimes committed by a wide range of actors – even
if he was a ringleader.
Now we’re back to prevention as poison and cure in its juridical manifestations. So let’s refocus
on genocidal process. Even as Nuon Chea claimed to be a scapegoat, he scapegoated others (the
U.S. and Vietnam) to cast off (legal) blame. But this scapegoating indirectly implicated him, since
the DK regime used precisely the same “recipe” to rid their society of its perceived source of woes.
A laundry list of “poisonous” groups – depicted as linked directly or indirectly to the U.S.
and Vietnam – were targeted for “cure,” what Khmer Rouge discourse sometimes referred to as
34
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being “swept up” and “cleaned” (boas somat). It’s not just pharmacists who dispense “medicinal
remedies”: so, too, do genocidaires. Both are pharmakoi to return to the conceptual fulcrum of this
essay section.
As the aforementioned euphemisms suggest, genocide as pharmakon is often manifest in
discourses of purity and contamination and related binaries. And as highlighted in Derrida’s
reading and the very idea of pharmakon, Phaedrus foregrounds such binaries, including Thamus
and Thoth’s dialogue about speech versus writing. Derrida, of course, highlights pharmakon
because it illustrates the slippage and implosion of such binary distinctions – just as they collapse
in the genocidaire’s attempt to parse good and evil identities, since human beings, like the term
pharmakon, contain contradictory qualities that are impossible to contain in reductive categorical
definitions.
Genocide as pharmakon. Dispensation. Arrangement and Order. A “recipe” for genocide.
Medusa’s Blood
We’ve reached the end of these critical prevention studies meanderings, the back and forth this
textual flow. We began and now end with Medusa even as she’s been with us the entire time. She
haunts my words and your reading. She is the preventer’s ghost and double -- as well as the critical
preventer’s guide.
So, I urge you, always bear in mind the first lesson of prevention: “there’s a Medusa in the
room.” It is one that has a doppelgänger, its critical prevention “last lesson” twin.37 Take a look. See
what you can discern.
In their different ways, both lessons teach that, as we begin our “digs” and render our
articulations, we redact, foregrounding and backgrounding, pushing complexities out of sight –
like the multiple dimensions of the story of Medusa condensed into a mythic moment of Perseus’
heroics and glory.
Medusa can also, of course, be read through the notion of pharamakon. Medusa as scapegoat.
Medusa as gender transgressor. Medusa as poison (petrification) and cure (her powers weaponized),
qualities manifest in her very blood. Medusa as embodying a host of binary oppositions that
collapse in her polysemy, like pharmakon in Derrida’s rendering.
This polysemy is a key point at which myth and critique meet, both demanding an
“unloosening” (to reinvoke to the etymology of “analysis”) and openness that enables us to see
what has been pushed out of sight, the ground of rethinking.
At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the word “critical” has two key inflections
related to its Greek root, krinein, which suggest both one who discerns and one who judges. This is
a fraught role since discernment may be used in a “judgemental” sense to make normative claims.
Indeed, the Khmer Rouge contended that the “science” of Marxist-Leninism had made them allknowing and thereby legitimated their project of social engineering. We know how that tragedy
ended.
In this regard, myth and critique themselves stand in an interesting critical relation. Critique
decenters myths that have been flattened into shallow narratives (like the redacted versions of the
Medusa myth or the “culture industry” the Frankfurt school unpacked). Myth, in turn, decenters
critique that bulldozes complexity in an attempt to “reveal” the truth in a singular manner (like a
singular reading of myth and other cultural forms through a Marxist lens or the sorts of claims to
truth made by the Khmer Rouge).
In this regard, we might even speak of a mythological grammar of critique, one that, through
its polysemy, multivocality, contextualization, openness, ambiguation, reflexivity, and use of
juxtaposition and drama, challenges such “judgmental” critique.38 Used together in such a manner,
Alexander Laban Hinton, “Afterword: Look Again Aleppo – The Last Lesson in Prevention,” in Rethinking Peace:
Discourse, Memory, Translation, and Dialogue, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton, et al. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield,
2019), 221-238.
38
I would like to thank one of the peer reviewers for suggesting I expand on this aspect of the relationship between myth
and critique. On myth, narrative, and critique, see Peter Fitzpatrick, The Myth of Modern Law (New York: Routledge,
2002); George Pavlich, “Dissociative Grammar of Constitutional Critique?,” in Genres of Critique: Law, Aesthetics
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each providing a reflexive check on the other, myth and critique constitute a powerful tool for
critical inquiry, including the critical preventer’s “digs.”
This point has haunted us since you read the first line of this essay. Pig in a poke, I warned
you, the “critical difference” was already there. And so I conclude by returning to this essay’s
beginning discussion of Medusa to underscore the point that the critical preventer’s endeavor is a
recursive one and indeed has failed if it seems to have reached a fixed end.
We saw how Medusa and her myths speak to the study of perpetrators, since she is at once
victim and perpetrator, violated and violent, human and Gorgon monster – collapsing our neat
victim-perpetrator binaries and related dehistoricizations (multiple acts of violence before and
after “the event”), hero myths (Perseus the hero, also a perpetrator), depoliticizations (remember
Poseidon, King Polydectes, and Athena’s machinations and curse), and justice facades (Medea
“brought to justice” even as she is a victim to multiple crimes).
For critical preventers, Medusa serves as a warning and reminder: be careful not to become
inflated by the glories of convention and heroic prevention. Look for pharmakon, the flip side
of the coin. For we, too, run our own epistemological pharmacies. We’re prevention pharmakoi,
dispensers of poison and cure.
And so, even as we celebrate prevention’s halting successes and moments like the the 70th
anniversary of the UN Genocide Convention that began this special issue, we must bear in mind
that they are haunted occasions and therefore that the critical preventer must always remember…

and Liminality, eds. Karin van Marle and Stewart Motha (Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2013), 29-46; Johnson, The Critical
Difference.
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from Genocide-Impacted Rwandans and Indigenous Youth in Canada
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Introduction: Social Death and the Health of Group Life
This paper sets out to explore community-based insights into genocide prevention by comparatively
examining strategies for group survival developed in communities of Canadian-Indigenous youth
and Rwandan student genocide survivors.1 Of course there are many profound differences in the
circumstances that led to these genocides. The Rwanda genocide of 1994 occurred during a civil
war and was ended by an absolute victory won by military forces that went on to form the current
government – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).2 The colonial genocide of Indigenous Peoples on
the Canadian Prairies unfolded in a different way.3 This comparative research is focused on psychosocial responses among genocide impacted youth. In particular, I am interested in the preventative
capacity of communities to employ emergent and adaptive practices that foster resilience and allow
healthy forms of group life to displace the pre-conditions of genocide.4
This work engages with philosopher Claudia Card’s conception of social death which initiated
what James Snow has described as a “radical shift in conceptualizing genocide” and an important
step toward overcoming the “…fissure between the theorizing of genocide and the marginal[ized]…
voices of witnesses and survivors of genocides.”5 Card describes social death as the “…utter loss of
freedom and control over one’s vital interests [which] can be trans-generational and thus survive
one’s death. Before death, genocide victims are ordinarily deprived of control over vital transgenerational interests and more immediate vital interests.” 6 This paper draws on periods of
ethnographic research with the Association des Etudiants et Éleves Rescapés Du Genocide (AERG),
as well as with a group of community leaders from an Urban Indigenous Village in Winnipeg,
Canada. This research highlights the voices of Rwandans and Indigenous Peoples of Canada
who have survived genocides and are organizing locally to address and transform the genocidal
potentialities of social death they continue to confront on a daily basis.7
This paper flips the narrative of genocidal victimization and instead calls attention to insurgent
and transitional practices that are generating emotionally charged inter-generational vitality. A
key theme explored in the following section is how fighting social death requires promoting the
social conditions that give rise to healthy forms of group life. Practices that promote a thriving
group life are considered to be salutogenic – a term deriving from a combination of the latin salus
(health) and the greek genesis (origin). In the latter sections, salutogenic dynamics are identified
in the practices of cultural adaptation among young people who have been impacted by genocide
in both Rwanda and Canada. This approach to genocide prevention promotes what social death
1
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assails: social vitality. For Card, “Social vitality exists through relationships, contemporary and
intergenerational, that create an identity that gives meaning to a life.” Social death isn’t as much
about killing as it is about the “major loss of social vitality,” that in turn destroys positive identities
and can result in “a serious loss of meaning for one’s existence.8 Card’s approach to understanding
genocide “takes the focus off individual choice, individual goals, individual careers, and body
counts, and puts it on relationships that create community and set the context that gives meaning
to choices and goals.”9
Such careful attention to the multiple-levels of intersecting-processes and perspectives has
also been central to the development of colonial genocide scholarship. For instance, as Andrew
Woolford observes, it has been “a disservice to force Aboriginal experiences of ecological destruction
into a framework that acknowledges only the subsistence value of land to a group,” when what is
critically at stake in genocide is also the ontological destruction of the very essence of group life.10
Building on these and other micro-level analyses, this paper unpacks the theoretical underpinnings
of salutogenic approaches that can be applied to thinking about genocide prevention efforts. These
theoretical interventions largely underscore already existing community-based solutions that have
demonstrated the capacity to prevent genocide and secure the foundations of group life on their
own terms. The Canadian and Rwandan contexts differ tremendously and it is not my intention to
compare suffering but rather to call attention to the ways that both communities have found ways
to survive on their own term. Not only are these powerful examples of psychosocial resilience,
they are strategic approaches to counter-acting social death. As Almedom and colleagues describe,
Psychosocial resilience encompasses a dynamic multidimensional set of personal capabilities
as well as social and material assets/resources that individuals, families, and communities
mobilize to mentally and emotionally embrace “turbulent” change and transformation
while maintaining routine functioning without loss of identity, integrity, or core purpose in
life that defines them as who they are individually as well as collectively.11

The latter part of this paper incorporates first-hand accounts from Rwandan and Canadian genocide
survivors. The struggles described by community members exemplify the ongoing contest between
the forces of social death and those of group life. In both the Rwandan and Canadian contexts, social
alignments based on mutual aid, chosen kinship, and collective ritual are all important features
of genocide prevention. These three powerful community-level genocide prevention strategies
mobilize a framework that takes into account key findings from research that has focused on locallevel sensibilities of coherence as a basis for resilience.12
Stimulating Salutogenic Displacement of Social Death
As a branch of “positive psychology” salutogenesis, like much genocide scholarship, builds on
insights from survivors of the Holocaust. Victor Frankl perceived that,
Those who know how close the connection is between the state of mind of a man – his
courage and hope, or lack of them – and the state of immunity of his body will understand
that the sudden loss of hope and courage can have a deadly effect.”13
8
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What Frankl knew from his own experiences he expressed by paraphrasing Nietzsche’s famous
aphorism “he who knows the ‘why’ for his existence … will be able to bear almost any ‘how.’”14
Frankl developed and applied the insights he gained from his experiences in the Nazi concentration
camps through his “meaning centered” approach to clinical psychotherapy called “Logotherapy.”15
Antonovsky, in contrast, pursued a more systematic approach to public health among genocide
survivors. Antonovsky grounded these research questions in the day-to-day practices of Jewish
Holocaust survivors living in Israel, who had been able to thrive in spite of, and in some cases
because of, their experiences. These early studies of human health responses to trauma helped pave
the way for what is now a significant body of evidence documenting salutary and transformative
experiences among survivors of violence sometimes referred to as “post-traumatic-growth.”16
Promoting salutogenesis can be understood as a process of essentially reverse engineering the
“utter loss of freedom and control over one’s vital interests” characteristic of social death. Social
death takes hold when the conditions needed for healthful group life are undermined by fear,
uncertainty and despair. Conversely, for Antonovsky “the origins of health are to be found in a
sense of coherence.”17 An individual’s sense of coherence according to Antonovsky refers to
a global orientation that expresses the extent to which one has a pervasive, enduring though
dynamic feeling of confidence that (1) the stimuli deriving from one’s internal and external
environments in the course of living are structured and predictable, and explicable; (2) the
resources are available to one to meet the demands posed by these stimuli; and (3) these
demands are challenges, worthy of investment and engagement.18

This three-part sense of coherence construct has been used as the basis for a quantitative 28-item
“sense of coherence scale” as well as a shorter 13-item version.19 This approach understands
human health as a “dynamic-steady state” that exists on a spectrum of ease to dis-ease. There are
three sub-components to Antonovsky’s coherence model that reflect key domains associated with
salutogenesis: comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness. Cross-cultural findings using
sense of coherence measures have been influential in the fields of global health, establishing that
these three dimensions of coherence are valid indicators of durable forms as social vitality and
long-term resilience.20 Recognizing that hope, healing and transformation can and do co-occur on
a spectrum that includes despair, violence and uncertainty is itself an important step toward
preventing genocide.21
Orienting the Micro-Foundations of Genocide Prevention
In the introductory essay to the extensive reader on genocide scholarship Jens Meierhenrich describes
the “emphasis on the micro-foundations of genocidal violence” as being of the “utmost importance
for second-generation scholars of comparative genocide.”22 While Meierhenrich’s review does not
14
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include examples from the salutogenesis literature, the sense of coherence approach offers insights
into the mobilizing orientation behind political violence as well as the psychological capacity to
resist and overcome these oppressive and destructive forces.23
Antonovksy’s early work on the origins of health after genocide took place at a historical
moment when the intensification of settler colonial processes in Israel were ramping up systemic
displacement, exclusion, and violence against Palestinians in the occupied territories.24 For
Antonovsky, the health of the Israeli state seems necessarily embodied in the shared coherence of
individual Israeli settlers. In the preface to his landmark 1979 study “Health, Stress and Coping,”
Antonovsky describes his friend, colleague and Israeli settler, Abraham David Katz, as someone,
who “more than anyone I’ve ever known, embodied what I later came to call the sense of coherence.
Unhappily,” Antonovsky continues, “David Katz… was killed at the Suez Canal in the Yom Kippur
War.”25 Katz demonstrates that someone’s personal coherence does not prevent them from fighting
and killing in war, and suggests it likely helped align and cohere groups of Israeli soldiers who
understood themselves as fighting to secure the conditions of collective survival for their people.
Local-level violence is always mediated by the ways that groups of people comprehend situations,
manage collective responses, and make meaning when they feel that their survival is pitted against
that of another ethnic, religious, or political group.
The relevance of engaging genocide prevention at the level of community coherence is
highlighted in Lee Ann Fujii’s study of the neighborly dynamics of genocide in Rwanda. In order
to understand public violence Fujii calls attention to the ways that complex social interactions
are mediated by relationships that can either facilitate or prevent instances of direct violence and
killing. As Fujii describes it,
Genocide as a process becomes a temporal and spatial unfolding of ambiguous actions,
shifting contexts, and actors with multiple contradictory motives ... Viewing actors
dynamically allows us to probe a broad range of people’s behaviour during the genocide,
with its attendant contradictions, ambiguities, without the need to box actors into the
standard categories of ‘victim,’ ‘perpetrator,’ ‘bystander’ or ‘rescuer.’26

Community relationships can create, maintain, or prevent locally relevant “alternative pathways
to violence” from forming.27 When seeking to prevent genocide it is important to become sensitive
to the ways that meanings shapeshift across local contexts, creating shared understandings and
mutually intelligible feelings. In other words, it is essential to account for the fact that in addition
to cognitive understanding, meaning is also felt.
In the decades since Antonovsky’s original work, salutogenic research has expanded greatly
with increased attention to both the gender and affective dynamics of day-to-day life. Eritreanborn, Oxford-educated biological anthropologist Astier Almedom has contributed immensely
to the study of salutogenesis. In particular, Almedom’s work calls much needed attention to the
ways that gender and affect are involved at all levels of community crisis response including
activities of genocide prevention.28 Almedom’s work extends and deepens Antonovsky’s model
by incorporating qualitative analysis including attention to the role of women and emotional labor
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in orienting and sustaining local-level sensibilities of coherence.29 Almedom’s work marks a shift
to a sensibilities of coherence model that incorporates analyses of the powerful affective energies
generated in the face of existential threats.
The importance of feelings is certainly not a new domain of knowledge, as Tanana Athabascan
scholar Dian Million points out “academia repetitively produces gatekeepers” that prevent
Indigenous women “entry into important social discourses because we feel our histories as well as
think them.”30 For Million “A felt analysis is one that creates a context for a more complex telling.”31
In recent instances of colonial genocide against Indigenous Peoples, Million notes that it wasn’t
until First Nation’s men and women shared their personal testimony of sexual and other forms of
abuse that Canada was put under “an international spotlight for genocidal child abuse spanning a
century.”32 New sensibilities of coherence emerged thanks to “Native women’s personal narratives
[that] explored the racialized, gendered, and sexual nature of their colonization.”33 As these
narratives circulated throughout Canada they brought untold histories and unheard voices to the
surface in ways that “transformed the debilitating force of an old social control, shame, into a social
change agent in their generation.”34
Similarly, complex types of mobilized affective dynamics have been part of reorienting
the social emotional dynamics connected to the Rwandan genocide. For many Rwandans, local
sensibilities of coherence are encoded in parables and allegory. As Rwandan-Canadian Psychiatrist
Deogratias Bagalyshia describes,
Rwandan tradition provides a set of popular beliefs and practices to which the people of
Rwanda often turn in difficult situations and times of great distress… The proverb creates a
bridge between emotions, feelings or states of mind suffered at difficult moments, and the
appropriate attitude prescribed by Rwandan tradition, to surmount the difficulties caused
by this trying situation.”35

These culturally embedded expressions are part of the community-level sensibilities of
coherence in both Canada and Rwanda. These ways-of-knowing the world also inform the
relationships that give form to the affinities and aversions that exist in regional networks. Preventing
genocide requires incorporating emotionally and culturally coherent analyses that attend to the
ways that perceived threats are likely to evolve during periods of social uncertainty. Turning to
the field of Cultural Studies provides some useful ways of conceptualizing and exploring how how
analyzing affective dynamics of these local conditions can inform critical genocide prevention.
Emergent Prevention and the Structure of Feeling
The work of cultural theorist Raymond Williams is helpful in seeing how feelings are involved in
constituting the foundations of group-life. Feelings give shape to latent patterns of social behavior
before they are fully manifest. These preconditions exist as emergent culture. For Williams, “What
matters finally in understanding emergent culture … is that it is never only a matter of immediate
practice. Indeed, it depends crucially on finding new forms of adaptation of form.”36
This is a critical insight for genocide prevention. The preconditions of overlap with the
preconditions for its prevention; both involve profound “adaptations of form” which give rise
to shared identities and challenge relations of power. Embedded local actors are sensitive to
these conditions of “pre-emergence” in ways that enable them to respond to subtle contingencies
John Parker, et al., Hope Is the Engine of Life.
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that would be missed by outsiders. Such sensitivity is a necessary part of both identifying and
working toward displacing the immediate conditions of social-death. When the preconditions for
salutogenesis are undermined this creates the conditions for uncertainty that can create regional
power vacuums and lead to for escalatory spirals of conflict. Power vacuums also undermine the
spirit of local resistance, making it more possible for genocidal-orders to emerge and allowing
the conditions of social death to spread unabated. Accounting for these qualitative tipping-points
requires sensitivity to the relative stability and affective intensity of constantly evolving life-anddeath scenarios.
The potentialities of day-to-day life change with the rising and falling of affect. Affect refers
to life’s emotional energies set in motion publicly and in ways that either increase or decrease
individual and collective capacities for action.37 Williams’ critical insight for genocide prevention
is that “what we have to observe is in effect a pre-emergence, active and pressing but not yet fully
articulated, rather than the evident emergence;” we must, says Williams “explore the concept of
structures of feeling.”38
When ontological destruction is occurring, political issues are immediately seen for what they
are: matters of life and death. As AIDS activist and social movement scholar Deborah Gould writes,
“emotion incites, shapes, and is generated by practices of meaning-making.”39 Gould describes the
shared identities that are forged amidst such existential struggle as “affective ontologies” given
shape by the mobile affective energies that infuse and inform daily ways-of-being-in-the-world.40
Naming and responding to things that can kill can be a powerful way to clarify and amplify
local sensibilities of coherence. Putting emotionally charged discourses into local circulation can
influence collective behavior by creating social alignments in response to collective threats. As
emotionally “sticky” tropes circulate through conflicted spaces they stick to people who relate to
the manner of expression given to shared feelings often presented as politicized tropes, giving
them greater currency, and more exclusionary weight, among identity-based communities. These
affective economies are important to mobilizing exclusionary practices, polarizing groups, and
intensifying local-level antagonisms.41
These dynamics are significantly amplified through social media channels.42 As defense
analyst John Arquilla notes, there has been a paradigmatic shift in the relative power of networks
and nations across the globe – a shift that has important implications for genocide prevention.43
The power of networks creates new potential for approaches to genocide prevention that engage
the dynamics of transformational mass participation.44 Enabled and amplified through digital
communications technologies, networked social alignments can create new pathways to action.
Affective coherence is critical to both orienting and activating small groups either on to, or off of
pathways that lead to genocidal violence. This requires understanding the emotional attachments
that align individuals with a perceived collective.
Sara Ahmed writes that,
Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, we need to consider how they
work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate the relationship between the psychic and
the social, and between the individual and the collective … emotions work by sticking figures
together (adherence), a sticking that creates the very effect of a collective (coherence).45
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Approaching genocide prevention through a sensibilities of coherence lens can help identify
local thresholds of violence that exist along un-fixed affective edges in ways that can inform how
more spatially fixed local boundaries are understood. Such increased nuance helps to account
for the ambiguity and ambivalence that can characterize conflicts where ethno-religious political
divisions alternate back and forth between being more-or-less fluid or frozen identity groupings.46
Understanding the constitutive role of affective forces within social-networks also can help account
for the reasons why some people find it extremely difficult to escape the immediate conditions
of social death.47 Finding points of shared understanding and felt solidarity can create a basis for
shifting the affective valence in an entire community. Strategies of prevention based on affective
alignment may also enhance survival opportunities for community members when navigating
complex and shifting local conflict conditions including the threat-multiplying effects of climate
change.
The Rwandan and Indigenous-Canadian communities case studies examined in the following
sections demonstrate cross-cultural practices that illustrate elements of both emergent culture and
affective mobilization. First hand descriptions from genocide survivors provide an indication of
how these community groups have oriented their own local organizing toward both preventing
and surviving genocidal conditions. Finding ways of leveraging the affective force needed to
displace the dynamics of social death represents an ongoing challenge and opportunity for
genocide prevention studies.
Family, Villages, and the Salutogenic Quality of Kinship
Few levels of analysis more directly indicate the health or illness of regional group life than the
day-to-day conditions of life for children. The extensive intergenerational trauma and broken
social bonds related to genocide have destroyed many biological families in both Rwanda and
among Indigenous communities in Canada. The deadly long-term consequence of colonial policy
starkly illustrates Card’s insight, already cited, that “genocide victims are ordinarily deprived of
control over vital trans-generational interests and more immediate vital interests.”48
The central place of children in-group life is clearly indicated in Article 2 of the Genocide
Convention outlining the different ways that group life is targeted through acts aimed at children.49
In both Rwanda and Canada attacks on children and culturally important kinship networks were
foundational to the character of the genocidal assaults on group life. Indigenous youth in Canada
became dislocated from their land-based ways of life, kinship relations and cultural teachings
as a result of settler colonialism. The Indian Residential School system and subsequent versions
of Canadian child welfare policy epitomize the colonial focus on assimilating or eradicating
Indigenous group life generationally. In Rwanda, webs of community and familial relations that
were once a source of help became a deadly hindrance when the intensity of full-blown genocidal
killing took hold of the hills.
The research literature on the psychosocial impacts of war and genocide on children has
understandably been focused on the pathogenic outcomes that these horrific processes have on
children’s lives and the long-term impacts on their future chances in life. However, in her 2005
review of the resilience literature Almedom notes that “anthropological insight into children’s
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experiences cautions against the (pathogenic) ‘universalist’ and ‘apocalypse’ models, respectively,
of childhood and war.”50 As an alternative, Almedom advocates for greater inclusion of “combined
models of risk and resilience involving narrative approaches” which contribute to “building
children’s sense of coherence, self-efficacy, and resilience.”51 Such community practices have the
capacity to displace social death and cultural destruction with Indigenous-led ways of being-inthe-world that promote what Cindy Blackstock describes as “cultural perpetuity.52
Community-Led Organizing in Winnipeg’s Urban Indigenous Village
The prairie city of Winnipeg, Canada has a population of 800,000 people including a large
Indigenous community. Indeed, Winnipeg has the largest urban Indigenous population of any city
in Canada, with over 90,000 Peoples from Cree, Ojibwe, Oji-Cree, Dakota, Dené, Inuit, and Red
River Métis backgrounds. For many Indigenous youth living in Winnipeg their conditions of dayto-day survival are deeply entangled in systems connected to the ongoing traumas of colonization
and in particular, the Indian Residential Schools (IRS) system.
Policies of territorial dispossession, apprehension, and transfer of Indigenous children,
and the criminalization of traditional land-based spirituality were all efforts intended to inflict
“conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”53 These
genocidal realities remain embedded in neo-colonial government institutions that McCallum
and Perry describe as “structures of indifference.”54 Indeed, trans-generational transmission of
trauma associated with dispossession from traditional territories, destruction of language and
culture, and child apprehensions all continue to contribute to poor Indigenous health.55 Canada’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission has called “upon the federal, provincial, territorial, and
Aboriginal governments to acknowledge that the current state of Aboriginal health in Canada is a
direct result of previous Canadian government policies.”56 Indeed, the presence of negative “social
determinants of health” including high levels of incarceration, rampant suicide, and exposure to
disproportionate levels of violence all converge to support the thesis that social death continues to
be a genocidal threat to Indigenous peoples.57
The bleak fact is that twenty-years after the last IRS closed the Canadian child welfare system
had more Indigenous youth in care than at the height of IRS operations.58 Indigenous youth make
up nearly 90 percent of youth in state foster care. This translates into more than ten thousand
Indigenous young people who have been removed from their homes and separated from their
families. These youth “in care” are case-managed as wards of the Canadian state, living in
arrangements that vary widely, although some of the broadest pathways available lead directly to
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adverse social determinants of health.59 These overlapping and interlocking cycles coupled with
intensive surveillance and interference by government agents in community-level responses has
deprived many Indigenous Peoples of the capacity to care for their own children.
This situation regarding Indigenous youth in care has become recognized by all parties
involved as untenable. While governments continue to flounder, community-leaders are
advocating responses that can be understood as re-establishing local sensibilities of coherence.
In Winnipeg, “The Village” has become a common referent, which encompasses a variety of local
solutions to a plethora of community-specific problems. The Village does the work of creating
salutogenic conditions for the youth, and in so doing, directs vital energy away from the domains
of social death, and toward the aims of life
It’s the Village’s role to take care of the children … If we want to change what’s happening
with children that’s going to have to come from us. So that means we have to help our
neighbors. That means we have to help our relatives. That means we get to work on being
good parents, good uncles, good aunties. But not just for our family but also for the people
who live beside us, and for our whole community.60

Michael Redhead Champagne is an Indigenous organizer and advocate who started an antiviolence initiative Meet Me at the Bell Tower in 2011. Having grown up in Winnipeg, Champagne is
acutely aware of day-to-day experiences of street violence, racialized policing, child apprehensions,
sexual exploitation, suicide, and addictions that exist within his community.61 Champagne is an
advocate of Winnipeg’s urban Indigenous-led, “Village.” “The Village,” as it is referred to locally, is
a network of urban Indigenous people and their allies living in and around Winnipeg. The concept
builds on existing Indigenous culture and includes strengthening local knowledge through the
revival of kinship networks, clan systems, and Indigenous languages.62 Taken together, these local
practices create capacity for community healing, and cultural perpetuity. The aims of the Village
can be understood as preventing social death by fostering salutogenic relationships held together
by locally relevant sensibilities of coherence.
Working with other groups within The Village has enabled networked responses through
which communities can influence the conditions that impact on their own well being. These
networks amplify community capacities; when people come together for events like Meet Me at
the Bell Tower, they become part of
creating safe spaces for people to share their opinions and their perspectives and their
lessons. It’s an opportunity for citizens to see their power. And because it’s not often attended
to – and it’s never operated on by elected officials – the community gets to see what we as
citizens can do when we organize ourselves ... It enriches our community.63

Youth raised in the child welfare system in Manitoba are more likely to experience gang related
violence and to become ensnared in the sex trafficking industry.64 These factors have also been
identified as contributing to the genocidal phenomena of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women
and Girls. The Canadian national commission that was struck to investigate the circumstances
surrounding these disappearances and deaths found that these outcomes were part of the ongoing
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genocide against Indigenous Peoples.65 Genocide prevention in such contexts requires direct forms
of community-led intervention.
Champagne grew up in the child welfare system and has become a leading voice calling for
community-led responses to the government’s child welfare policy by mobilizing his community
to become the village that children need.
The Village has to engage with every single level of government. The Village is critical in
building up people’s institutional knowledge to know and understand which jurisdiction,
which level of government is required to implement which solution… So what that does is it
forces the grassroots community to examine: what is the role [of] these different jurisdictional
bodies, or these governments in the solutions that we are beginning to implement right now
because we’re not waiting. I don’t have faith in the government-led process. I don’t really
have faith in the government, period. We’ve got to save ourselves.66

Winnipeg’s “Village” exercises forms of digital sovereignty through its extensive
communications network, a strong social media presence, and the use of internet memes in rearticulating dimensions of culture and identity.67 This enables information sharing, maintaining
connections, live streaming difficult encounters, coordinating resources, and mobilizing collective
actions.68 As Champagne puts it, “The advantage of the Village is its fluidity.”69
Village sensibilities of coherence help to cohere relationships that exist both online and
offline. This has generated a network of “topological relations,” a development also noted in the
anthropological observation that villages have moved past being “bounded units” and are now
seen as topological “places enmeshed within amorphous realities significantly characterized by
the circulation of people, goods, images, and ideas not moored to any single place.”70 In Winnipeg
social media channels have created many opportunities for urban Indigenous youth to reconnect
with local land-based ceremonies and cultural teachings. These topological connections have been
significant in the rise of Winnipeg’s Village and have created what Shields and colleagues describe
as new ecologies of affect.71 These changing relational dynamics are transforming the preconditions
of genocide and salutogenic growth.
New Families: Chosen Kinship and Mutual Aid Among Rwandan Student Genocide Survivors
Ten years after the 1994 genocide approximately 17 percent of Rwandan youth under the age 18
were orphans. 72 The reasons for the children becoming orphaned include “the 1994 genocide, later
massacres, imprisonment of adults accused of genocide and HIV/AIDS.”73 In total, it is estimated
that there are between 65,000 and 227,500 Youth-Headed Households (YHH) in Rwanda.74 Research
into the day-to-day conditions of over 690 Rwandan orphans indicated that 52 percent felt their
relatives took advantage of them. Even more indicated they did not trust their relatives to look out
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for their best interests and 57 percent believed that the community would rather hurt them than
help them.75
Based on these and other findings from youth-headed households in Rwanda, Thurman and
colleagues suggest that community supports outside of biological family are central to recovery
after genocide. “Taken together, these data suggest that family-centered interventions may not be
ideal in this setting, thus interventions targeting villages are recommended.”76 While the authors
of this study are referring to more traditional Rwandan villages, the foregoing discussion of
emergent, topological Indigenous Villages in Canada indicates that there are emergent potentials
to be explored further in Rwanda.
In Rwanda, like everywhere else in the world, “children and youth need a sense of belonging to
their communities – to neighbors, family and friends who comprise the network of care, protection
and identity in their lives. Social connection and emotional support are critical for survival.”77
Some similar manifestations of the inter-generational trauma that has plagued Indigenous
communities in Canada can also be seen among Rwandan youth. Many young people witnessed
and experienced violence, were displaced from their homes and lost multiple family and friends.
Additional complexities exist in family relationships since it is estimated that over twenty thousand
children were born of rapes inflicted upon women during the 1994 genocide.78
The Association des Etudiants et Éleves Rescapés du Genocide (AERG) is a community of genocide
survivors organized based on a “New Family” kinship model which provides a powerfully
unifying sensibility of coherence. AERG functions as an emergent organization that is understood
by New Family members to be an important way for survivors to ensure their survival and shape
their futures – as well as the future of Rwanda – in positive ways.79 This orientation is particularly
significant when considering the self-reported size of AERG’s national network. As described
on the AERG official Rwandan website, “AERG is represented nationally at 41 Universities and
institutes of higher learning and 484 secondary schools in Rwanda, with a total country-wide
membership of 43,398.”80
AERG’s New Families operate semi-autonomously in their day-to-day affairs while remaining
connected through an overarching national body and numerous levels of state-involved bureaucracy.
81
At the local level New Families are comprised of small groups of between ten to fifteen male
and female student survivors. Each New Family appoints a “mother” and “father” figure from
their peer group with the rest of the group maintaining sibling-like relations. New Family parents
help to mediate internal disputes and take care of the administrative work needed to facilitate
the practical interface between family groups at the regional and national-level organizations.82
Each AERG family is made up of three types of members: 1). An effective member who is a
survivor 2). An adhérent member who is a student but not a survivor, one who is sympathetic
and wants to support AERG, 3). A member of honor, such as a university professor, a business
person, or someone who is influential in the society. Someone to whom the organization can turn
to for advice and moral support. “Outside these three categories, we have a sage, someone wellrespected, members of the family can seek advice from for a member’s better future. The person is
called parrain [godfather] or marrainne [godmother].”83
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In addition to having survived the 1994 genocide many AERG members also grew-up in
youth-headed households. As students, AERG members represent a relatively elite group of young
people. They have faced difficult life circumstances, but in AERG they have found new sensibilities
of coherence which provide the salutogenic supports needed to pursue their education. Many
Rwandan youth do not have these opportunities, and in many communities of marginalized
youth, the conditions of social death associated with trauma, addictions, stigma, and loneliness are
pervasive.84 Youth trying to manage parent-less households are put under enormous pressure to
fill in the gaps left by biological families and traditional community-cultural connections. AERG
emphasizes the importance of individuals fulfilling their responsibilities to their chosen families,
communities, and country. In turn, the collective helps create safe spaces where individual AERG
members can process their trauma.
New Families perpetuate salutogenic conditions insofar as they understand individual healing
to be part of broader socially transformative processes that will eventually enhance the wellbeing
of their entire group. In their organizational structure, AERG shares certain features with other
community organizations formed by genocide survivors. In particular, among communities of
Holocaust survivors in 1970s Israel, “Individual sense of coherence mattered less in the communal
context” where shared supports that “protected the collective” were present.85 Among the day-today activities that typify New Family relations are acts of material mutual aid – such as sharing
school supplies, or pooling funds – paired with ongoing emotional support. As one interviewee
indicated, “If we see someone is worried because he doesn’t have something, we tell him he doesn’t
have to feel bad for missing something, you can approach another member of the family and they
help you.”86
The sensibilities of coherence that are anchored to these chosen kinship networks also provide a
grounded basis for outreach work. AERG members work with local elementary schools mentoring
younger children and encouraging youth to work toward preventing genocide and building a
collective future. In this sense, AERG mobilizes the affect connected to their genocidal experiences
in ways that contribute to creating the conditions of pre-emergence for future generations following
them. In ways that echo the work of Indigenous women described by Million, AERG surfaces their
private feelings publicly to transform what could be a “debilitating force” of shame and social
death “into a social change agent in their generation.”87 New Families help youth to feel a sense
of belonging based on trusting friendships and reliable networks that promote life and defend
against social death. As one AERG interviewee put it,
We created the families so we can know each other well, and if one of us has problems, we
can see how we can help them. There are some who live alone. When that person joins the
family, he feels that he’s not alone, he has someone else, another family.

In these families we have a father and a mother – the way it was before. We try to create these
families so that we can feel we have parents, even though they are the same age, they are the big
person, they take care of us. Some of us have parents who are widowers, they are left with nothing,
they can’t help their children – so these families try to do what they would be doing for their
children.88
Chosen family structures in Rwanda have created spaces connected by relational webs based
on individual experiences of trauma and oriented toward promoting peace and health among
communities. After leaving the New Family formation at the end of their university studies, AERG
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members are able to re-integrate into communities and in so doing help disseminate elements of
these salutogenic sensibilities of coherence. As a result, networks of interconnected New Families
have contributed to the local conditions needed for healthy cultural adaptations to occur. These
chosen families are altering the pre-emergent cultural conditions in Rwanda by generating
significant networked-capacity for decentralized genocide prevention. AERG’s New Family model
is well suited to both combating forms of social death among its members, and also assembling
webs of security that are adapted to survival in the volatile Great Lakes region where state-level
relations and the alignment of regional military factions can change rapidly.89
Ritualizing Emergent Community
Of the three dimensions that characterize local sensibilities of coherence (comprehensibility,
meaningfulness, and manageability) the struggle to re-establish deeply embedded cultural
meaning is perhaps the most profound undertaking within these community groups. AERG
members invest significant emotional energy into supporting other members of their New Families
to pursue personal and public healing. These practices help to repair the ontological ruptures that
the genocide has caused at all levels of society. The role of New Families is powerfully performed
during ritualized mourning and burials for loved ones. Locating and burying the remains of loved
ones killed in the genocide is a major issue in Rwanda where the connection to ancestor spirits is of
great personal and cultural importance.90 An AERG member described a burial ritual for a member
of a New Family who had lost biological family in the genocide whose remains had never been
recovered.
Recently a family member wanted his family buried officially, so we had to go there and
help him with everything. Which means we helped in everything – at work, at home and
with things that required money, and so the burial took place. So we sat with him after the
burial, lit some fire, and even the neighbors could see that he had a family and they could
join, and everything was cool. He lost a lot of his family members, but we don’t know where
they were buried, so we were there to bury people but they were not there. So we all sat
together and talked about a lot of things, and all the neighbors joined in and we talked until
the morning – and everyone could see that he had a family with him.91

Such publicly visible rituals are extremely important in rebuilding the bonds of community
that genocides always target. Additionally, these public performances signal to others that these
individuals are not marginal, or easily victimized, because their new families have their backs. The
place-based and embodied nature of these practices highlight the profoundly emotional experience
of mourning, as well as the affective power of mourning performed publicly.92
Traditional ceremonies and other rituals are also central to Winnipeg’s urban Indigenous
Village.93 Ritual gatherings integrate traditional Indigenous teachings and medicines such as
sage and sweet grass in public spaces where communities are struggling with direct violence and
social death. These ritualized spaces have become safe and accessible points of connection for
people trying learn about their Indigenous culture and the legacies of colonialism. Local rituals
help develop salutogenic sensibilities of coherence. Creating shared understandings, building
relationships, connecting Indigenous youth to cultural teachings, and language skills are all
important pre-requisites for community emergence. Champagne describes with detail his attention
89
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to the affective preconditions that enable people to connect with The Villages shared orientation
and begin to feel part of a collective sensibility of coherence. The emotional intelligence of leaders
like Champagne has been a key factor in the success of one of Winnipeg’s longest running,
independent, Indigenous-led community gatherings Meet Me at the Bell Tower.
Our style, our flavoring, our strategy, and our culture at Meet Me at the Bell Tower… has
always been to create an environment before you deliver information. We have to create an
environment where people are smiling, people are laughing, people feel good. Medicines are
important for that.94 The children are important for that. They always set the tone right. Like
having the smudge, having the drums, having the kids at the front end of everything we do
at the Bell Tower.95

These ritualized community gatherings mobilize affective energies and transmit intergenerational knowledge needed for deeper and more sustainable forms social organization.
Breaking colonial cycles and helping to re-align communities along clan-based teachings has become
a transformative strategy. Winnipeg’s Indigenous Village Model demonstrates how emergent
organizing can help create pathways with alternative outcomes to the colonial present haunted by
the “constant specter of Indigenous death.”96 Villages are a basic unit for enacting modes of local
governance that are in keeping with – not in opposition to – underpinning Indigenous ontologies.97
Again Champagne is succinct in his assessment. “I don’t think the way Western institutions or
Western culture raised people is conducive to responsibility-based leadership. And the Clan
System is all about responsibility-based leadership.”98
Conclusion: Social Death is Incompatible with Salutogenesis
Communities of genocide-impacted youth in both Canada and Rwanda continue to be leaders
when it comes to community genocide prevention that displaces the conditions of social death and
promotes forms of salutogenesis. These community groups have also been able to influence national
level discourses in significant ways. In Rwanda, the state’s dominant role in narrating collective
memories continues to “shape notions of culpability and future possibilities for social change.”99
Brehm and Fox suggest that these state-level historical narratives have provided individuals with
“a new lens to evaluate their nation’s post-genocide progress,” including shifting blame from
individuals to institutions, especially those outside of Rwanda.100 While the historical narratives
in both Rwanda and in Canada may well be shifting, these ideologically laden structures remain
implicated in the production of social death either through processes of exclusion or indifference
even as they do important work toward reconciliation.101
By focusing on the specific ways that local sensibilities of coherence mesh with the conditions
of social death, this paper shifted the emphasis from state-level narratives to community practices
that generate, promote, and sustain good health and social vitality. These local insights suggest
that genocide prevention must increasingly work to identify and engage with the affective edges
that serve as thresholds for local violence when they are still “in effect a pre-emergence.”102 The
prevention of social death requires a high level of contextual attunement to local economies of
affect as well as sustained attentiveness and accountability to the ways that people’s day-to-day
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realities intersect with, and are impacted by, the conditions of social death. Members of Rwanda’s
local AERG network and Winnipeg’s urban Indigenous Village, and countless other groups like
them, are working to prevent genocide through contextually specific cultural adaptations that
provide coherent ways for them to improve their own lives and the lives of their chosen families.
Genocide impacted communities in both Rwanda and Canada are still at risk because of
unresolved genocidal preconditions that have been able to persist primarily due to state-level
systemic contradictions. Locally however, community practices based on the principles of mutual
aid, networked kinship, and grounded ritual are all emergent elements of, and coherent strategies
for, creating healthy and sustainable futures that embrace the rich complexities and potentialities
that are the essence of life.
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The Nuremberg trials following World War II brought to light the extensive crimes committed
by the German National Socialist regime against civilian and military populations. German
violations of the Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention of 1929 were revealed to be commonplace
during the war. Currently, the British Government’s official position is that German violations
of the Geneva Convention were spontaneous events. Philip D. Chinnery, in Hitler’s Atrocities
against Allied PoWs: War Crimes of the Third Reich, attempts to prove they were indeed centrally
authorized by Berlin. This is not Chinnery’s first work on prisoners of war. He has also authored
two books on Allied prisoners of war during World War II and another on Chinese and North
Korean-perpetrated war crimes during the Korean War (1950-3). While the events recounted are
emotionally fraught and no doubt war crimes, the book suffers from a variety of structural and
research deficiencies which makes the book of limited value to academics and impedes its ability
to accomplish its objective.
German atrocities against British and Commonwealth prisoners are the work’s central
focus. Chinnery was previously the historian and chairman of the National Ex-Prisoner of War
Association. As he states in his introduction, “this book has been written to help set the record
straight and to try to educate those in the government who should know better.”1 Specifically,
those who should know better are the British politicians who denied an appeal for monetary
compensation to survivors of German prisoner of war camps. By contrast, former prisoners of the
Japanese were awarded compensation by those same politicians Chinnery seeks to persuade.
The individualized effort in recounting the fate and tale of British POWs is impactful. The
victims are not nameless but rather are revealed to be individuals. Whether massacre survivors,
escapees, or downed aviators, Chinnery presents these men as men of honor and individuals
against whom the moral repugnance of the German military was visited.
The book is organized into sixteen chapters, plus an appendix, glossary and index. The
chapters are largely arranged chronologically. Several chapters are thematic, including a chapter on
atrocities against Soviet prisoners of war, the murders of downed airmen, and life in the prisoner of
war camps. The appendix consists of two transcriptions of British War Office documents regarding
punishment of German war criminals.
The book starts with Germany’s invasion of Poland. Several massacres in Poland are covered,
including the Soviet-perpetrated Katyn Forest Massacre. Oddly, the book does not explicitly state
in the text that the Soviets executed these Polish prisoners. Readers will find that listed under an
unsourced photograph at the end of the chapter. This chapter also includes a section on how the
German government treated its own citizens found guilty of small acts of kindness to the Polish
prisoners turned laborers in the Reich.
The book’s British focus begins in Chapter Two where Chinnery lays out several massacres
and executions of surrendered British prisoners by German units and individuals. The next few
chapters are also focused on British and Commonwealth prisoners taken in North Africa, the
1
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Mediterranean, and Italy. The book’s longest chapter is dedicated to the commandos executed as a
result of the infamous Kommandobefehl (“Commando Order”). When coupled with the twenty-nine
pages later dedicated to the deaths of Special Air Service men, the risks faced by captured special
operations forces become readily apparent. The book then examines executed airmen, POW camp
life, and atrocities committed at D-Day, Arnhem, and during the Battle of the Bulge. Chinnery
concludes by looking at the incomplete postwar efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice. Like
other chapters, it is largely on British efforts.
Only one chapter, a mere seventeen pages in length, is dedicated to atrocities against Soviet
prisoners of war. In the Soviet east, the German Army’s “complicity in...ideological warfare is
well-established, particularly at the higher levels.”2 Given the extensive mortality rates among
Soviet POWs, estimated between sixty and eighty percent, this chapter should have received
further expansion.3 The German atrocities on the Eastern Front are not unknown nor unavailable
for reference. This chapter’s scholarship is cursory, largely relying on the recollections of one
British witness. While Chinnery briefly mentions the fate of Jewish Soviet prisoners of war, he
does not access texts like Shneyer’s Pariahs Among Pariahs: Soviet-Jewish POWs in German Captivity,
1941–1945.4 For example, there are no discussions of the Uman pit (Stalag 329) where tens of
thousands of Soviet POWs died or of DULAG-205 at Stalingrad.5 Additionally, the writing is rife
with gross generalizations that detract from the book’s value. Soviet POWs are presented as a
faceless mass. As an example, Chinnery compares the British and Soviet prison camps as follows.
The most noticeable difference between the Russian camp and the British Stalags was a total lack
of discipline among the Russians and another difference between the British and Russian camps
was the smell. Apparently the Russian idea of personal cleanliness was clearly different to that in
the West when he notes that the other inmates were dark, swarthy-looking men from the east….6
Similarly, in a brief section on postwar Soviet justice, the fate of the soldiers of the German
6th Army after its capitulation at Stalingrad is callously referred to as how “German other ranks
also paid for their sins.”7 While there is no doubt the 6th Army committed war crimes during their
operations, this post facto judgment of all members of the command is inappropriate in a scholarly
work.
The book succeeds in bringing to light some of the atrocities committed against prisoners of
war by the German military during World War II. This said, it has three major flaws. First, as
discussed above, there is a distinct lack of balance between atrocities committed on the Eastern
Front and those against the Western Allies. Secondly, it suffers from a lack of scholarly grounding.
While many of the chapters reference research files at the National Archives at Kew, the referencing
is done by section rather than inline with the text. The result is anyone seeking to verify Chinnery’s
sources will have a difficult time replicating the work. Furthermore, there are almost no references
to the existing scholarship already done on the subject. Instead of presenting a focused synthesis,
the result is a work that seems largely anecdotal in nature. Thirdly, for a book which seeks to
persuade the reader of government-wide complicity in the mistreatment of prisoners, the work
lacks a strong legal grounding. While Lord Russell of Liverpool, the Deputy Judge Advocate,
British Army of the Rhine, is referenced in the book’s introduction and conclusions, the lack of
other legal sources and findings is an oversight which weakens the argument that the events
recounted were not isolated incidents. This absence makes it difficult for the reader to draw the
dots between the actions of individuals or units and their political and military leadership in the
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absence of documented orders.
Hitler’s Atrocities Against Allied PoWs cannot be regarded as an academic study of the fate
awaiting captured Allied servicemen and women. Its narrow focus, socio-political goal, and
limited engagement with the historiography prevent it from serving as more than a survey
text or springboard. Rather, the book’s value is largely an emotional one. Chinnery attempts
to tie the individual fates to a larger argument that the German armed forces and their security
force compatriots were systematically responsible for the abuses described in the book. While
the individual cases are compelling and some, like the executions that took place under the
Kommandobefehl, have a clear connection to explicit policies, the book does not succeed in linking
its other examples to a larger line of reasoning.
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German sociologist Heinrich Popitz whose work is included in the “national sociological
literary canon” of Germany delves into the nature, issues, and forms of power in Phenomena of
Power: Authority, Domination, and Violence.1 Initially published in 1986, in German as Phänomene
der Macht, he seeks to identify the historical premises of power that informs the presumptions of
society’s understanding of power. In this publication, Popitz draws on lectures from over thirty
years of teaching, reflections on previously published papers to expand on his work Prozesse der
Machtbildung (Process of Power Formation) and provide additional chapters for this second edition.
Popitz work consists of eight chapters separated into two parts focusing on the forms of
enforcement and stabilization of power. To assist the reader a chapter addressing the general
conceptual framework to contextualize the analysis that follows is provided. In part one, violence,
a threat to authority and the use of technical action to solidify the hold on power are analyzed as
forms of the enforcement of power. In part two, Popitz describes and analyzes the processes by
which power is consolidated by a few to dominate others and its institutionalization in support of
the perpetuation of violence.
Chapter one serves as a primer to the monograph and provides a general framework to use as
a reference for analyzing the phenomena of power. Popitz positions power as an essential “element
of the human condition, fundamentally affecting the very essence of human sociability.”2 Using
a historical lens Popitz frames the problematization of power as a human fashioned reality that
influences the structure of society. Power ubiquitously forms a transparent layer that society sees
through and translates the centralized structures and institutions of everyday life. By exercising
power at the upper levels of social hierarchy, limitations are placed on the freedoms of individuals
in the lower strata. The ability of individuals to assert power based on their positionality in society
is explored in the context of anthropological understandings of the power of asserting oneself
against external forces.”3 In asserting oneself, an individual is demonstrating the primacy of their
power through action. The instrumentalization of power is the mobilization of punishment and
rewards for oneself and others. Identifying alternatives to punishment and reward that influences
the behavior of others to form the basis for authoritarian power. Power can be modified to the
situation increasing and decreasing the freedoms of individuals directly and indirectly within the
constraints of societal structures.
Part I examines the forms of enforcement starting with violence, the role of threats, and
exploring the need for authority. Chapter two focuses on violence as a means of the enforcement
of power through the infliction of harm. Those that exert violence are subjecting others to a
consequence that is outside of their control. The vulnerability to violence, the anxiety, and fear
that accompany it, is not something that can be ignored and is ever present in an individual’s
consciousness. The ultimate manifestation of violence is killing which according to Popitz shows
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that “all violence has its own termination.”4 In chapter three, Popitz provides a detailed analysis
of instrumental power, threating and being threatened. Actions of individuals can be guided by
the generation of fear through threats of the infliction of harm, whether it be physical, economic,
or emotional. Being the subject of a threat or threatening behavior shapes the consciousness
with which an individual determines how to react to a given situation in the presence of what is
perceived as an authority figure. Building on the connection between fear and authority, Chapters
four and five explore the nature of societal and individual bonds to authority. Authoritative power
grows from the relationship between those who can achieve recognition, shape the perspectives,
and whose acknowledgment provides the sense of self to others.5 Popitz argues, “authority is a
form of superiority that, when it becomes reciprocal, can be converted into a relationship of a
particular nature,” in which the approval of the authority figure becomes the motivating factor
for individuals.6 In chapter six Popitz brings together the preceding chapters to demonstrate how
violence, threats, and authority can be employed to modify societal structures to produce actions.
Part II focuses on the process and institutionalization of the formations of power. Chapter 7
considers the question of “How does it happen that a few gain power over many?” in ways that are
obvious and expected.7 Using the examples of power formation on a ship, prisoner’s camp and in a
boarding school, Popitz demonstrates how the capacity for organization, exclusive power, and the
process by which orders are recognized provide legitimacy to those who seize power. In chapter
eight, he examines the institutionalization of power in the context of the factors of its formation.
Depersonalization, formalization, and integration increase as power becomes institutionalized
providing stability necessary for growth and legitimacy. As power becomes increasingly centralized
and routinized, its institutionalization becomes the norm within the societal structure.
Phenomena of Power lends itself for use by faculty, undergraduate and graduate students,
and others who have an interest in the relationship between how society understands, complies
with, challenges and institutionalizes power. For the layperson who has an interest and a general
understanding of the nature and dynamics of power, this work offers an accessible means to
develop further knowledge of the subject.
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In his 2012 article, “Critical Genocide Studies,” Alexander Laban Hinton wrote, “As the
outlines of the field [of genocide studies] emerge more clearly, the time is right to engage in critical
reflections about the state of the field, or what might be called critical genocide studies. The goal
is not to be critical in a negative sense but to consider, even as a canon becomes ensconced, what
is said and unsaid, who has voice and who is silenced, and how such questions may be linked to
issues of power and knowledge.”1
In his significant text, The Politics of Annihilation: A Genealogy of Genocide, Benjamin Meiches
answers this call with a novel approach to analyzing the ways in which ideas, concepts, and
understandings about what genocide is and how it is to be prevented have become entrenched
politically and intellectually. At the center of this analysis is what Meiches refers to throughout his
text as the hegemonic understanding of genocide. For Meiches the hegemonic understanding of
genocide is formed by the “dominant series of assumptions and practices” that exist as part of a
belief that “genocide is a self-evident concept…supported by strong presumptions about meaning,
language, and law.”2 Furthermore, the hegemonic understanding is not limited to a single definition
of the concept of genocide, but rather “a form of discursive practice within the politics of genocide,
which operates as if the concept of genocide may be defined by more or less objective criteria, has
stable political implications, and can be used to set up a static taxonomy or hierarchy for governing
mass atrocities.”3
Using what Michel Foucault describes as genealogy, Meiches set out to evaluate the process
by which the concept of genocide has become intelligible as such in the present. The Politics of
Annihilation is divided into two main parts, “The Concept and Its Power” and “The Politics of
Genocide.” In the first part, Meiches explores the different components of the concept of genocide—
including groups, mereology (or the part/whole distinction), destruction, and desire—as they have
developed, evolved, interacted, and become generally accepted. Meiches writes that it is through
the interactions of these components across time that “render the concept intelligible, meaningful,
and actionable in global politics.”4 As Meiches demonstrates in the four chapters that make up
the first part of his text, it is also through interactions with the four components of the concept
of genocide in politics and law that a hegemonic understanding of genocide has emerged, one
that synonymizes genocide with mass killing when perpetrated through direct physical violence
against ethno-religious groups.
As Meiches articulates, this is problematic because it is exclusionary; it places groups and
identities that do not conform to those protected outside the possibility of genocide, while also
restricting genocide to mean only one type of violence and its variants. Relatedly, it also produces a
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positive feedback loop in which the hegemonic understanding of genocide is constantly reproduced
and, therefore, perpetuated. As Meiches argues, by excluding some groups from the Genocide
Convention’s protection and reifying nationality, ethnicity, race, and religion as the substantial
categories of group life in global politics, the Genocide Convention “constitutes them as standards
for the expression of threatened identity. These standards generate powerful incentives for groups
to represent themselves (or be represented) within these terms.”5
In the second part of his book, Meiches’ connects the politics of genocide, the “multiplicity
of discourses, contestations, language games, ruminations, affective and rhetorical strategies,
maneuvers, and dissimulations surrounding the concept of genocide,” to genocide as politics, “a
mode of political practice or activity that employs a variety of forms of mass violence to target
and destroy groups.”6 In the final three chapters of The Politics of Annihilation, Meiches sets out
to evaluate the role of the hegemonic understanding of genocide in the creation of international
institutions, international law, and genocide scholarship, which themselves seek to “fix great
power politics, norms, institutions, or media sources to align the concept of genocide with the
expectations of the performative power declarations that genocide ought to possess.”7
Meiches successfully addresses the ways in which the hegemonic understanding of genocide
regulates what are viewed as credible and accurate invocations of genocide, which has a productive
effect on imagined responses to genocide. Conversely, as Meiches argues, by regulating when
genocide may be invoked, the hegemonic understanding “reifies political domination by excluding
a priori many claims regarding the intelligibility of destructive processes.” Furthermore, the
appearance of genocide serves as evidence of a need to reformulate the international system in a
manner that is more “attuned to the types of harms envisioned by the hegemonic understanding.”8
In other words, the hegemonic understanding of genocide, involving the mass killing of members
of a (legally) protected group, necessitates the emergence of new mechanisms of political control
to obstruct occurrences of genocide, including through engagement in armed conflict. As Meiches
notes, the reconceptualization of war as a method of humanitarianism “marks a significant break
from the prevailing definition of armed conflict by situating the actors, relations, and ethics in
new domains.”9 Perhaps worryingly, depending on the audience, this new form of humanitarian
governance, writes Meiches, dislocates localized efforts at genocide prevention while legitimizing
the development of new techniques of “humanitarian” violence.
The role of power relations in the development and maintenance of what Meiches refers to
as the hegemonic understanding of genocide recalls for me David Luban’s “Just War and Human
Rights.”10 Published in 1980, Luban argues that some states lose their legitimacy and, therefore,
their sovereignty, when they violate the rights of their citizens. Meanwhile, states that retain their
legitimacy hold the moral authority to decide when other states have lost their legitimacy and to
intervene on behalf of the persecuted population. Luban’s article contributes neatly to the hegemonic
understanding of genocide by excluding some forms of violence, those more likely to be associated
historically or presently with settler and imperial western states, while focusing his attention on
violence of the dictatorship as that which may be justly responded to with war by legitimate, i.e.
western, states. The hegemonic understanding sits as a foundation to a framework that attaches
genocide to a particular meaning, not exactly wholly static, but also not malleable in the way that
Lemkin intended. The possibility of genocide is limited to the hegemonic understanding and it
is from this understanding that the political possibility for prevention of genocide is generated.
The hegemonic understanding of genocide is then constantly reproduced and perpetuated by
participation of various actors in international institutions, legal forums, and elements of genocide
scholarship that were themselves created out of the hegemonic understanding of genocide.
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The value of Meiches’ research is extensive. It offers significant evidence in support of many
of the emerging critiques of the field of genocide studies. Like the dominance of Holocaust studies
before, the hegemonic understanding of genocide is stifling. It is a dictatorial and exclusionary
concept, as such it denies space for evolution, imagination, and possibility. In response to Meiches’
work, one might question whether there is anything wrong, per se, with a hegemonic concept of
genocide. After all, hegemonies do not materialize out of thin air and a hegemonic understanding
creates necessary boundaries that differentiate genocide on one side and something else, whether
crimes of war or crimes against humanity and other forms of persecution on the other. However,
as Meiches’ thoroughly delineates, the hegemonic understanding of genocide is problematic—a
consequence of the “politics of genocide.” It gives inalterable and supposedly objective meaning to
a concept that is fluid by nature and malleable by necessity.
Meiches also inspires reflective and introspective thinking. Genocide scholars ought to read
this book because it is not possible to do so without questioning our assumptions about the
meaning of genocide—what is included in one’s understanding and what is excluded—and what
this means in relation to the prevention of genocide—which cases warrant recognition and reaction.
Furthermore, Meiches’ book will motivate its readers to consider the ways in which we contribute
to the maintenance of a hegemonic understanding of genocide. Even those of us who seek to
challenge its hegemony may find that we inadvertently and unconsciously reinforce elements of
its dominance simply by approaching the subject of genocide through culturally embedded biases
that we are often aware of and, much to our vexation, have unintentionally internalized. In this
regard, Meiches has ably contributed to the field of (critical) genocide studies in ways that extend
beyond the singular uniqueness of his text. Indeed, it is fair to expect that The Politics of Annihilation
will inspire and inform the works of scholars yet to come.
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This collection of essays by academics and activists provides the first survey of truth and
reconciliation processes that have taken place in the region comprising Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and
Melanesia. Its primary aim is to document and share their experience of truth and reconciliation,
offering a framework that juxtaposes the different approaches based not only on geography
but also on the idea that human rights atrocities are driven by “clashing historical narratives.”1
Underlying this framework is the argument that truth-seeking processes can be leveraged to
resolve root causes of conflicts. Truth-seeking is not viewed from an institutional or legal lens.
Rather, truth-seeking and reconciliation are captured as an interactive and historical process that
gradually weaves unofficial narratives with official ones. Poetry and song feature prominently in
this text to demonstrate how this process can occur outside of formal, time-bound governmental
processes to address injustice.
The book asserts that truth-seeking processes hinge on civil society’s ability to disseminate
knowledge between institutions and the populace as well as between different countries and truth
commissions. As such, the volume connects the lessons learned in this region to efforts towards
truth and reconciliation with indigenous people in Canada, where the book was published. Many
of the authors participated directly in the truth-seeking processes they analyze, which highlights
these civil society dynamics.
The discussion is organized by nation and is further divided into sections on different conflicts.
It begins with essays on truth and reconciliation in Timor-Leste in response to the atrocities that
many have characterized as genocide.2 The study of Timor-Leste is followed by analysis of an
array of truth-seeking efforts in different parts of Indonesia that progress chronologically from
1965 as well as from national to local responses. The section on the Solomon Islands expands on
the topic of truth-seeking and reconciliation in conflicts characterized by ethnic tensions. The final
case study looks at the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The book devotes the greatest number of essays to Timor-Leste, which sets the foundations
for the rest of the book. The analysis of the truth commission final report dissemination process
is relevant for anyone with an interest in institutional legacies or historical memory of genocide.
Other key themes emerge in this section, including the role of the church in truth-seeking; linkages
between international economy, conflict and truth; and the secretive forms that narrative and
reconciliation can take even after the throes of conflict subside. These themes reach their most
eloquent expression in later sections of the book.
The ingenuity at play in the region is best described in the chapter by Lia Kent and Rizki Affiat
on Aceh’s Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. They analyze the benefits and limitations
of the world’s first permanent truth and reconciliation commission, which has no temporal limit
on its investigations. Their essay also traces how the Timor-Leste experience influenced truthseeking in Aceh, while capturing Aceh’s unique aspects. In this regard, their consideration of how
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the devastating tsunami in Aceh in 2004 influenced truth-seeking is significant, since it coincided
with post-conflict assistance. This essay illustrates how truth-seeking unfolds episodically due to
political, economic, cultural, and environmental factors.
The chapter devoted to the translated diary of an executed Indonesian political prisoner
(Gatot Lestario) in 1965 is an example of the powerful contrasts in the volume between official
and unofficial truths. Lestario’s testimony in print for a global audience is the book’s evidence of a
state’s inability to fully control truth-seeking, in either time or space.
The strengths of this book are its lyrical style and inter-disciplinary analysis. It is accessible to a
broad audience. However, for transitional justice practitioners or specialists, the lack of discussion
of holistic justice is striking.3 The book relies on responding to the South African model, and at
times employs the dated dichotomy of retributive and restorative justice.4 Because there is a siloed
concentration on truth commissions, tones of romanticism towards truth-telling occasionally
surface in the book.
This reverence for truth-telling is not necessarily misplaced. It helps lead to new and interesting
questions about how truth commissions can embrace indigenous forms of truth-telling and begin
to consider the environment as a victim/participant. It also challenges us as scholars to consider
methods of analysis that are less forensic and more empathetic.
Overall, this book fills a gap in scholarship. Previously these truth-seeking processes in the
region were usually studied in isolation. Now there is a credible reference for comparative analysis
and practice.
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Doppelgänger. I begin with a confession. The Justice Facade is Man or Monster?’s double.2
Companion volumes. They stand alone, but each haunts the other. Sabah Carrim and Timothy
Williams are ideal reviewers in this regard, each having written thoughtful reviews of Man or
Monster?, the first-born of these fraternal twins.3 Not surprisingly, their reviews directly and
indirectly point to the parentage, anthropology and critique manifest in critical genocide and
transitional justice studies form.4
Carrim and Williams are both political scientists who have done research on the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal. But Carrim (law, human rights, and creative writing) and Williams (transitional justice
and perpetrator studies) also have sub-disciplinary foci and areas of expertise that lead them to
highlight key themes of The Justice Facade and its relation to Man or Monster? in different ways.
Both, for example, note the emphasis on critique. Carrim does so in her first sentence
through literary allusion, quoting the novelist Louis Ferdinand Céline, who states “Everything
that’s important goes on in the darkness.” This quote indeed speaks to a key aim of both projects:
unpacking taken-for-granted assumptions and common-sense knowledge and looking at what has
thereby been occluded.
Man or Monster? takes up these issues in terms of the notions of articulation, redaction, the
redactic, dehiscence, thick frames of power, and the banality of everyday thought.5 The Justice
Facade, in turn, invokes these conceptual ideas but inflects them through the idea of the transitional
justice imaginary and related metaphor of the justice facade.
And indeed, returning to Carrim’s invocation of Céline, we might say that both projects argue
for the important of looking at “the darkness” masked by the facade of presumption and the
thick frames of power, ranging from the torture chamber to transitional justice. The Justice Facade
1

Professor Hinton’s rejoinder to the book reviews by Carrim and Willams should have been published in the same issue
as part of a book review forum in 13(2) of the journal. We apologize for the editorial delay and present his complete
rejoinder in this issue.
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delineates this transitional justice imaginary in detail, highlighting its key assumptions, aspects,
and obfuscations.
Williams likewise notes The Justice Facade’s focus on critique, locating the book within a larger
“critical turn” in human rights and transitional justice—and I would add peace and conflict studies
and critical genocide and prevention studies.6 He also notes the connection to power, an issue
explored in detail in both books through, for example, discussion of the “thick frames of power”
(Man or Monster?) and a “discursively-informed phenomenological transitional justice” and the
masking and obfuscating effects of the transitional justice imaginary and facade (The Justice Facade).
What, exactly, is being masked? This point is suggested from the start by each book’s cover
image. The cover of Man or Monster? highlights articulation and redaction with a defaced photo
of Duch, the commandant of S-21 prison, which is graffitied in Khmer and English vernaculars,
opaque to non-speakers, which diverge in critical ways.

Likewise, The Justice Facade’s cover features the not yet complete “modern” ECCC court, a
project under construction. The blue skies rise above, suggesting aspiration for a higher, even
utopian, purpose. Behind the court “facade” stands a hardly noticeable building featuring
“traditional” Khmer architectural style hinting at something “local” that is obscured. Likewise, a
line of Buddhist “nuns,” dressed in white, stand in front of the court, also barely distinguishable
yet also suggestive in this regard.
Here we segue to the second background strand of the companion volumes’ parentage,
anthropology. Again, Carrim and Williams discuss this issue in different ways. Williams points to
my anthropological approach directly, while also noting in passing that The Justice Facade argues for
a discursively-informed phenomenological approach to transitional justice. This phenomenological
approach is one area that perhaps could have been taken up in more detail by these two fine
reviews and one that inflects more broadly.
And indeed, The Justice Facade directly critiques of universalizing approaches that often
dominate not just transitional justice but human rights, development studies, genocide studies,
peace and conflict studies, and a range of related and normatively tinged disciplines. As Williams
notes, the direct critique of Sikkink’s notion of “the justice cascade” is one way the book does this.
But The Justice Facade does so in other ways large and small, building up a broad case that the
transitional justice imaginary obfuscates and misdirects us in many ways, not just in obscuring the
centrality of Buddhism to how many Cambodians experience and understand transitional justice
but also how power and interests are involved and influence the court. Carrim and Williams touch
on temporality -- ranging from teleological assumptions to the jurisdiction of the court, which
delimits and narrows “the truth” – as an illustration of this point.
Both reviewers also highlight other ways in which The Justice Facade (with many of echoes of
Man or Monster? starting with its graffitied cover) offers not just a critique of transitional justice but
6
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an argument for and illustration of how transitional justice and international law could benefit from
being anthropologically and ethnographically informed and more experience-near. Otherwise,
transitional justice risks remaining suspended in the transitional justice imaginary, a point made at
the onset in the The Justice Facade’s framing preface.
A phenomenological approach, The Justice Facade argues, offers much in this regard. On the
one hand, it provides a theoretical and conceptual means of escaping lingering transitional justice
dilemmas such as essentialism, the local-global binary, and “thin” models of “localization.” To step
behind the transitional justice facade, Carrim and Williams both note, we must take account of the
intertwined discourses and enactments of transitional justice in contexts ranging from the court
itself to rural villages where the mediating influence of Buddhism is extremely important.
Both reviewers point out that the volume raises important issues regarding this process of
vernacularization.7 And indeed, the title I almost chose for this book is “Justice in Translation.” It is
only through an understanding of everyday experience, understandings, and practice, The Justice
Facade contends, that we can begin to answer the question with which the book begins: “What is
the point of holding international tribunals in places like Cambodia.”
To close, I want to raise one last issue: writing. The Justice Facade and especially Man or Monster?
seek to offer both critique and insight through literary strategies—an issue I have discussed in
detail in a 2018 Journal of Genocide Research book forum review on Man or Monster?.8
This use of literary strategies is most evident in The Justice Facade‘s Preface, which immediately
foregrounds the transitional justice imaginary through a story. The book later uses life-history,
narrative structure, and person-centered accounts that decenter the explanatory and directive
prose that often dominates our discipline. Indeed, both The Justice Facade and Man or Monster?
use literary strategies to subvert the teleology that often seeps into our hyper-directed exposition.
Carrim, who is also a novelist, is keenly aware of such strategies.
So perhaps it is appropriate to conclude with thanks to Carrim and Williams for their thoughtful
review essays and the ways they point out how The Justice Facade, in indirect conversation with its
Man or Monster? doppelgänger, explores what is lost “in the darkness.” This endeavor, as Carrim
highlights, is at the heart of both books and, I would add, a critical genocide (and transitional
justice) studies.
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Das radikal Böse (Radical Evil)
Director: Stefan Ruzowitzky
Germany/Austria, 2013
Reviewed by Raya Morag
The Hebrew University
Radical Evil,1 Stefan Ruzowitzky’s documentary film, begins with a motto by Holocaust survivor
and author Primo Levi: “Monsters exist, but they are too few in number to be truly dangerous.
More dangerous are the common men, the functionaries ready to believe and to act without asking
questions.”2 This motto portends the film’s unique representation of the major enigma of the
twentieth century, that of the ordinary man who becomes a monstrous perpetrator.
Ruzowitzky, the director (and scriptwriter), a member of the third generation (his grandfather
was a Nazi), uses three audial sources to reflect on the enigma of the ordinary man, which is the
subject of his film: original quotes taken from the diaries and letters of the Nazi death squads,
the Einsatzgruppen, who shot some two million Jewish civilians in Eastern Europe during World
War II; (excerpts from) Head of the SS Heinrich Himmler’s Posen speech from early October
1943, given in Nazi-occupied Poland before officials of the Nazi party;3 and interviews with
psychiatrists; historians; genocide experts; and ninety-three-year-old Benjamin Ferencz, one of the
chief prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials.
The Einsatzgruppen quotes are read by well-known German actors (such as Devid Striesow
(The Counterfeiters, and Downfall4), Alexander Fehling (Inglorious Basterds and Labyrinth of Lies5), and
Volker Bruch (The Baader Meinhof Complex and The Reader6), whose voices are familiar to German,
Austrian, as well as global spectators. In contrast, non-familiar actors reenact the death squads’ lives
and deadly acts: watching Nazi propaganda films, vomiting after the first massacre, shaving before
the next day of executions begins, and taking pictures together. Their anonymity, symbolizing the
faceless Nazi masses, stands in contrast to the familiar voices of the actors who speak “in their
place.” I suggest that the perpetrator’s voice, attached to and based on the enigma, and in contrast
to the victim’s, is “replaceable” because it symbolizes the non-integrity of the voice’s owner, his
denial. Immersed in denial, the perpetrator’s disembodied, replaceable voice is not the expression
of the speaker’s inner essence, a guarantee of the Truth. Thus, it signifies an immanent split between
truth and its utterance, the voice being the (failed) mediator. The “exchanged” voice becomes that
which radically undermines the possibility of self-expression and self-presence, insofar as it reveals
the rupture at the core of the perpetrator’ subjectivity. The actors’ voices invest the quotes from
the diaries and letters with a dramatization that makes them alive but, due to the self-reflexive
irony of their immediate identification as cinematic celebs, paradoxically also keep the horror at a
distance. Most importantly, I suggest that it is this uncanny combination of the familiar sound with
1
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the unfamiliar image, the gap between body and voice, deed and reflection, that calls for the
spectators’ recognition.
The second audial source, the unmistakable recorded voice of Himmler, is intertwined
within the Einsatzgruppen accounts and thus assists in enhancing the sensation of authenticity.
The third audial source, interviews with renowned researchers (such as the Harvard psychiatrist
Robert J. Lifton, the author Christopher R. Browning, and the priest Patrick Desbois7) who
attest to the major insights achieved in research during the last seventy-three years, have an
accumulating effect. Thus, when the film represents the results of prominent psychological
experiments (of Solomon Asch, Stanley Milgram, and Philip Zimbardo) directed at the topic,
the camera is located above the experiments, which are presented through minimal graphic
means. Providing a high angle gaze, the camera once again raises the question of proximity
and distance from Evil and from past events. Ruzowitzky uses a split screen such that a line of
boots is juxtaposed with a close-up on the face of one of the soldiers, thus raising both Holocaust
iconography and reflexively reflecting on it, while calling for the spectators’ awareness of the
pervasiveness of these images. Benjamin Ferencz closes this complex discussion by emphasizing
that out of the 3,000 soldiers of the death squads, only twenty-four were put on trial (due to
lack of seats at court). Fourteen of them were sentenced to death, but the verdict was carried
out in only four cases. All the others served various periods in prison and were released in
1958. According to Ferencz, the court failed in this mission.
In its unique cinematic language, I suggest, Radical Evil adheres to Dominick LaCapra’s
suggestion that there is a
tendency to restrict explanations to two broad, binaristically opposed options: (1) the
role of industrialized mass murder, bureaucracy, the machinery of destruction, “desk
murder,” the banality of evil, and the behavior of ordinary men in extraordinary
circumstances and (2) the role of perpetrators as anti-Semitic, cruel, sadistic, gleeful
monsters. Moreover, the second option may be criticized solely predominantly in terms
of the first.8

This is done by juxtaposing these options mainly through the various uses of sound. In this,
though the film does not include a victim’s testimony and thus its presentation of the Holocaust
trauma is indirect and non-emotional, its multi-layered presentation of the perpetrator’s figure
and symbolic and real voice demands the spectators’ ethical response to the immanent tensions
and paradoxes embodied in this enigma. The overall interpretation that arises from the film’s
connection between the perpetrators’ audial accounts and the outcomes of the experiments
marks the major achievement of this film. When members of the third generation in Germany
read the accounts of the Einsatzgruppen they undoubtedly position themselves in their place,
symbolically embodying their voice. However, Ruzowitzky’s cinematic language addresses
global spectators as well, constantly reminded them that as the catastrophic events that have
taken place during the first two decades of the twenty-first century prove, this irresolvable
enigma should still haunt each and every one of us.
Title of the Film: Das radikal Böse (Radical Evil); Director: Stefan Ruzowitzky; Producers: Kurt
Otterbacher, Wolfgang Richter; Screenplay: Stefan Ruzowitzky; Cinematography: Benedict
Neuenfels; Film Editor: Barbara Gies; Sound Designer: Tatjana Jakob; Cast: Devid Striesow,
Alexander Fehling, Volker Bruch; Countries: Germany/Austria; Language: German; Year of
Production: 2013; Production Company: W-Film; Duration: 96 minutes.
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Adolf Eichmann’s capture is undoubtedly one of the most famous criminal captures of history.
A high-ranking, bureaucratic Nazi who engineered the Final Solution, Eichmann fled to Argentina
after the end of World War II. Argentina became a haven for Nazi war criminals, protected by a
right-wing government. Attempts by Germany to extradite from Argentina Dr Josef Mengele, who
had conducted medical experiments on camp prisoners, were unsuccessful.
In 1958, Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad, received a tip that Eichmann was living in
Argentina. It was not until 1960 that Mossad acted on this and conducted an operation to capture
Eichmann and bring him back to Israel to stand trial for his Holocaust crimes. Operation Finale
[Chris Weitz, 2018] deals not with the life and crimes of Eichmann, or his life in Argentina,1 but the
Mossad operation to capture him. Starring a high level cast including Oscar Isaac as Mossad agent
Peter Malkin and Ben Kingsley as Eichmann, the film is splendidly acted by all cast, including a
serious role for the traditionally comic actor Nick Kroll. Isaac in particular delivers, capturing the
internal struggle of a man who lost his sister and her children in the Holocaust but who has to
come face to face with the architect of his family’s death and try to extract information — and a
signature — from him.
The film starts with the tip received by Mossad from a Holocaust survivor living in Argentina.
Lothar Hermann’s daughter Silvia was dating a German boy, Klaus, who lived with his ‘uncle’,
Ricardo Klement. But Hermann recognises Klement as Eichmann, and reports this to Mossad. What
follows is the most gripping part of the film: the operation to confirm Eichmann’s identity and
capture him. It is enthralling because the Mossad team has to identify Eichmann without tipping
him off and risking him fleeing. Eichmann is identified by photos taken by one of the agents from
a bag, from which the agency compares photos and determines that his ears are the same. The
operation then turns to the capture. Eichmann is a man of habit and timeliness, taking the bus to
and from work every day at the same time. He is ultimately captured by the team as he walks from
the bus stop to his house, put into a car, drugged and taken to a safe house.
After the capture, the movie slows significantly, dragging out the 10 days during which the
team had to hold Eichmann in a safe house before they could remove him from Argentina. In this
time, the Israeli government requires a signature from Eichmann demonstrating his agreement to
go to Israel and stand trial. While some agents try intimidation tactics, Malkin tries the far more
effective technique of creating rapport with the prisoner, eventually securing Eichmann’s signature.
It is this technique that creates conflict for Malkin, having ‘ordinary’ conversations with the man
who engineered his family’s death.
In the film, during this time, Klaus is collaborating with Argentinean police to hunt the
Mossad team, a scenario which seems highly unrealistic (that a teenage boy would head up his
own police hunt squad?) — and in fact, this did not happen. In the film, the team are almost caught,
all deserting the safe house at the last minute, barely evading Klaus’ hunting squad. The agents,
with Eichmann, then head to the airport. Eichmann had to be snuck out of Argentina, so this is
done with Eichmann in the guise of an El Al pilot, flying a plane of Israeli diplomats back to Israel
after visiting Argentina for its 150th Independence Day celebrations. Almost all the team boards
1
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the plane, and they are ready to go, but the plane’s departure is delayed at the last minute,
risking Eichmann being reclaimed by Klaus and his police squad. Malkin has to run back to the
airport to file papers that had been removed by a Nazi, and at the very last minute, the plane
takes off with Eichmann on board.
The film closes with the trial of Eichmann, with the agents played by Isaac, Kroll and
Mélanie Laurent all present. We learn that Eichmann was executed in 1962, and that Malkin
kept quiet about his role in the operation until his mother’s death, when he told her that he had
avenged his sister and captured Eichmann.
Overall, the film is very close to the reality of the operation. The few cinematic licences
taken are that there was no love interest between Malkin and Laurent’s doctor character, who
was in reality a male doctor; there was no hunting squad of police with Klaus Eichmann; and
there was no last-minute hold up of the plane taking off — it took off without a hitch, heading
to Israel. Interestingly, it is the created scenes which are the least gripping and do feel like
they do not fit; for example, the love story between Malkin and Laurent’s agent/doctor are
unnecessary and add nothing to the story.
Apart from that, the details are accurate, down to the fact that Malkin wore gloves when
capturing Eichmann because he didn’t want to touch Eichmann. Scenes were filmed in the
original locations in Argentina (e.g. the actual cinema where Silvia met Klaus). In this regard,
it is an excellent film to use in an educational context, being largely true to the facts and
context of the operation. It also weaves in the psychological challenges for even highly trained
intelligence agents when dealing with génocidaires: the internal struggle and temptation to
simply execute the prisoner out of revenge for the deaths of their families and the 6 million
Jews, rather than return him to face trial. We see Malkin struggling, picturing Eichmann’s
direct involvement in his sister Fruma’s death. The temptation is real and at times a too-easy
option, but ultimately the team supports each other and ensures that they do not stoop to the
Nazis’ level, but rather, apply rule of law and return Eichmann to face trial for his crimes. In
his book about the operation, Malkin speaks of them as “professionals” who “realized the best
revenge was getting him [to Israel]… that the point of this thing wasn’t just an eye for an eye
but justice.”2
It is a shame that the film did not touch more upon the aspect of the trial that dealt
specifically with Eichmann’s capture. While Eichmann’s trial is of course notable for being the
(domestic) trial of a high-ranking Nazi who contributed substantially to the Holocaust,3 in the
legal world it is also renowned for its significant contribution to jurisprudence on jurisdiction.
There were two issues of jurisdiction in the case: one, universal jurisdiction (prosecuting
someone for crimes committed in a different country); and two, whether it is legal to exercise
jurisdiction over someone who was kidnapped from another country. This second head of
jurisdiction is obviously highly relevant to the film’s subject matter, as it raises the question of
the legality of the very operation that is the focus of the film. Eichmann’s defense contended
that Israel had violated international law by kidnapping Eichmann. The issue was even
addressed by the United Nations Security Council, which deftly sidestepped the controversy
by declaring it an issue between Israel and Argentina, requesting Israel to make reparations
to Argentina, and encouraging friendly relations between the two countries.4 Ultimately, the
Israeli court was never going to allow Eichmann a loophole through which to escape trial and
punishment, and so it was decided that, regardless of how a defendant was obtained, once
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he was in custody, he could be tried.5 Malkin does not touch of this in his book, but it can only be
imagined that the appeal against jurisdiction based on their own actions would have affected the
Mossad team members; another psychological battle for those involved, which would have been
interesting to see portrayed on screen.
Operational Finale is available on Netflix, opening access to the story of Eichmann’s capture to
a substantial audience worldwide. Netflix is available worldwide (except China, North Korea and
Syria),6 and Netflix specifically promoted this film; thus the distribution of Operation Finale as a
form of Holocaust education is very effective, particularly given that it stars the popular and very
prominent Star Wars7 actor, Oscar Isaac. In this regard, along with Schindler’s List [Steven Spielberg,
1993], based on audience reach, this is surely one of the most impactful Holocaust films. While it
may not tell the story of the Holocaust itself, the capture of Eichmann (and other war criminals and
génocidaires) is part of the broader process of genocide, a significant element of survivors’ recovery
through seeing justice done to the perpetrators of a genocide in which they lost family, community
and a significant part of their group, however that may be defined. Thus, bringing to film the
stories of the people who bring perpetrators of atrocities to justice is vital. It is also inspirational,
likely influencing the next generation to be part of the intelligence and justice mechanisms that
contribute to punishment of perpetrators and consequently deterrence of future atrocities.
Title of the Film: Operation Finale; Director: Chris Weitz; Producers: Oscar Isaac, Brian KavanaughJones, Fred Berger; Screenplay: Matthew Orton; Cinematography: Javier Aguirresarobe; Film
Editor: Pamela Martin; Sound Designer: Scott Hecker; Music: Alexandre Desplat; Cast: Oscar Isaac,
Ben Kingsley, Mélanie Laurent, Lior Raz; Country: United States; Languages: English/Spanish/
French/German; Year of Production: 2013; Production Company: MGM/Automatik; Duration: 122
minutes. Available on Netflix.
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The Trial of Ratko Mladić
Directors: Henry Singer, Rob Miller
United Kingdom, 2018
Reviewed by Iva Vukušić
Utrecht University
A myriad of films about conflicts and atrocities, war crimes and war crimes trials are made
each year. Some of them are feature films, and some are documentaries. One of those documentaries
is The Trial of Ratko Mladić, premiered in November 2018 at the International Documentary Film
Festival in Amsterdam. It is a thorough, accurate, multidimensional and nonmanipulative account
of one of the biggest war crimes trials in history. As such, it speaks to at least three audiences: those
interested in the former Yugoslavia, those interested in war crimes trials and judicial responses to
mass violence, and those interested in perpetrators and perpetration of mass violence.
Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb general who commanded the Bosnian Serb Army (Vojska
Republike Srpske, VRS) for the duration of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) was first indicted in 1995,
by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The
Hague.1 The ICTY was established in 1993 by the United Nations Security Council to hold those
most responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes accountable. It was an
international court, dependent on state cooperation to make arrests. When Mladić was indicted
in 1995, alongside Radovan Karadžić, the President of Republika Srpska, a statelet that was being
built through violence and expulsion, there was no political will to make the arrests. Mladić was
finally apprehended in 2011, in a small village in a northern province in Serbia, in bad health,
hiding with relatives. In December 2017, the ICTY closed, just weeks after pronouncing Mladić
guilty and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The case is currently on appeal and scheduled to
be completed in 2020.2
Mladić was charged for a large set of incidents relating to: 1.) the violent campaign Bosnian
Serb forces engaged in in the spring and summer 1992, resulting in the death, torture, rape and
expulsion of thousands of non-Serbs from large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2.) siege of
Sarajevo, 3.) genocide after the fall of Srebrenica, and 4.) the hostage-taking of UN blue helmets.3
It was a huge case, years and years in the making, as prosecutors painstakingly worked on lowerlevel perpetrators, civilian, military, and paramilitary. The ICTY indicted 161 individuals and
convicted 89. A number were army officers. For example, the Popović et al., and Tolimir cases
dealt with Mladić’s subordinates during and after the fall of Srebrenica. Those cases helped lay the
groundwork for the Mladić trial, both in terms of practice i.e. how to conduct and manage a large
case, and in terms of content - the evidence - what is that essential proof that needs to be presented
by the prosecution to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt.
This documentary focused on the genocide component of the case, which is understandable
given the size of the trial. It would have been very difficult to tell the story of the entire trial in any
meaningful way in 90 minutes or so, because the court heard almost 600 witnesses, accepted tens of
thousands of pages of documents into evidence and produced a record so large that it would take
one individual several years to study it thoroughly. Therefore, the majority of the documentary
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deals with Srebrenica, the only set of incidents the ICTY entered convictions for genocide,4
and Prijedor. The latter is likely less familiar to readers, even though for those who study
the former Yugoslavia, it is well known as a town in north-western Bosnia where the violent
campaign to take over municipalities in early 1992 led to mass victimization, detention in
camps such as Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm, and led to drastic demographic changes and
the virtual disappearance of non-Serb communities. As in the Karadžić case,5 the prosecutor
has attempted to prove that events in Prijedor and a set of other municipalities in 1992 were so
drastic, so violent and so systematic that they have reached the threshold where they should
be considered genocide. The trial judges ruled, in both Karadžić and Mladić that they were not
convinced that threshold has been reached. Mladić was however convicted for extermination,
persecution, murder, and forcible transfer of non-Serbs from that area. Both cases are currently
on appeal.6
This documentary is a product of a long-lasting dedication, study and a clear-headed
approach. Often enough, documentarians take on, out of the noblest motives, complex trials
to depict without dedicating enough time to understand how trials work. Sometimes they get
carried away and depict how atrocities take place in black-and-white simplistic narratives and
make perpetrators almost cartoonish caricatures, evil to the point where the audience has an
easy job, to sit back and judge. This is not the case here. The film draws heavily upon the work
of individuals with expertise and does not make mistakes that may pass by unnoticed by most,
but that would irritate those that spend their lives observing these trials. This documentary is
serious, does not take cheap shots to make grandiose moral points, and is balanced: listening to
both prosecutors and defense counsel, survivors and Mladić’s family members. Importantly,
at the premiere in Amsterdam, in the Q and A, members of the prosecution and defense were
there, and showed support for the film.
What we know about the details of these atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, we know
largely because of trials. Millions of documents, almost five thousand witnesses, years of court
proceedings enabled us to have the biggest, most thorough collection of material about the war
in the former Yugoslavia in the ICTY archives.7 Amazingly, the ICTY is the only war crimes
court that provides extensive access to its evidence material.8 Of course, not everything is
accessible, as some documentation and testimony remains confidential, but much is available,
to everyone and for free. Those sources can be used for what Diane Orentlicher called
“shrinking the space for denial.”9 In the recent years, the interaction of history and war crimes
trials has been investigated even more,10 and historians can benefit greatly from using these
records. Historians have been central to ICTY cases, and one of them, Robert Donia, wrote a
thorough political biography of Radovan Karadžić, based on Donia’s expert testimony in over
a dozen trials.11 At times, ICTY evidence had a deep impact, challenging long-held views about
what really happened, such as in the case of the so-called Scorpions video.12
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The archival material the documentary uses, in combination with contemporary interviews, is
an example of excellent use of evidence material. For example, images of Mladić in the aftermath
of the fall of Srebrenica show an arrogant man clearly enjoying his victory. It is this kind of footage,
which is juxtaposed to courtroom proceedings, and interviews with participants in the process:
prosecutors and defense attorneys, Mladić’s son, survivors whose families were wiped out. That
is peppered with images of Mladić in the seventies, enjoying family holidays. One of the strongest
points of the documentary was in how it treated one iconic image from the aftermath of the fall of
Srebrenica. That is footage some readers may remember, of Ramo Osmanović, a man filmed on a
meadow after capture as he was fleeing Srebrenica, calling loudly to his son and other Muslims to
turn themselves in to Serb forces, telling them they will be fine. Ramo is etched in our memory as
only that – a man on a meadow calling for others to surrender, thinking that is their best hope for
survival. In fact, it wasn’t. Ramo and his son Nermin were murdered and exhumed years later, in
2009, from two different mass graves: Nermin’s remains were found in Snagovo close to Zvornik,
and Ramo’s in Zeleni Jadar, in the vicinity of Srebrenica. Both are now buried in Potočari memorial
graveyard, across the road from where the UN was based in the protected area of Srebrenica.
In this documentary, what is shown through interviews with his wife who survived the war,
and who testified at the ICTY, are two pictures: Pictures of Ramo and Nermin before the war. In
that moment, the documentary reminds the viewer that even iconic images have backstories, and
Ramo and Nermin had lives before that footage, lives that were cut short through the violence the
trial tries to address. After seeing this film, the image of Ramo in our minds does not need to be
only of a scared man on a meadow, who will soon be killed. We see Ramo in another light, and that
is important. Ramo was a victim, but he was also much more than that.
What this film shows, albeit only subtly, is the extraordinary work so many people have done
in order to conduct these investigations and hold these trials. Although he is in the film just for
a moment, on a photograph, pictured standing next to a mass grave, it is worth mentioning the
French investigator Jean-Rene Ruez who was in Tuzla just weeks after Srebrenica fell, looking for
clues as to where the missing people were. He was the lead Srebrenica investigator for six years,
seizing documents, interviewing perpetrators, survivors and family members, and searching
for mass graves.13 Who we do see is Eldar Jahić, an investigator with the Prosecutor’s office in
Sarajevo14, who spent months on the exhumation of the Tomašica mass grave close to Prijedor.
Tomašica is one of the biggest mass graves in Bosnia, and Jahić spent months at the site, alongside
colleagues, knee-deep in mud, rain or shine, coordinating the work of getting those decomposing
bodies, hundreds of them, out of the ground, to get them cleaned, identified, and properly buried.
Peter McCloskey, an American prosecutor, spent a decade prosecuting Srebrenica cases, one after
another. McCloskey and his team were able to reconstruct what various actors did in the process
of mass executions after the fall of Srebrenica, hour per hour. What these investigators, prosecutors
and analysts did to prosecute and punish perpetrators and recover remains, is astounding, and
was anything but easy. What we know about Srebrenica and other crimes, and we know a lot, is
due to their work.
Finally, for those interested in the former Yugoslavia, there are several recent, or reasonably
recent films, both documentaries and feature films, that touch upon some of the topics discussed
in this review. First, one documentary and one feature film by the same author, Ognjen Glavonić,
a young Serbian director. Depth Two is a documentary from a few years back, and it is notable for
two reasons: it is very well researched and accurate, and it is both beautiful and poetic. The film
Prevention 12, no. 2 (2018), 35-53 accessed December 13, 2018, doi: 10.5038/1911-9933.12.2.1527; Ivan Zverzhanovski,
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ed. Dubravka Žarkov and Marlies Glasius (New York: Springer, 2014), 89-110.
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deals with the operation to hide bodies of Kosovar Albanians killed by Serbian forces during the
Kosovo war in 1998, and 1999. Glavonić’s award-winning feature film, from 2018, The Load is an
expansion on the topic of moving dead bodies in order to conceal the crime. The film is accurate,
beautiful and moving. One feature film exploring the aftermath of violence from the perspective
of the perpetrator and his family is Mirjana Karanović’s A Good Wife. Karanović masterfully
describes just how difficult it is to come to terms with the past in a society that does not want to
do that. Finally, the feature Men don’t cry, based on real-life attempts by civil society groups to try
to help war veterans in Bosnia and Herzegovina live with their trauma. All these are exceptional
contributions that bring nuance and humanity to thinking about the war in the former Yugoslavia.
War is one of the most extreme experiences any person or any country can go through. These films,
along with the documentary The Trial of Ratko Mladić successfully uncover this universal struggle,
pain and difficulty of dealing with a violent past. Thus, for anyone interested in these processes,
this is clearly a must-watch.
Title of the Film: The Trial of Ratko Mladic; Directors: Robert Miller, Henry Singer; Producers:
Ida Bruusgaard, Jovo Martinovic; Cinematography: Richard Gillespie; Film Editor: Anna Price;
Music: Anne Nikitin; Country: United Kingdom; Languages: English, Bosnian, Croatian; Year of
Production: 2018; Production Company: Sandpaper Films; Duration: 99 minutes.
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